

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Winter 1983–84

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Martin Staniland — Africa, the American Intelligentsia, and the Shadow of Vietnam

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David Stephens — President Carter, the Congress, and NEA

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In accordance with the bylaws, the annual corporate meeting of the Academy of Political Science will be held on Monday, January 23, 1984, at 3:00 P.M. in the Academy's conference room at 2852 Broadway, New York, New York, for the purpose of electing directors, presentation of the executive director's annual report, and the transaction of such other business as shall come before the meeting.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

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From the Editor:

In this issue. . .

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST takes a fresh look at trends in the American party system. He reaches the same conclusion that he set out in a *PSQ* article ten years ago—that the structure of competition between the Democratic and Republican parties established in the New Deal era is headed neither for disintegration nor realignment, but, more likely, for reinvigoration.

MARTIN STANILAND examines the effects of the Vietnam War upon American attitudes toward crises in Africa. He argues that Vietnam created a belief in the inevitability of guerrilla victories everywhere and that there is a need to be more sensitive to the impact of analogies on debate about foreign policy.

PAUL LIGHT analyzes the influence of two recent American vice-presidents, Nelson Rockefeller and Walter Mondale. Light concludes that the influence of a vice-president rests on a combination of internal White House resources, opportunities for lobbying and persuasion, and strategies for maximizing those resources and opportunities.

DAVID STEPHENS argues that the cost to President Carter of political support from the National Education Association was the commitment of excessive resources to a relatively unimportant goal, the creation of a Department of Education.

SALLY H. GRAHAM offers a new interpretation of Woodrow Wilson's role in the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, stressing the importance of militant suffrage agitation in Wilson's political calculations.

AARON WILDAVSKY wonders whether the hierarchical bias of "industrial policy" as reflected in Amitai Etzioni's *An Immodest Agenda* will find support in a society increasingly challenging the authority of those who would have to make that policy.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

ANNETTE KAR BAXTER, 1926–1983

It is with deep sorrow that I record the untimely death of *PSQ* Editorial Board Member Annette Kar Baxter, the Adolph S. and Effie Ochs Professor of History in Barnard College, Columbia University. Although Professor Baxter became a formal member of our Board only in the last two years, she had for almost a decade been generously providing wise editorial advice in her fields of expertise—American history and especially the history of women in America. Annette Baxter will be greatly missed in the world of careful and scholarly study of women and even more by those of us who had the good fortune of being her faculty colleagues and personal friends.

D. C.

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Whither the American Party System? — Revisited

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST

Exactly ten years ago, *Political Science Quarterly* published an article of mine that asked in its title, "Whither the American Party System?" and answered by challenging what appeared at that time to be the two most prevalent views of the future of American politics. One view held that the American party system was in, or was entering, a period of major realignment; the other that political parties were disintegrating, would continue to disintegrate, and might eventually even disappear.[1] These two interpretions advanced competing visions of the future, but they agreed on the present: the New Deal party system — that structure of political competition established in the 1930s between a liberal

[1] Illustrative of journalistic and scholarly literature advancing the realignment thesis, although often with reservations, were Roger D. Masters and Paul T. David, *The Reporter*, 7 November 1963, 23-26, and 5 December 1963, 8; Angus Campbell, "Interpreting the Presidential Victory," in Milton C. Cummings, Jr., ed., *The National Election of 1964* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1966), 281; "Plight of the U.S. 'Liberals' — Signs that an Era is Ending," *U.S. News and World Report*, 14 July 1969, 38; Samuel Lubell, *The Hidden Crisis in American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1970), 17; M. Stanton Evans, *The Future of Conservatism* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1969), xi-xii; Kevin P. Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969), 36-37, 22; and Joseph Alsop, *Washington Post*, 15 September 1972. Most influential among those who projected continued party disintegration was Walter Dean Burnham, in "The End of American Party Politics," *Trans-Action*, December 1969, 12-22, and in *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1970), especially ch. 5, "The Onward March of Party Decomposition." David S. Broder incorporated the thesis in the title of his book, *The Party's Over* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution. He is the author of *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress* (1981) and *Dynamics of the Party System*, first published in 1973 and revised in a just-published new edition, from which this article is adapted.

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Democratic party and a conservative Republican party, divided primarily on issues of the role of government and domestic economic policy—was becoming history. While I stopped short of a flat prediction (as did most of those holding the dominant views), I suggested that it seemed more likely that the New Deal system might be revived in something approaching its old vitality. I concluded:

> In the long run, the prospect may well be for a further gradual decomposition of the two-party system. But there is at least as much reason to believe that in the short run the headlong march toward decomposition that marked the late 1960s will be checked and reversed, that the New Deal party system will be reinvigorated, and that most of those who ceased identifying with one or the other major party in the recent turmoil will reidentify. The parties may not regain the degree of voter loyalty that was accorded them in the crisis days of the Great Depression. But the bonds between voter and party would be restored to something like the strength of the late 1950s and the early 1960s—before Goldwater, Vietnam, Watts and Hough, campus riots and draft card burning, and the Chicago Democratic convention of 1968.[2]

What do events of the succeeding decade indicate about the direction of the party system? Are the parties speeding toward disintegration? Is the New Deal system being superseded by a new alignment, a new structure of party competition? Or is that system moving toward a reinvigoration?

During this decade, as in the preceding one, there has been no dearth of predictions that a wholly new alignment was coming into being. Such forecasts poured forth particularly after the spectacular victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980 over a Democratic party that seemed no more than a faded remnant of the party of New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier, and Great Society days. "It is plainly the end of an era," proclaimed Theodore H. White, chronicler of the making of presidents, on the NBC television network on election night. David S. Broder, a most respected political columnist, used the same phrase next day: "It certainly had all the appearances of an era ending—and a new one beginning."[3] "The 1980 election marks the end of a traditional period in American politics," said pollster Peter D. Hart a few months later.[4]

Political scientists might less readily commit themselves, but they at least entertained this possibility. The editors of an early volume on the 1980 election, summarizing the views of their contributors, found "some evidence" that a political "realignment" had occurred, but in the end they hedged. "Time will tell," they concluded; the new era would depend on how well the Republicans succeeded in quelling the voters' discontent.[5] But looking back over a somewhat longer period and writing even before the 1980 election had occurred, Bruce A. Campbell expressed a wide consensus of political scientists in saying: "Those

[2] James L. Sundquist, "Whither the American Party System?" *Political Science Quarterly* 88 (1973): 581.

[3] *Washington Post*, 6 November 1980.

[4] *Washington Post*, 18 May 1981.

[5] Ellis Sandoz and Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., eds., *A Tide of Discontent: The 1980 Elections and Their Meaning* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), 194, 209.

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observing the American electorate over the past couple of decades just *know* that something important is going on."[6] It was all very reminiscent of the commentary after the 1964 Lyndon Johnson landslide, when the Republican party appeared to be in its death throes, and after Richard Nixon's two victories in 1968 and 1972, when the division and defeat of the Democratic party was seen by many as a historic turning point.

The main body of political science theory had for some time been encouraging predictions of realignment. V. O. Key, Jr., the doyen of party realignment analysts, had a quarter century earlier offered a theory of critical elections that had been refined and modified but that was, in its essentials, universally accepted.[7] Critical elections were a recurrent phenomenon of American politics, wrote Key, and they were the instruments of realignment, by which an old party system gave way to a new one. Reviewing history, scholars identified critical elections at fairly regular intervals, every thirty or forty years. The last was in 1932, or maybe 1936. So by the 1960s and 1970s, another was due, or even overdue. Could this election—be it 1964 or 1972 or 1980—be the one that all expected? Any self-respecting observer, whether journalist or political scientist, would not want to be caught looking the other way when the great event occurred.

The Calm of the 1970s

Until the Reagan campaign at the end of the decade, however, there was little evidence in the 1970s of strong realigning forces at work in the political system. The great issues that had thrown politics into turmoil during the preceding decade abated. The Vietnam War came to its graceless end, the campus riots burned themselves out, the urban ghettos were placid, the civil rights revolution entered its stable, plodding phase. What shifting of party allegiance these events produced—most notably, the soldification of the black vote in the Democratic column—was largely accomplished by the early 1970s. Watergate was a new distraction, for a time, but once it was resolved with the resignation of President Richard Nixon, the questions of economic policy that history indicates normally dominate American politics returned to their usual place. Double-digit inflation was the specific issue that aroused the country; in a Gallup Poll just before the 1974 election, 79 percent of the respondents named inflation as the country's "most important problem."

The trend lines that measure party strength reflected the general calm of the 1970s. The long process of convergence, by which the former one-party Republican states of the North and the former solid Democratic South aligned their political behavior with that of the nation as a whole, moved close to completion, as shown in Figure 1. But this was the cumulation, clearly, of forces long at work.

[6] Bruce A. Campbell, "Realignment, Party Decomposition, and Issue Voting," in Bruce A. Campbell and Richard J. Trilling, eds., *Realignment in American Politics: Toward a Theory* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 82.

[7] V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics* 17 (1955): 3–18.

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FIGURE 1

Convergence in Strength Among Three Groups of States as Measured by Gubernatorial and Congressional Vote, 1930–1980



Sources: Paul T. David, *Party Strength in the United States, 1872–1970* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), composite B index, and articles under the same title in *Journal of Politics* 30 (1974): 785–96; 37 (1975): 641–42; 38 (1976): 416–25; 40 (1978): 770–80; computations of 1978 and 1980 composite B data by Alec P. Lamis. The composite B index gives equal weight to the vote for governor, U.S. senator, and U.S. representative. These votes are a better measure of basic party strength than the vote for president, which is more subject to deviational influences.

a. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.

b. Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming.

c. California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin.

It represented the slow settling into place of the New Deal party system established in the 1930s. Realignments of national party systems are not necessarily reflected at once in every state and country. But by 1954, the Republican North had conformed generally to the national pattern, as liberal Republicans (or their generational successors) found their natural home in the Democratic party. It was only a matter of time until conservative southerners similarly found their way into Republican ranks. Figure 1 demonstrates that the massive, century-old southern deviation from the national norm had narrowed from as much as forty percentage points in the 1940s to fewer than five in the late 1970s.

In all three groups of states, the division of party strength was about the same at the end as at the beginning of the decade. A Democratic deviation in mid-decade is evident, no doubt attributable to Watergate, but that scandal—like scandals of the past—evidently did no lasting harm to the party that was

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FIGURE 2

Party Identification of the Electorate According to Two Public Opinion Surveys, 1952–1980



Sources: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies (CPS); American Institute of Public Opinion, Princeton, N.J. Data plotted biennially, excluding those who failed to respond to the question or who gave an answer classified as "apolitical," "don't know," or "other party."

a. Based on election survey taken in October or November, except in 1956, which averages two surveys in April and October; in 1962, which averages two in May and November; and in 1964, which averages three in January, May, and October.

b. Entries through 1970 based on the average of three surveys taken during calendar year, in 1972 the average of two polls, in 1974–78 the average of four or more, in 1980 and 1982 the average of twenty.

blamed. Much the same pattern appears in data on self-identification by parties of respondents to public opinion polls, shown in Figure 2, and in registration of voters by parties. After allowance is made for the Watergate deviation, the 1970s show little change in the proportions of voters calling themselves Democrats, Republicans, or independents. Registration figures, likewise, nowhere reflect anything approaching the monumental gains and losses in party affiliation that occurred during the major realignment of the 1930s. Even the Republican registration gains in the South developed relatively slowly in the 1970s, as the voters during the Watergate era swung back strongly, if only temporarily, to the Democrats.

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The New Right, Reaganism, and Realignment

The "end of an era" commentary after the 1980 election, however, seemed at first glance to have substantial basis. That campaign was extraordinary in many ways. It presented in the most vivid focus in many years the basic conflict over domestic economic issues that had been the rationale of the New Deal party system for nearly half a century. Ronald Reagan ran as the most ideological candidate since Barry Goldwater—and he was the most ideological winning candidate since Calvin Coolidge or, perhaps, since Grover Cleveland. Reagan set out not just to stem the growth of the welfare state, but to dismantle it. While Jimmy Carter, as Democrats go, was something of a centrist, the contrast between candidates and parties on the old New Deal-type questions was still a sharp one. Nevertheless, the campaign saw a range of additional issues that cut across the New Deal alignment and appeared powerful enough to possess a realignment potential. Those included the questions of social policy that had spurred the rise of the movement that came to be known as the New Right, and the debate between "hard-liners" and "soft-liners" on foreign and military policy in which the New Right had joined. If 1980 turns out to have been a critical election year, it would be the result of issues raised to prominance by the rightist crusade. The story of that movement and its association with Ronald Reagan, then, needs to be reviewed, and the prospects of a realignment from the Right evaluated.

The Rise of the New Right

As the Republican party was undergoing the shock caused by the Watergate scandal, followed by the resignation of both President Nixon and Vice-President Spiro Agnew, its public standing slid to the lowest point ever reached by either major party since the beginning of public opinion polling—and surely, indeed, since the formation of the parties themselves. Only 23 percent of the electorate, according to both the Center for Political Studies (CPS) and Gallup polls, were willing to identify themselves as Republicans. Yet this collapse occurred, anomalously, in a period when political conservatism as such enjoyed a substantially higher measure of popular support than did political liberalism.

From 1970 through 1976, the CPS surveys found almost twice as many conservatives as liberals when respondents were asked to rate their political views on a liberal-conservative scale. The Gallup Poll asked the question even more pointedly: if a realigned two-party system offered the voters a choice between a conservative party and a liberal party, which would they prefer? The answer, in 1974, favored the conservative party by 39 to 28, with 33 percent undecided.

The anomaly was not lost on conservative strategists and activists. And, as many saw it, the finger of blame pointed squarely at the Republican party. The Grand Old Party (GOP) had been the opponent of Democratic liberalism for half a century, yet now when liberalism had lost its popular appeal the Republicans were still unable to win and hold the allegiance of the country's apparent

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conservative majority. Clearly, something must have been dreadfully wrong with the Republican party.

To a group of young conservative activists, a new and aggressive strategy was called for, and they formed a network of organizations to pursue it—a network that they and the media came to call the New Right. It has been composed of groups spawned by the crosscutting of social and moral issues that arose in the 1960s—"right-to-life" organizations that sprang up after the Supreme Court's 1973 abortion decision, religious groups mobilized to protest the Court's decision barring organized prayer from public school classrooms, organizations formed to oppose gun control in any form, neighborhood groups opposed to busing for purposes of school integration, inheritors of the anti-civil rights forces of the 1960s who resented what was perceived as government favoritism toward minorities, and so on. Kevin P. Phillips, who is credited with popularizing the term "New Right" in 1974, saw the New Right as combining three "powerful patterns": it was a "partial heir" to the George Wallace movement, based on the white lower-middle classes of the South and West; it was closely allied with the anti-abortion movement; and it was the political expression of what may be a new great religious revival.[8] "The very essence of the New Right is a morally based conservatism," according to Paul Weyrich, one of its leading organizers, "our view is not based in economics but in a religious view."[9]

But Phillips's emphasis on the "populist" character of the movement and Weyrich's disavowal of an economic view illustrated the New Right's dilemma. Unless the moral, social, and religious issues became so dominant in politics that people chose their party predominantly on the basis of its position on those issues—in other words, unless the party system were realigned on a new line of cleavage defined by that complex of questions—the New Right would have to make common cause with other conservatives, in particular the economic conservatives who had given the Republican party its reason for being, its program, and its leadership. But a moral or religious populist-conservative is not necessarily an economic conservative. The Populist party of the nineteenth century was quite the opposite of conservative, and while the latter-day followers of George Wallace might resent the intrusion of the national government into race relations, they did not necessarily resent its farm price support programs, its assistance to small businesses and local community public works, or its social security and unemployment compensation expenditures.

Yet the marriage had to be made. That was how the "emerging Republican majority" would be created, Phillips had said in his 1969 book by that title. It would appear when the traditional Republicans succeeded in absorbing the George Wallace following. And bringing about the marriage was the goal of two books of New Right strategy published in 1975—one by William A. Rusher,

[8] Kevin P. Phillips, *Post-Conservative America: People, Politics and Ideology in a Time of Crisis* (New York: Random House, 1982), 47–49.

[9] Quoted in ibid., 48.

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publisher of the conservative *National Review*, the other by Patrick J. Buchanan, formerly of President Nixon's White House staff.[10] Both agreed that Nixon had failed to achieve the union of conservative forces and that (as of 1975) Gerald Ford was failing also.

Rusher gave up on the Republican party. It contained too many liberals, he complained. They could not dominate the party, but their "ineradicable presence" forced the GOP to compromise its conservative positions. He argued that this propensity to compromise "makes the Republican party, all else aside, so spectacularly unfitted to be the political vector of the conservative majority in the American society."[11] Buchanan's break with the Ford administration was no less complete, but before joining a third party crusade he sought "a more conclusive prognosis . . . that the Republican party is indeed sick unto death, no longer a seaworthy vessel of the new conservatism."[12]

The spectacular near-success of Ronald Reagan in his campaign in 1976 against an incumbent president of his own party, Gerald Ford, resolved that uncertainty. The Republic party appeared ready made to become the New Right's vehicle. The once-significant liberal or progressive wing, led by "eastern establishment" figures such as Governors Thomas Dewey and Nelson Rockefeller, had become a tattered remnant. The contest for control of the GOP after it left office in 1977 was thus between the conventional conservatives, who carried on the tradition of such leaders as Senator Robert Taft and President Ford, and the bloc who accepted the philosophy and strategy of the New Right.

Conservatism Triumphant

In the next two elections, the latter group was spectacularly successful. The Republicans who won—and especially those who scored upset victories over Democratic incumbents or who won in the traditionally Democratic states of the South and Southwest—were for the most part those who adopted the whole range of conservative positions, espousing not only the party's familiar themes of limited government, lower taxes, and less inflation but also the new social conservatism of anti-abortion, anti-busing, and prayer in schools, as well as a rising new nationalism of higher military expenditures and uncompromising confrontation with the Soviet Union. In 1980, not only did the Republicans nominate and elect the New Right's long-standing favorite candidate for president, Ronald Reagan, but they elected sixteen new Republican senators—twelve of them replacing Democrats, in the biggest turnover since 1958. At least eleven of the newcomers had campaigned as ultraconservatives on social, military, and foreign, as well as economic, policy.[13]

[10] William A. Rusher, *The Making of the New Majority Party* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1975). Patrick J. Buchanan, *Conservative Votes, Liberal Victories: Why the Right Has Failed* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1976).

[11] Rusher, *The Making of the New Majority Party*, xxii-xxiii.

[12] Buchanan, *Conservative Votes*, 175-77.

[13] However, the losing Democrats were not disproportionately from the party's liberal ranks.

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In short, the Phillips-Rusher-Buchanan strategy appeared to have been fully vindicated in the great Republican victories of 1980. Traditional Republicanism and George Wallace anti-liberalism had been successfully brought together. The GOP made impressive gains in those areas, both North and South, that had been marked as Wallace territory in 1968.[14] The self-identified conservative majority, it appeared, could indeed be mobilized, if candidates appealed to all the conservatives—those motivated by moral or military-foreign policy, as well as by economic issues. "The moral issue was what put us over the top . . . [and] carried us to victory," said Representative Newt Gingrich, a Georgia Republican, of the 1980 election.[15] Paul Weyrich estimated that Reagan's anti-abortion stand alone accounted for 3 percentage points in his 1980 vote.[16] That estimate might be high, but few politicians or political observers were likely to deny that the single-issue anti-abortion vote had been decisive in several congressional elections. In the 1980 senatorial election in New York, for example, Republican Alphonse D'Amato received 152,000 votes as the candidate of the Right to Life party, a single-issue anti-abortion group, that represented 2.4 percent of all votes cast in the election and exceeded D'Amato's total margin over his Democratic opponent.[17] Other single-issue groups, such as the fierce opponents of gun control, were well organized and powerful as well, and clergy of the New Right's evangelical wing were moving beyond social and religious conservatism to mobilize their following to support candidates embracing economic and foreign policy conservatism as well.

While the outcome of the 1980 presidential election was determined primarily by the popular dissatisfaction with Jimmy Carter's leadership,[18] Reagan's ideological conservatism did make its contribution, as indicated by an analysis of which Democrats and which independents gave Reagan their vote. Table 1 shows the variance in the proportions of Democrats and independents voting for Reagan, and of Republicans defecting from Reagan, among persons holding various issue positions and among persons of various population groups as represented in the CPS post-election survey. While many of the numbers in the sample are small, the pattern of Reagan's appeal is consistent and unmistakable.

Liberal, moderate, and conservative Democrats suffered about equally from being on the same ticket with Jimmy Carter. See Demetrios Caraley, "Do Congressional Liberals Really Need to Tremble? A Quick Look at Some Hard Data," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (1981): 27–30.

[14] Rhodes Cook, "Republicans Hoping for Realignment," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 39 (1981): 711–13.

[15] A. James Reichley, "A Change in Direction," in Joseph A. Peachman, ed., *Setting National Priorities: The 1982 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981) 255.

[16] Ibid., 257.

[17] Robert L. Spitzer, "The Right to Life Movement as a Third Party: The Policy Environment and Movement Politics" (paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, N.Y., 5 September 1981), 10.

[18] In the summer of 1979, only 34 percent of Democrats approved Carter's performance, according to the Gallup Poll—the lowest such rating since Gallup began using this measure in the 1930s—and his standing remained low through the election. Everett Carll Ladd, "The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Election," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (1981): 6–7.

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TABLE 1

Voter Support for Reagan in the 1980 Presidential Election by Issue Position and Population Group

Issue or population group	*Number responding*	*Percent of Democrats defecting to Reagan*	*Percent of Republicans defecting from Reagan*	*Percent of independents for Reagan*
Total sample	968	22	12	56
Civil rights				
Believe pushing too fast	344	34	10	70
Believe pushing about right	456	18	10	53
Believe pushing too slowly	123	10	33	31
Busing				
Oppose in all circumstances	556	29	11	63
Accept in some circumstances	366	15	13	43
Government help to minorities				
Disapprove	432	31	7	74
Approve	441	14	20	38
Equal rights amendment				
Disapprove	353	39	8	75
Approve	512	17	19	43
Abortion				
Oppose in all circumstances	103	26	10	73
Approve in some circumstances	476	22	8	62
Approve in all circumstances	355	20	19	46
School prayer				
Approve	591	20	10	66
Oppose	209	18	7	38
Government power				
Believe government too powerful	515	31	10	62
Believe government not getting too strong	156	19	21	33
Environment				
Favor relaxing regulations	292	31	10	69
Favor maintaining regulations	452	20	13	46
Defense spending				
Favor increase	637	28	3	65
Favor decrease or present level	243	14	7	41
Jobs and living standards				
Oppose government intervention	280	38	4	74
Accept limited intervention	323	24	18	49
Favor government intervention	242	15	24	41
Age				
18–39	411	21	11	51
40–59	306	25	13	61
60 and over	253	19	12	59
Religion				
Protestant	629	21	11	59
Catholic	218	28	14	55
Income				
Over $50,000	229	17	4	53
$25,000–$50,000	145	23	7	52
$15,000–25,000	347	21	3	63
Under $15,000	174	26	6	50

Source: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies.

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Democratic defectors and independent Reagan supporters were disproportionately those who held the strongest conservative views—those who thought the civil rights movement was pushing too fast, who opposed busing for integration under all circumstances, who thought minorities should look to themselves rather than to the government for help, who opposed the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, who would prohibit abortion under any circumstances, who favored the school prayer amendment, who would reduce the scale of government except for national defense, who would relax environmental regulations, and who held that unemployment and living standards were not a primary concern of government.

In contrast, Reagan's appeal to Democrats and independents showed no systematic variance among income, age, or religious groups. The class basis of politics established in the New Deal era was again attenuated—more than in 1976, but not as much as in 1972 or 1964—as voters were swayed by issues that had nothing, or very little, to do with class.[19] Indeed, the most striking figure in the income section of Table 1 is the falloff in the proportion of Democratic defectors to Reagan in the highest income bracket.

Can the Reagan Coalition be Solidified?

The question remained: Did the "Reagan revolution" of 1980 signal a major realignment of the party system? Would those legions of disgruntled Democrats who voted for him become Republicans?

During the early months of 1980, the most encouraging portent for the Republicans came from the voter registration figures. For the first time in many years, the GOP was gaining a substantial plurality of new voters. As shown in Table 2, out of a net gain of 4.1 million registered voters between 1978 and 1980 in twenty-five states and the District of Columbia that register by parties, the Republicans claimed 1.6 million, or 38 percent, outpulling the Democrats by 361,000. The Republicans' 38 percent of newly registering voters compared to 30 percent of the existing body of registered voters in 1978. The shift was more strikingly anti-Democratic than pro-Republican, for the Democrats' 29 percent of the new voters compared to the party's 57 percent share of those on the rolls at the beginning of the period. New voters rejecting both major parties amounted to a phenomenal proportion of 32 percent, compared to 13 percent of the 1978 electorate in those states.

As the year progressed, the Republican resurgence also began to appear in the public opinion polls. Through the campaign period, and the election and in-

[19] Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, *Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982), 105, show that the white working-class voters in the CPS sample gave 9 percentage points more support to the Democratic candidate than did middle-class voters. This compares to 17 points in 1976 but only 2 points in 1972. Class polarization reached its postwar peak in 1948, when the difference was 44 percentage points.

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TABLE 2

Change in Voter Registration Totals, by Parties, in Twenty-Five States and the District of Columbia, 1978–80 (in thousands)

State	Republican	Democratic	Other	Total
Alaska	6	1	11	19
Arizona	86	36	29	152
California	478	313	441	1,232
Colorado	67	−15	38	89
Connecticut	39	56	24	118
Delaware	7	9	6	22
District of Columbia	4	23	11	38
Florida	250	275	67	593
Iowa	−14	−21	−1	−36
Kentucky	45	98	12	155
Louisiana	70	69	55	194
Maine	−5	7	66	69
Maryland	47	94	36	177
Massachusetts	11	42	53	106
Nebraska	23	−6	7	23
Nevada	25	. . .	5	29
New Hampshire	33	23	−23	34
New Mexico	25	22	8	55
New York	61	106	336	503
North Carolina	110	211	24	345
Oklahoma	67	29	8	103
Oregon	53	−24	58	87
Pennsylvania	52	−152	57	−43
South Dakota	14	9	3	27
West Virginia	10	6	2	18
Wyoming	10	2	6	18
Total	1,574	1,213	1,339	4,127
Party's percent of net gain	38	29	32	. . .
Party's percent of 1978 registration	30	57	13	. . .

Sources: Republican National Committee, *Republican Almanac, 1979*, table 2; *1981*, table 2; supplemented by data obtained from state publications and from the Elections Research Center, Washington, D.C.

auguration, the GOP showed striking gains in its share of self-declared partisans in every national poll. And the trend continued into the spring of 1981, when the data had accumulated with enough force to produce a flurry of newspaper speculation about a Reagan realignment. The poll with the largest sample, the Gallup Poll, showed a Republican gain of 7 percentage points (from 21 to 28) between early 1980 and early 1981, comprising a 6 point loss by the Democrats (from 47 to 41) and a 1 point drop of self-declared independents (from 32 to 31).[20]

[20] *Gallup Report*, No. 195, December 1981, 33. The Gallup figures average the findings of surveys taken in January through March 1980 and late January through early May 1981, the latter combining six polls of about 1,500 each, for a total of 9,000 respondents.

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If early 1980 is taken as the base period, these Republican gains were indeed spectacular. For every three persons who claimed Republican identification at the beginning of the Reagan campaign year, four did so a year later. In a longer historical perspective, however, the gains were less impressive. The 21 percent of the electorate claimed by the GOP in early 1980 was a historic low point, a level so low as to cast into doubt the proposition that the United States had a two-party system at all. When the Republicans rebounded to 28 percent by 1981, they were still below the strength of the Dwight Eisenhower years and about the same as in the pre-Watergate Nixon period. The Democratic advantage over the Republicans in 1981 was still three-to-two, no less than in 1949, or 1960, or 1972. In fact, if 1972 is taken as the base period, there was no Republican gain at all—only a recovery from the long and abnormal depression in Republican fortunes precipitated by the Watergate scandal and the unprecedented resignation of the party's president and vice-president. One would expect the GOP to recoup its losses as soon as the Nixon-Agnew image was obliterated by new and appealing leadership. By putting a fresh face on the discredited party, Reagan succeeded in restoring it to its old plateau of popular support. But he did not lift it higher and, by the summer of 1982, Republican strength began to drift downward from the post-inauguration level.

The country's broadly based parties had always comprised disparate, discordant, even hostile elements, and had always lived in a world of internal compromise. Thus the Reagan coalition faced stresses that were neither unique nor unusually severe. Certainly, the coalition it hoped to supersede—the one assembled by Franklin Roosevelt in New Deal days—had enjoyed a long life despite the almost total incompatibility of some of its elements.

Perhaps as much instinctively as consciously, earlier party coalitions to survive had adopted a life-preserving pattern of behavior. They limited their party programs, insofar as possible and for as long as possible, to the kinds of issues around which they were originally organized and that continued to form the basis of their unity and cohesion. They avoided taking extreme positions even on those issues. As long and as well as they could, they evaded, postponed, and straddled any issues that cut across their coalition, that set its elements warring against one another.

The New Right strategy, which in 1980 could be called the New Right-Reagan strategy, departed abruptly from the accustomed pattern of behavior. To a degree with few precedents in American history outside the times of intense polarization during realignment crises, it disdained compromise. Not content simply to slow down, or halt, the half century-long growth of government and drift toward the welfare state (as were the Republicans under every other postwar leader save Goldwater), the new GOP set out to reverse the trend, and to dismantle as much as possible of the national governmental apparatus the two parties had together fashioned. Instead of avoiding the divisive crosscutting new issues, it embraced them.

Unquestionably, the New Right-Reagan strategy brought a host of devoted, zealous converts to the Republican cause. But the traditional, intuitive, com-

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promising strategy of political parties in the United States does have its basis in experience and common sense—and therein lay the special weakness of the Reagan coalition. For coming down sharply on one side or the other of a divisive issue repels at the same time it attracts. When in 1976 the Republican part for the first time took decisive stands in its platform against busing, abortion, gun control, and affirmative action hiring quotas, and for school prayer, it increased the number of voters who were cross-pressured, who agreed with the GOP position on some issues but preferred the Democratic position (or Democratic ambiguity) on others. In William Schneider's phrase, many traditional conservatives found "themselves horrified by the excesses of the New Right."[21] Cross-pressured voters, when the time comes to choose, may come down on either side.

The gamble in the New Right-Reagan strategy was that, if the GOP took a staunchly conservative stand over the whole range of public issues, the majority of the cross-pressured voters would resolve their conflicts by letting their conservative rather than their liberal convictions prevail. But this hope rested on another, unspoken assumption—an ideologically pure conservative Republican party would be competing against an equally ideological, liberal Democratic party, making the competition for the cross-pressured voters at least equal. William Rusher, for example, began his argument in his 1975 book with the finding of the Gallup Poll of the previous year that when a national sample was asked to choose between two parties, one conservative and one liberal, 36 percent preferred the conservative party and only 26 percent the liberal, with 38 percent undecided. Assuming that the undecided ultimately divided in the same proportion as the decided, the conservative party would have a 59 percent to 41 percent advantage.[22]

But will that large bloc of undecided in the center—the moderates, the fence-sitters, the ambivalents—in fact divide in approximately the same proportion as those whose views are firm? A more plausible assumption is that the centrists will respond in a general election (insofar as their votes are based on issue positions) to candidates and parties whose views are, like their own, somewhere near the center. Thus, Barry Goldwater in 1964 was perceived as an extremist of the Right rather than a moderate and lost. Likewise, George McGovern in 1972 was seen as an extremist of the Left and lost.

True, Ronald Reagan in 1980 was perceived as an extremist by a substantial body of voters—yet he won. But it was in spite of, rather than because of, his extreme ideological conservatism. During the campaign, the CPS survey data make clear, Reagan stood well to the right of the electorate that ultimately chose him, in the voters' own views. From all the evidence, Reagan finally won the

[21] William Schneider, "Democrats and Republicans, Liberals and Conservatives," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *Party Coalitions in the 1980s* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1981), 195. Everett Carll Ladd has argued that the "really consequential" factional split in the Republican party is wholly over tactics, not ideology. See *Where Have All the Voters Gone? The Fracturing of America's Political Parties*, 2d ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1982), 18–22.

[22] Rusher, *The Making of the New Majority Party*, xiii.

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support of a majority of voters only because he was able to moderate his image. Particularly in his debate with President Carter in the week before the election he went out of his way to convince the decisive bloc of doubting viewers that he was no saber-rattling militarist or an enemy of social security. By election day the impression of amiability and reasonableness prevailed with enough voters to give him the 50.7 percent majority with which he won.[23]

The New Right strategists, as ideological zealots, have not limited their commitment to those issues on which the conservative position has exhibited the most powerful appeal. Even though the polls are consistent in showing more conservatives than liberals, their meaning is cast in doubt by the ambiguity that surrounds both terms, as Rusher himself recognized.[24] When the same pollsters ask the voters their positions on specific policy issues, the conservatives have by no means a clear advantage. As can be seen from the numbers in Table 1, the conservatives could claim clear majorities in 1980 for their opposition to busing and their support of school prayer, but the liberals had the majority on the Equal Rights Amendment and on the maintenance of environmental regulations. On defense spending and the responsibility of government for jobs and living standards, opinion was on the conservative side of center, but on abortion it was on the liberal side. On questions of civil rights and aid to minorities it was bulked very near the middle. A majority of Americans, polls have consistently shown, want at least a limited form of gun control. As to the role of government, according to Gregory B. Markus, CPS survey respondents throughout 1980 "were generally opposed to sizable cuts in spending for health, education, and related services. . . . Consequently, Carter, not Reagan, was located somewhat closer to the average citizen on this issue."[25] Support for reduced spending, according to Arthur H. Miller, "was more a response to the belief that waste and incompetence can be cut . . . than an ideological rejection of all Great Society Programs."[26]

On most issues, then, a position of extreme ideological conservatism subjects the conservative party to being outflanked by a party of flexible and moderate liberalism—even though that label itself may be in disrepute. To put it in more theoretical language, for the conservative party to compete on equal terms with

[23] Kathleen A. Frankovic, "Public Opinion Trends," in Gerald M. Pomper, ed., *The Election of 1980: Reports and Interpretations* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1981), 106–107, discussed polling data indicating that the Reagan-Carter debate, as well as an early one between Reagan and John Anderson, "alleviated . . . serious concerns about him held by the electorate" and modified the perception that he was "a strict ideologue on all issues." Wilson Carey McWilliams, "The Meaning of the Election," in ibid., considered the debate probably decisive in persuading the majority of voters "that Reagan was not so kooky as to keep them from gratifying their desire to be rid of Carter" (p. 170). A Connecticut poll reported by Everett Carll Ladd, "The Brittle Mandate," 10, supported this interpretation.

[24] Rusher, *The Making of the New Majority Party*, xv-xvi.

[25] Gregory B. Markus (of the Center for Political Studies), "Political Attitudes during an Election Year: A Report on the 1980 NES Panel Study," *American Political Science Review* 76 (1982): 545.

[26] Arthur H. Miller (senior study director of the 1980 CPS survey), "What Mandate? What Realignment?" *Washington Post*, 28 June 1981.

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the liberal party for the central block of undecideds, the two parties must be equidistant from the center. So a Republican party cast in the mold of Reaganism might win the allegiance of more voters than a Democratic party identified as "McGovernite"—or even, perhaps, one seen as fixed to the views of Senator Edward Kennedy—but a Democratic party perceived as moderate, flexible, and nonideological would enter the contest against a rigid and ideologically conservative Republicanism with a distinct advantage.

The Collapse of 1982

In the spring of 1982, the Gallup Poll found that 28 percent of its respondents called themselves Republicans—the same proportion as a year before. In relative terms, however, the GOP had lost ground, for the Democrats had gained 4 points at the expense of the independents, rising from 41 to 45 percent. By June, the Republicans slipped to 26 percent, while the Democrats rose to 48. Other national polls showed a comparable halt to the Republican advance, and the beginnings of a retreat.

The downward trend was climaxed in the election of November. Centering their attack on the state of the economy—high interest rates, high business failure rates, and the highest unemployment levels since the Great Depression—the Democrats won a sweeping victory. Their gain of twenty-six seats in the House of Representatives was the greatest since 1922 by either party in its first off-year election after being turned out of the White House. The Republicans called the results a "wash" because they held their own in the Senate, but this contention ignored the narrowness of the Republican victories in individual races. The Senate outcome was, indeed, a statistical fluke. Of the races decided by 2 percent or less of the vote, the GOP won four of five; of those settled by 6 percent or less, it won eight of nine. The winners who squeaked through to victory typically saw their share of the vote reduced by 6 or 7 percentage points from their races six years earlier. The Democrats gained a net of seven governorships, bringing their total to thirty-four, and they increased from twenty-eight to thirty-four the number of states in which they controlled both houses of the legislature. On the morning after the 1982 election, the country seemed to have returned to the "one-and-one-half-party system" that had prevailed, most of the time, since the New Deal revolution. Ronald Reagan had not succeeded in forging a new majority coalition. The protest vote of 1980 had not been solidified into a durable Republic allegiance.

Possible Futures of the Party System

Down which road, then, is the party system moving? Toward disintegration and disappearance? Toward realignment and a new, post-New Deal system? Or toward reinvigoration of the existing structure of party competition? Or, can it be moving in more than one of these contradictory directions at the same time?

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To deal first with the disintegration thesis, let us glance again at the dotted lines in Figure 2 that have been so often cited as the premier indicator of party decomposition. Political activists and observers who have deplored the weakening of voter fidelity to parties can take no small encouragement from those trends. The dip in the proportion of self-declared independents in the CPS biennial survey—more than seven percentage points over the four-year span that saw the rise of Reagan Republicanism—is especially intriguing. For every five independent voters in 1978, CPS found only four in 1982. This decline was as steep as the incline during the decade of disintegration. The Gallup trend line, based on a much larger sample and averaging figures from throughout the year instead of only from campaign periods, shows no such decline, and, for that matter, no such steep earlier rise. Its proportion of independents held steady at the 29-30 percent level for a decade. But, by both sets of figures, the "onward march of party decomposition" that had once appeared inexorable came to a halt in the mid-1970s, and has remained at least halted, whether or not the march has been resumed in the opposite direction.

On the other hand, the proportion of new voter registrants who reject both parties has been rising steadily. Yet this can perhaps be explained as a lagging indicator, in the jargon of economists, reflecting not a recent or current rise in the proportion of independent voters, but simply a higher degree of conformity between the attitudes of the self-declared independents and their behavior when they register to vote.

If the parties maintain a solid hold, then, on roughly 70 percent of the electorate, how are the configuration of the parties changing? No one would deny that some substantial shifts have taken place. Though the Republican party in 1982 represented no greater share of the electorate than it did in 1972, it was surely different in makeup. One would not expect the gains of 1980–81 to correspond exactly to the losses the party suffered in the Watergate era, and to the extent they did not, some realignment would have occurred. One would expect, for instance, that the steady growth of Republicanism in the South that was interrupted when the GOP was discredited by Watergate would be resumed, and it was. Both the Gallup and the New York Times/CBS News polls show the Republican gains of 1980–81 to have disproportionately occurred in the South.[27] Similarly, there were gains among other population groups, notably the Catholics, that have been predominately Democratic for reasons of tradition rather than philosophy. And the new Republicans drawn from these and other groups were mainly the ideological conservatives. The New York Times/CBS News poll found the GOP gained 12 percentage points (from 42 to 54 percent) among self-identified conservatives in 1980–81, only 4 points (from 33 to 37 percent) among moderates, and 4 points (from 22 to 26 percent) among liberals.[28] The gains, as one would also expect, were disproportionately among voters under thirty-five,

[27] *Gallup Report*, No. 195, December 1981, 39; *New York Times*, 3 May 1981.
[28] *New York Times*, 3 May 1981.

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whose political preferences are less firmly fixed. Only one phenomenon of 1980–81 could be called wholly unexpected—the sudden appearance of what came to be called the "gender gap." Interviewing voters as they left their polling places in 1980, the pollsters found to their consternation that Ronald Reagan's margin of victory was provided almost entirely by men. Male voters preferred Reagan over Carter by 54 to 37 percent but women gave him only a 1 point margin, 46 to 45.[29] The gender gap has carried over to party preference, and it has continued with no apparent lessening into 1983.[30]

The evidence, then, points to a continuing realignment of the electorate along liberal-conservative lines. Conservatives who have been anchored to the Democratic party for reasons of geography, religion, or ethnic background—or whose parents had been Democrats for those reasons—are steadily coming to find their political home in the Republican party. Liberals who have been Republican for the same reasons are moving in the opposite direction, to the Democrats. The Republican party has been steadily becoming more conservative, and under Reagan's leadership that trend has been accelerated. The Democratic party has been planted more securely at the left of center, as its once powerful southern conservative wing continues to dwindle with the continuing realignment in that region.

How the as yet minor Reagan revolution is interpreted depends on what kinds of conservatives have been moving to the GOP, and this is by no means clear. How many can be described as economic conservatives, motivated by the old issues relating to domestic economic policy and the size and role of government? How many are social conservatives moved by the new crosscutting issues of race, abortion, school prayer, and the rest? How many are military and foreign policy conservatives who prefer the more assertive nationalism and anti-communism of the Republicans? The proportions cannot be calculated, because the several streams of conservatism are intermingled at the borders even while distinguishable at the core. Moreover, some voters are motivated not by a single issue or set of issues but by a combination. All one can say is that the realignment of

[29] New York Times/CBS News poll, *New York Times*, 9 November 1980.

[30] The Gallup Poll in late 1981 found a 19-point spread between the parties among women (46 percent Democratic to 27 percent Republican), compared to a 12 point difference among men (40 to 28). The Washington Post/ABC News poll of March 1982 found a Democratic advantage of 45 to 17 percent among women and 33 to 23 percent among men (*Washington Post*, 29 March 1982), while the New York Times/CBS News survey found an advantage of 41 to 23 percent among women and 33 to 22 percent among men (*New York Times,* 30 June 1982). Public opinion data suggest the gender gap may arise from several causes. Women sensitive to feminist issues tend to see social conservatism, as embraced by the Reagan-led Republican party, as inimical to the gains women have made in recent years. Beyond that, women have been responding differently from men on a range of other issues, which have turned them toward the Democrats. The editors of *Public Opinion* have classified these issues under a "compassion" dimension (a greater concern for the unemployed, the blacks, and the poor, all especially hard hit by the Reagan budget cuts), a "risk" dimension (a lesser willingness to relax environmental standards and regulations), and a "force" dimension (less support for military spending and foreign interventionism, more support for gun control, and so on). Editorial, "A New Era in Men's and Women's Attitudes," *Public Opinion* 5 (1982): 27–32.

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the Reagan period, like all realignment since the early 1960s, is a compound of two separate phenomena. First, there is the old and continuing adjustment process that continues to distribute the electorate on either side of the liberal-conservative line of cleavage established in the New Deal era over the class and role-of-government issues that have persisted since that period. Second, a new minor realignment (or, perhaps more accurately, realignments) was precipitated when the Republican party took its stance clearly at the conservative pole on the host of crosscutting moral, social, and military and foreign policy issues that disrupted the New Deal party system.

Yet, potent as the crosscutting issues have proved to be, they appear to lack the power to supplant the New Deal party system with a new one organized on a different rationale, along a new line of cleavage, and with a new definition of the party conflict. Separately, no one of the crosscutting issues is sufficient; none is of the magnitude of the great issues that brought about the major realignments of the past—slavery in the 1850s, free silver in the 1890s, or response to the hardships of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Together, they do not cluster well. Initially, they divide into two distinct issue complexes—social and moral questions, and military and foreign policy questions—that cut across the electorate in different directions. And each of these is diffuse, made up of somewhat separable, discrete issues that engage different individuals and groups with varying degres of intensity. Collectively, they may at times be powerful enough to dominate political debate—one of the necessary qualities of a realigning issue—but not with the simplicity and clarity necessary to polarize the community, which is another of the required attributes.

Indeed, the events of 1981–82 illustrate how much more powerful, intrinsically, are economic questions whenever the country suffers from a severe economic dislocation of any kind. Once the country moved into double-digit inflation, the social and moral questions that had been at or near the top of the "most important problems" list in the preceding years could hardly make the list of all, and they hardly figured in the 1982 midterm election. When the economy is sick, morals are something for the churches to worry about, while restoring economic prosperity and stability becomes perforce the overriding responsibility of government. It is not an accident that, once the profound moral question of slavery was settled in the nineteenth century, the line of cleavage between the parties was redrawn on the basis of economic policy and has been defined by economic questions ever since.

While crosscutting social or foreign and military policy issues will surely arouse the electorate from time to time, they are unlikely to displace, for long, the prodigious questions of economic and fiscal policy that dominated the election of 1980 and the first years of the Reagan revolution. And the latter issues are of the kind that can serve to revitalize the existing party system. Instead of cutting across the current line of party cleavage, they run along that line. Just as crosscutting issues blur the difference between the major parties, so issues that coincide with that line shapen and reinforce it, because the parties take their natural stances on opposing sides. Years and even decades after the New Deal

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era, such coincident issues as the Taft-Hartley Act, public housing, anti-recession measures, aid to education, Medicare, and the War on Poverty drew clean lines between the parties and dramatized the continued relevance of the New Deal party system. If that system seems meaningless when crosscutting issues dominate political debate (resulting in responses such as "There is no difference between the parties," "Neither party takes a clear stand," "Neither party represents my point of view"), coincident issues give it meaning and so create, or reinforce, the attachment of voters to the parties.

One may speculate that the Reagan revolution in American politics will have that consequence. On a whole range of domestic economic and role-of-government questions, any perception that political parties do not take clear stands must have been shattered by the forceful, categorical positions taken by Ronald Reagan and his party during the campaign. The contrast between the Republican and Democratic approaches may have been muddied a bit by the centrism and vacillation of the then incumbent Democratic president, Jimmy Carter; but the distinction between Reagan Republicanism and the longer Democratic record and tradition could only be stark for attention voters old enough to have lived through the Lyndon Johnson era, not to mention the times of Harry Truman and Franklin Roosevelt, and for those who listened to Senator Edward Kennedy's message to the 1980 Democratic convention as the inheritor of that tradition. Polling evidence suggests that the perception of party differences was indeed heightened. The 1980 CPS survey found that 58 percent of the respondents saw "important differences" in what the two major parties stood for, compared to 46–52 percent in the six surveys held in presidential election years between 1952 and 1976.[31] Asked to state what the differences were, the respondents gave answers that reflected almost unchanged the party images established in the New Deal era. Of 1,836 differences cited by the 875 interviewees who identified one to three important differences, 598 related to class—the familiar "big business against the little man" and "special interests against the people" dichotomies. Another 570 concerned the role and size of government, spending, and domestic economic policy. National security drew only 91 mentions and other aspects of international affairs drew 39. The crosscutting social issues had scarcely registered as differences between the parties. Responses related to civil rights, blacks, and other minorities numbered 31, women's rights 21, and abortion 18. Only 2 persons mentioned law and order, the issue the Republicans had tried so energetically to make a party issue a decade earlier.

As the 1984 campaign season approached, the dynamics of the party system seemed sure to widen and sharpen the differences between the parties on the traditional range of role-of-government and economic questions. On the Democratic side, a safe prediction was that the party would be pulled gradually but steadily from the center back toward its customary left-of-center stance. Mean-

[31] Martin P. Wattenberg, "The Decline of Political Partisanship in the United States: Negativity or Neutrality?" *American Political Science Review* 75 (1981): 943. The 1956 survey omitted the question.

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while, as the Democrats moved to the left, the Republican party, as long as it remained under Ronald Reagan's leadership, appeared unlikely to stray far from the conservative extreme. New Rightists inside and outside the administration would exert powerful reistance to any centrist drift. As the distance between the parties widened, the heightened significance that the party system acquired in 1980 and 1982 would be sustained and the attachment of voters to their parties strengthened.

To say the New Deal party system can be revitalized is not, of course, to say that the Democrats will necessarily recover and maintain their old advantage. The Republicans will gain if the Reagan administration turns out, despite the setbacks of its first two years, to be markedly successful; shifts in the party balance can always occur within a continuing party system. Nor does revitalization mean that the old New Deal Democratic coalition will be restored. It is a common misunderstanding of the New Deal party system to describe its essential character in terms of ethnic and regional groups—the Democratic South and urban Catholics and Jews and blacks competing against a Republican rural and Protestant North. The realignment of the 1930s was powered by a historic ideological dispute, and it created two parties with opposing ideological colorations. Insofar as the Democratic party continued to hold a disproportionate share of southerners or Catholics, that was in spite of rather than because of the realignment. Those groups remained preponderantly Democratic, and other groups basically Republican, out of inertia, as vestiges of the old regionally based system of party competition that the new alignment supplanted. Over the years, the ethnic and geographic lines have eroded as the New Deal party system settled into place. Activists, from whatever region or family background, gravitated to the Democratic party and conservatives, from whatever demographic group, found their natural home in the Republican party. When the New Deal *alignment* is strengthened, the New Deal *coalitions* are weakened, and vice versa. By now, the distinctive Democratic cast of much of the South, and of much of the Catholic population, has all but vanished, while the Democratic party has made its compensating gains among erstwhile Republican groups. The one ethnic group still allied overwhelmingly to one party has been the blacks, but their Democratic affinity springs not from tradition but from ideology. They have conceived their interests as lying with the party whose philosophy is more favorable to governmental activism.

In the long run, then, prospects for the party system appear to me much as they did ten years ago. To repeat what I said then, there is still strong reason to believe that the headlong march toward party decomposition that marked the late 1960s will continue to be checked. It may even be reversed, and the New Deal party system reinvigorated, as the political debate returns to the economic policy and role-of-government questions that traditionally have been—perhaps one can say normally are—the stuff of American politics.

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Africa, the American Intelligentsia, and the Shadow of Vietnam

MARTIN STANILAND

In 1965, Charles Frankel, a philosopher and an assistant secretary of state in the Johnson administration, remarked that the role of intellectuals in international affairs had been curiously neglected. Since then, a greater sensitivity to the sociology of knowledge and to the resilience of intellectual orthodoxies has perhaps made students more aware of the power that stereotypes and analogies can exercise. Intellectuals, as Frankel noted, are the principal engineers and salespersons of the very language used in international relations, the creators and promoters of its symbols and concepts. His description of their activities merits extended quotation:

> International affairs are peculiarly susceptible to galloping abstractions. . . . Nowhere else do massive stereotypes and personified ideas play a larger role; nowhere do they do more to rigidify disagreement, to give it a quality of necessity and higher nobility, and to turn otherwise manageable conflicts into unmanageable ones. And intellectuals, more than most other groups, have the power to create, dignify, inflate, criticize, moderate these abstractions.[1]

Perhaps with the growing controversy over Vietnam in mind, Frankel further observed:

> Over the long run, a major nation's foreign policy is unlikely to succeed, or will, at any rate, became more costly and more completely dependent on violence and the

[1] Charles Frankel, "The Scribblers and International Relations," *Foreign Affairs* 44 (1965): 2.

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threat of violence, if it loses the understanding and sympathy of intellectuals in other countries and at home.[2]

The power that such a role gives to intellectuals is especially marked in dealings with the more exotic parts of the world.[3] The effect of this role is actually felt less in evaluation of foreign policy than in shaping perceptions of other cultures, in explicating the political behavior encountered in such cultures, and in suggesting parallels and metaphors from more familiar cultures or historical episodes.

The use of history can be particularly important, and American thinking about foreign policy has sometimes been criticized for its alleged abuse or distortion of history. Actually, two superficially contradictory views exist about Americans' approach to historical evidence. One is that Americans are grossly ignorant of and indifferent to the past, their own and that of others. Thus, Alexander Woodside has complained about "a haunting but rarely diagnosed form of American isolationism with regard to other peoples [that] manifests itself in a chronic refusal to take ancient history as seriously as it is taken in China, or Vietnam, or Indonesia, or Burma . . . to say nothing of Russia, France, or Ireland." Such "cultural isolationism," he argues, impedes communication not only with Europeans, but also (and especially) "with Asian revolutionaries."[4]

On the other hand, there are those, like Miles Kahler and Roger Morris, who complain that the foreign policy establishment has been obsessed with historical precedent, the result being mental inflexibility and self-righteousness.[5] The use of analogies may lead to over-simplification and distortion—it can provide, as Stanley Hoffmann has noted, "an escape from instead of an instrument of analysis."[6]

The contradiction between these views is superficial, since the indifference indicated by the first view is logically related to the abuse criticized in the second. Impatient with the complexity of history, Americans use it, as Hoffmann has suggested, like a rag-bag, raiding it when occasion arises for handy precedents and embellishing rhetoric. Such arbitrariness in dealing with history exemplifies, Hoffmann argues, a wider intellectual arbitrariness in American foreign relations, expressed in a yearning for simple formulas, a sentimentality

[2] Ibid., 4. See also Sandy Vogelgesang, *The Long Dark Night of the Soul: The American Intellectual Left and the Vietnam War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).

[3] See, for example, Harold R. Isaacs, *Scratches on our Minds: American Images of China and India* (New York: John Day Co., 1958).

[4] Alexander Woodside, "American Attitudes Toward History," *The Nation*, 13 December 1975, 614–15.

[5] Miles Kahler, "Rumors of War: The 1914 Analogy," *Foreign Affairs* 58 (1979/80): 374; Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 29–30.

[6] Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), 135.

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about interests and purposes, an intolerance of ambiguity, a discomfort in the face of uncertainty, and a reluctance to acknowledge the exotic.[7]

These considerations suggest that examining American relations with a given region should entail sociological and linguistic dimensions, as well as the usual discussion of interests and policies. In particular, we need to: identify the characteristics of the intellectual subculture responsible for shaping American assumptions and images relative to the region; specify ways in which the history and character of that subculture may have affected its values and attitudes; identify the most persistent and basic features of the "intellectual product" the subculture puts forth and to trace changes and fashions in the responses it favors and in imagery, analogy, and interpretation; and explore the ways in which this intellectual product and its elements have influenced the more important debates about American relations with the region. I apply this approach to American relations with Africa (an extreme case of exotic expertise) and illustrate the careers of two historical analogies, one fanciful (the American Revolution), the other downright obsessive (the Vietnam War).

The World of American Africanists

Certain features of the American relationship with Africa have made it especially prone to treatment by precedent, formula, and analogy. Africa has been marginal in the American political world and has rarely moved from "the back burner" of foreign relations.[8] The African subcommittees in Congress have had fitful and rather private existences. Except in moments of tragedy or outrage, public interest in Africa has been low.[9] Though there have been some famous African lobbies, their record of effectiveness is patchy, at least as far as the executive branch is concerned, and some (particularly on the liberal side) have been criticized for spending "more time looking for approval from their friends in Congress than in trying to change opinions."[10] Many such organizations seem

[7] Ibid., 135–37. For a comparative study of the use of history in relation to specific policy problems, see Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

[8] See Waldemar Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), 331; Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, 17–18; Anthony Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 70, 249, 280; and Russell Warren Howe and Sarah Hays Trott, *The Power Peddlers: How Lobbyists Mold America's Foreign Policy* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1977), 170, 188, 206.

[9] Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option*, 249; Howe and Trott, *The Power Peddlers*, 188, 206; and Aaron Segal, "Whose Joke is Spiro?" *Issue* 2 (1972): 68.

[10] Howe and Trott, *The Power Peddlers*, 205–6; see also p. 283. Anthony Lake has argued that the American Committee on Africa used flawed tactics, concentrating criticism on the State Department's Africa Bureau, one of "the groups within the bureaucracy which had views closest to its own. Consequently, it failed to put pressure on the offices and individuals which the Africa Bureau itself was trying to move and irritated the Bureau." Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option*, 71.

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to make up in stridency and mutual admiration for what they lack in political impact.

As for the media, their interest in Africa and in particular countries has been, in Norman P. Roberts's words, "crisis oriented and to a degree transient."[11] Partly because of cost, few newspapers have been able to maintain correspondents on the continent. The range of material covered still tends to be narrow and its treatment has given rise to a minor academic "critiquing" industry devoted to the exposure of stereotypes. Even wild animals, so prominent an element in African reporting, seem to get stereotyped.[12] Political developments still tend to be treated as outgrowths of the eccentricities of heads of states. For example, *Time* depicted the administrative reorganization of Zaire in terms of President Mobutu Sese Seko's gastric and literary habits.[13]

The lack of public interest in Africa and its low standing in the priorities of American foreign and defense policy have affected both the character and quality of debate about African issues and also their treatment by policymakers. The ideal "rational" debate about a foreign policy issue would presumably be one in which assumptions were rigorously examined, arguments coherently presented, evidence stringently criticized, and proposals dispassionately evaluated. Such a debate would encourage self-criticism and open-mindedness and would combine liveliness with a rising level of sophistication.

The policy "debate" about Africa is not like this. Even a modest amount of reading, listening to arguments, and attending hearings reveals a world of discussion that is highly compartmentalized, one in which arguments are loaded with loose logic, *ad hominem* abuse, trite pieties, and battle-frayed rhetoric. The world of American Africanists is not, in fact, one world, but rather a set

[11] Norman P. Roberts, "The Changing Images of Africa in some Selected American Media from 1930 to 1969" (Ph.D. diss., American University, 1971), 224. An excellent discussion of American press coverage of Africa is provided in Aaron Segal, "Africa and the United States Media," *Issue* 6 (1976): 49–56.

[12] Roberts refers, rather indignantly, to a textbook that alludes to the "dangerous work" of a hippo hunt, and to the gorilla as "not a pleasant fellow to meet." He comments: "One more knowledgeable of the habits of these animals might quickly question the 'danger' of a hippo hunt unless the hunter is foolish, and studies have increasingly pointed out that this is really a rather shy and retiring animal." Roberts, "The Changing Images of Africa," 158. The role of animals in America's perception of Africa is dealt with in Edward H. McKinley's witty and highly readable book, *The Lure of Africa: American Interests in Tropical Africa, 1919–1939* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co, 1974).

[13] The 22 July 1966 issue of *Time* commented: " 'What the Congolese need most is discipline,' Mobutu says. . . . Discipline is Mobutu's way of life. He rises at dawn every morning, takes a breakfast consisting mainly of Eno's Fruit Salts, a sparkling laxative, then settles down for an hour to read biographies of the world's political and military leaders" (pp. 33–37). The Congo has always been the most fertile source of American imagery of Africa. In 1966 Edward Sheehan of the *New York Times* described leaving a meeting with Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko in phrasing reminiscent of Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*: "The glass door outside the Foreign Minister's office was shattered; I did not have to open it. . . . I simply stepped through the jagged frame, and before dawn next day I departed for the interior." See "It's Still the Heart of Darkness," *New York Times Magazine*, 30 October 1966.

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of mutually isolated and oblivious compounds, among which communication is minimal (apart from the odd raiding party) and within which the tedium of bush life is relieved by the monotonous chanting of old war songs, the ritual vilification of enemies, and the periodic exhumation of martyrs. There is much singing and dancing, intense tribal solidarity, and complete indifference to the opinions of any outside world that may or may not exist.

The stagnant and factional character of the Africanist world derives from its marginality in the world of American politics and, paradoxically, from the centrality of America in African worlds. Issues that inspire a suffocating degree of partisanship in Africa are liable to inspire, in Anthony Lake's words, "more public yawns than yowls" in the United States.[14] The Africanist is, as it were, subjected to great heat from one side and freezing apathy from the other. Partisanship, fear of abuse, and lack of challenge by non-specialists all create ideal conditions for the type of automated political response so well described by Charles Peters.[15] No one is so invulnerable as the committed expert, knowledgeable about an area about which others neither know nor care—and no one is so immovable. The Africanist world is steeped in its own time-honored lore and thus moves according to its own ancient rhythms. It fails to connect with other worlds, especially the worlds of domestic politics, and gets little response when it tries.

Looked at from the point of view of non-specialists, the result is that African problems are often seen as "critical." They are not so intrinsically, but they can easily become so, since ignorance, inexperience, and indifference cause them not to be anticipated and, once noticed, not to be seriously considered until they have reached acute or endemic proportions. Thus in 1964, the *National Review* became extremely agitated at the prospect of the Chinese Communists seizing control of the world's supply of cloves through its influence in Zanzibar. Yet Averell Harriman is said to have had to tell President Johnson repeatedly the correct name of "that offshore island in the Indian Ocean."[16] In a more famous episode, Vice President Spiro Agnew expounded before an embarrassed Richard Nixon on the implications of what he understood to have been South Africa's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965.[17] And in 1978, a Texas congressman called to the White House to hear about Cuban involvement in Angola and Zaire emerged to remark testily that people in his district had never been heard of these countries.[18] Nor, to judge by their reported references to "Angolia," "Molli," and "Zambodia," had some of his colleagues.

[14] Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option*, 124.

[15] See Charles Peters, "Automatic Political Reaction," *New York Times*, 3 May 1981. Peters remarked: "Too much of the political discussion that we hear divides along predictable lines, and the result is that we quickly know what is coming next." He noted that automation is particularly marked in the "debates" over defense and abortion.

[16] I am indebted to Colin Legum for this anecdote.

[17] This incident is described in Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, 117–18, and Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option*, 130.

[18] Representative Kika de la Garza quoted in Richard C. Schroeder, "African Policy Reversal,"

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Africa as a Conceptual Dependency: The Influence of American History

Crisis diplomacy has had a striking effect on the way in which African issues are discussed. If, as Hoffmann argues, there is a general tendency in American foreign policy circles to argue by analogy, this tendency is likely to be most persistent in relation to areas and subjects that normally have low priority. This is not to argue that African policy is normally conducted in analogical terms, but rather than when an African issue forces itself on the attention of non-specialists, it is apt to be so treated. In this sense, Africa lives in a state of conceptual and semantic dependency on regions and preoccupations that are closer to the mainstream of American foreign policy.

Until the mid-1960s, the most common analogy applied to Africa was that of the American Revolution. Its dominance corresponded to the period when liberals felt that their assumptions and values were essentially the same as those of African nationalism. Although disenchantment about individual countries set in quite quickly after independence, the southward progress of nationalism provided frequent occasions for the renewal of hope and faith. In the Bicentennial Year, Andrew Young even managed to discern a similarity between the civil war in Angola and the tensions that had existed among Jefferson's followers ("with large French influence"), Hamilton's ("with some suspected British influence") and John Adams ("a confirmed Yankee")—though who was who, and where the Cubans fitted in, was not clear.[19]

Nevertheless, the mid-1960s generally marked the eclipse of the Spirit of '76 as a key to African politics, partly because liberals decided that African nationalism was radically alien in certain respects, partly because they felt that it was "ethnocentric" to wish one's own model on others, and partly because the Left and black radicals had persuaded them that 1776 had in fact been a good year only for white middle-class liberals.

The metaphor of eighteenth-century America was inappropriate both for the United States as a great power and for African states. It presumed a capacity for ignoring the world that African states could not exercise and a readiness to do so that Americans themselves had long since abandoned. Even if Africa's "Founding Fathers" had wanted to practice "liberalism in one country," the isolation of 1776 was impossible, or at least it was incompatible with the devel-

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Editorial Research Reports, 14 July 1978, 507–508. During hearings on Angola in 1976, Senator Joseph R. Biden commented that the first problem "was the difficulty of getting people to understand that there was an Angola." Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, *Angola: Hearings, January 29–February 6, 1976 on U.S. Involvement in Civil War in Angola*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, 143.

[19] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Angola: Hearings*, 57. Conservatives were very much opposed to application of the 1776 analogy to Africa, arguing that foolish liberals were encouraging premature independence in African territories that would become "the certain prey of native dictators or Communist regimes or both." J.D. Futch, "The Day of the Let's Pretends," *National Review*, 12 September 1959, 328.

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opmental ambitions of most leaders. (Guinea, admittedly, avoided "entangling alliances," but only by constantly changing partners and by putting political independence before growth.)

An international, even global, dimension thus became an abiding feature of the semantics of American debate about Africa from about 1964 onward. Even if the Vietnam War had not made Americans intensely preoccupied with the dilemmas of great powers, it is quite likely that the accumulated experience of African development itself would have suggested the inadequacy of analysis and prescription that assumed that national governments were effectively masters of their own houses. But the Vietnam War ensured that the ground of debate would shift from the essentially domestic, occasionally diplomatic, issue of how national development was best achieved to the wider issue of what kind of international order was desirable and how the rights and needs of Americans and non-Americans should be defined, satisfied, and accommodated. Given both the salience of Vietnam in American minds after 1964 and their rapidly diminishing interest in Africa, it is not surprising that parallels with southeast Asia were so readily discovered south of the Sahara.

The Shadow of Vietnam: Stanleyville-on-the-Mekong

The "Vietnam syndrome" actually comprised two elements: an analytic matrix or gauge, applied to determine whether "Vietnamness" was present, and used to detect imperialism, subversion, communism, or whatever; and a connected and all-too-automatic set of alarms, reflexes, and responses. Left and Right, radicals, isolationists, hawks and doves, all had Vietnam-detection kits and differed only in the uses to which they put them. The most active resistance was from African regionalists who complained that Africa was unique—a response that provoked scorn, irritation, or simply dismissal from the rest. The regionalists, it was said, were naive (they did not understand international realities), or hypocritical (since it was, after all, they who had claimed that the cold war could be won by respecting neutralism), or plain wrong (because the cold war clearly hadn't been won, no matter which side one was on).[20]

As used by the Left, the Vietnam syndrome operated to detect impending eruptions of American imperialism, to zero in on its puppets, and to spot forces of liberation to which solidarity might be addressed. In the hands of the Right, the syndrome worked to discover international communist inspiration in local uprisings and to alert a perennially complacent West to the need "to make a stand."

Most interesting, and perhaps most subtle in its action, was the impact of Vietnam on liberal attitudes, an impact that expressed itself less in an articulated

[20] More recently, Chester A. Crocker complained about the naiveté and ineptitude of regionalists. He asked: "When will Africanists recognize that they must provide explicit premises, if they are to participate effectively in the foreign policy process?" "Making Africa Safe for the Cubans," *Foreign Policy*, no. 31 (1978): 31.

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position than in a virtually implicit bias. It was a bias that assumed the futility of American involvement and the inevitability of guerrilla victory. The power of this bias was increased rather than diminished by its inarticulateness and by the fact that its injunctions eluded challenge. The bias expressed a mood of capitulation before history and a desire to ride whatever currents within it might be most powerful.

The first African "Vietnam" was found in the Simba uprising in the Congo in 1964, when rebels in the east captured Stanleyville and took European and African hostages. Because of Chinese activities in Burundi and Zanzibar, conservatives claimed to have detected, in the words of one report, a familiar pattern:

> Once more the familiar geographical pattern of Korea and Vietnam appears to be emerging: Communists in the north carrying on another war of aggression toward the south, backed by military aid from the big Communist powers.[21]

Since the government forces were in the southwest and the rebels were in the northeast, it first would have been necessary to turn the Congo on its side for the "familiar pattern" to become recognizable, at least to *U.S. News and World Report*.[22]

Writing of the situation of Moise Tshombe (at this point prime minister of the Congo), observers drew an even closer parallel with Vietnam. Tshombe was *persona non grata* with other African heads of state because of his earlier role as leader of the Katangan secession, and his isolation inspired images of South Vietnam. *U.S. News and World Report* declared that "Tshombe can no more survive without military aid from the outside than can the Government of South Vietnam.[23] Indeed, *Newsweek* remarked: "When Tshombe looks in the mirror these days . . . he sees the image of Ngo Dinh Diem."[24] When Tshombe eventually fell (as when he was appointed), it was widely rumored that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been instrumental in the deed.

Yet when Belgium and the United States intervened to rescue the hostages in Stanleyville, the objections raised in the United States were mainly concerned with the affront to African nationalism involved. Few critics suggested that the intervention was a manifestation of American imperialism or that the rebels were a proto-Vietcong. Rather, they argued that America had been insensitive and undiplomatic and that the Simba uprising was closer to the Mau Mau or the Boxer rebellions than to anything Karl Marx or V. I. Lenin might have dreamed up.[25]

[21] *U.S. News and World Report*, 21 December 1964, 34.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., 35.

[24] *Newsweek*, 28 December 1964, 31.

[25] See, for example, M. Crawford Young, "The Congo Rebellion," *Africa Report*, April 1965, 6–11; Russell Warren Howe, "The Eastern Congo's Phony Rebellion," *Reporter*, 11 March 1965, 35–6; William Pfaff, "The Congo," *Commonweal*, 5 February 1965, 599–601; Victor C. Ferkiss, "Breakdown in the Congo," *Commonweal*, 24 November 1964, 325–8. The most authoritative study

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However, as Vietnam became a more bitterly divisive issue at home, so the propensity to discern its form or potential in other places became more noticeable. It showed itself in the extremely jumpy reaction of J. William Fulbright and like-minded senators to the dispatch of three American aircraft to help Mobutu in Zaire in 1967 (to help him, indeed, in a conflict with white mercenaries, the *bêtes blanches* of liberals and African nationalists alike).[26] The fear of creating another Vietnam situation may have deterred President Lyndon Johnson from involving the United States in the Nigerian civil war—though evidence on this point is incomplete.[27]

But the most telling impact of Vietnam was felt in three central African crises that actully came to a head after the fall of Saigon in April 1975: in the Angolan civil war; in the second Shaba episode in Zaire in 1978; and in the final act of the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict.

The Civil War in Angola

Since the struggle for Angola reached its climax in the months immediately after the fall of Saigon, American attitudes toward this conflict were especially affected by the Vietnam experience. By this time, radical and left-wing elements opposed to American involvement in Southeast Asia had virtually fused, certainly so far as their tactics and demands were concerned. Yet as Angola showed, significant differences of posture remained behind the facade of protest. The Left, in both Vietnam and Angola, was unapologetically, actively, and consistently interventionist: the Vietcong was a progressive force; the Marxist Movimiento Popular de Libertaçâo de Angola (MPLA) in Angola represented the "popular vanguard party of the working class"; and both were entitled to support in their struggle against imperialism.[28] If the Soviet Union extended such support, then it was only meeting its obligations in the global battle against imperialism.

The liberal neo-isolationists had a distinct perspective, albeit one tending to a conclusion identical to that of the Left where American policy was concerned. They increasingly needed convincing that any intervention anywhere were justified. The lesson of Vietnam, they felt, was that conflicts in remote areas should

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of the rebellion is still R. C. Fox, W. de Cramer, and J. M. Ribeaucourt, "The Second Independence: A Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 8 (1965):78–109.

[26] For the liberal reaction to this episode, see Don Oberdorfer, "Nonintervention, 1967 Style," *New York Times Magazine*, 17 September 1967; "The Congo and the Senate," *The New Republic*, 22 July 1967, 6–7; Nielsen, *The Great Powers in Africa*, 322.

[27] For Johnson's difficulties over the Nigerian civil war, see John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–70* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

[28] See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, "Luanda is Madrid," *The Nation*, 10 January 1976, 12–17; John Saul, "After Angola," *Monthly Review* 28 (1976): 4–15; Basil Davidson, "African Economies," *The Nation*, 10 January 1976, 19; Azinna Nwafor, "The Liberation of Angola," *Monthly Review* 27 (1976): 1–12.

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be assumed to be local in origin and impact unless the most powerful evidence to the contrary was produced. In fact, the Ford administration by this juncture was taking a similar position; formally, everyone was agreed that it was improper and foolish to get involved in obscure civil wars and that the Angola conflict was essentially a civil war.[29] Why, then, did the neo-isolationists end up arguing that one party—Agostinho Neto's MPLA—should be recognized as the de facto, even the de jure, government?

The continuity that explains this shift lies not in any observation on the part of the MPLA so much as in their consistent orientation toward the American administration. In short, the critics were so deeply suspicious and disaffected that the administration only had to take sides in a conflict for them to bestow the benefit of every doubt on the other side. In the Angolan case, the sympathies of the Left and the liberals converged on the MPLA. For the Left, its virtues were never in doubt, but they were confirmed by the support lent by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the Eastern bloc generally. For the others, the virtues of the MPLA were suggested by the decision of Henry Kissinger to back its rivals, the Frente Nacional de Libertaçâo de Angola (FNLA) and the Uniâo Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA).

Such reflexive dissent had actually been evident during the late 1960s and early 1970s in the heavily stressed presumption that the United States was at some level responsible for Portugal's pursuit of its African wars.[30] There is no doubt that Portugal did use equipment provided for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) purposes in Angola; no doubt either that the Nixon administration had little inclination to push Portugal on decolonization in Africa; and no question that the use of the Azores base was a factor in the administration's reticence on southern Africa. But historians examining the level of active American assistance to Portugal, and weighing it against the intensity of the campaign waged over, for example, the sale of two Boeing 707s to Portugal, will certainly wonder at the degree of stridency generated on such questions. The stridency of the dissenters was surely generated by a deep belief that what America did was crucially important. Lurking behind the rage and indignation was an assumption of American power as ambitious as any held by militarists, but taking a Manichaean form. The assumption posited that wherever American values were being denied, there America must somehow be involved, squashing freedoms, crushing democracy, frustrating self-determina-

[29] On Angola as a "civil" or "tribal" war, see Kevin Brown, "Report from Luanda: A New Angolan Society," *The Nation*, 22 November 1975, 519; John Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs* 54 (1976): 409–12.

[30] See, for example, Wallerstein, "Luanda is Madrid," 17; William Minter, "Imperial Network and External Dependency: Implications for the Angolan Liberation Struggle," *Africa Today* 21 (1974): 25–39; John Marcum, "The Politics of Indifference: Portugal and Africa, a Case Study in American Foreign Policy," *Issue* 2 (1972): 9–17; Testimonies of Jennifer Davis and Barbara Rogers, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, *Complex of U.S.-Portuguese Relations: Before and After the Coup*, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 14 March–22 October 1974, 22–47, 48–68.

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tion. The conservatives insisted on seeing Communist agitators at work behind the Angolan and Mozambican revolts, while the radicals and liberals insisted on seeing American hands and American money at work behind Portuguese counterinsurgency.

In reality, Portugal had exceptionally large foreign reserves and had no particular difficulty buying arms and equipment in Western Europe.[31] For better or worse, it was fighting its own wars. When Portugal surrendered its African territories, the cause was not lack of money or supplies, much less because the United States had told it to stop, but rather because its fighting men and their families had come to see the human and economic cost of the war as excessive.[32]

The Manichaean approach, moreover, short-circuited serious debate about American priorities in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Critics on the Left assumed, conveniently, that the issue of the Azores base was artificial, despite the great value of the base during the Yom Kippur War.[33] Even when they recognized its possible value, they tended to dismiss NATO as a coalition of sinister military or imperialist forces. Thus, a rejection by the dissenters of American power was accompanied by a denial of American interests, and by a refusal to confront the complex choices of the Angolan situation. Simple assertions that the Pentagon wanted to use the Azores base and that this demand conflicted with African liberation sufficied for all serious argument about Europe and the Middle East to go into abeyance.

This alchemy of bias working against traditional interests and alliances also worked in favor of the MPLA, tacitly (and quite improperly) promoting it to a place in the Indochinese apostolic succession. By late 1975—after the Cuban and Soviet intervention—opponents of United States backing of FNLA and UNITA began to argue that it should have learned "the wisdom of failed policies from China in the 1940's to Ho Chi-Minh and Tito."[34] Remarks about "backing winners" and following "the tide of history" abounded in Congress and the media.[35]

[31] Robert S. Smith, "The Nature of American Interests in Africa," *Issue* 2 (Summer 1972): 42.

[32] Even Barbara Rogers, a strenuous critic of Portuguese and American policy in Africa, remarked in 1974 that Portugal could continue fighting "for a very long time to come." House Committee on Foreign Relations, *Complex of U.S.-Portuguese Relations*, 60.

[33] As late as spring 1973, critics were claiming that the Azores base was "no longer strategic." Nancy Freehafer, correspondence, *Africa Today* 20 (1973): 90. Six months later, approximately $1 billion worth of military equipment was flown via the base to Israel, at a time when other staging posts were being denied to the United States.

[34] Roger Morris, "The Pathology of a Blunder," *The New Republic*, 31 January 1976, 23. The lesson, according to Morris, was that the U.S. should "abandon the artificial backing of Roberto and [Jonas] Savimbi [and] offer diplomatic relations and cooperation to the winning faction."

[35] One of the earliest to become agitated about "backing a winner" was Senator Hubert Humphrey, who in August 1974 wrote to Kissinger urging indiscriminate support of the liberation movments in Portuguese Africa. Humphrey declared: "We have learned from painful experience the consequences of our being on the wrong side of issues of tremendous importance to other countries. . . . We must get on the right side of this issue before it it too late." Humphrey to Kissinger, 12

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This development was a singular tribute to the creative power of reflexive dissent, especially considering just how far the MPLA actually was from the irresistible indigenous force that critics supposed the Vietcong to have been. For at the time of the April 1974 military coup in Portugal, the MPLA was, in the words of a resident American observer, "incapable of more than mild harassment of the Portuguese army."[36] In fact, the Portuguese had been transferring troops to the more dangerous Mozambican front, having lost only eighty-one soldiers in Angola throughout 1973.[37] Not only was the MPLA just one of three ethnically and territorially circumscribed movements, but it was also the most factionalized. Indeed, after the coup in Portugal, a large proportion of the mediation performed by Portugal and the African states was devoted simply to coaxing the MPLA into one piece for purposes of negotiating independence. After the negotiations were concluded, the most active military wing of the MPLA defected to Holden Roberto and the FNLA. At most, the MPLA had 10,000 guerrillas; though they were reputed to be experienced and effective, they had lost active Soviet support by the start of 1974.[38]

The ultimate diplomatic victory of the MPLA was partly because of its Marxist rhetoric which, in the circumstances of 1974–75, lent it a persuasive allure of invincibility. The coup in Portugal no doubt enhanced this image, although in truth the credit for wearing down the Portuguese belonged not to Angolans of any party, but to the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in Guine-Bissau and to the Frente de Libertaçâo de Mozambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique.[39] In fact, these were the real African "Vietcong" organizations, in terms of holding a political monopoly and of demonstrating military control. Both had their followers in the United States, but neither got (or needed) the active moral and diplomatic support that the MPLA received and that enabled it, with Soviet and Cuban help, to disregard the power-sharing agreement it had signed in January 1975 and to avoid reconciliation with the FNLA and UNITA.[40] The MPLA was not inherently like

August 1974, reprinted in House Committee on Foreign Relations, *Complex of U.S.-Portuguese Relations*, 239.

[36] Brown, "Report from Luanda," 43.

[37] Colin Legum, "A Letter on Angola to U.S. Liberals," *The New Republic*, 31 January 1976, 17; Kenneth L. Adelman, "Report from Angola," *Foreign Affairs* 53 (1975): 563.

[38] In early 1974, according to Charles Ebinger and others, the MPLA's chances of success appeared marginal. See Charles K. Ebinger, "External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War," *Orbis* 20 (1976): 671. The FNLA was generally reckoned to have the largest army, with up to 15,000 guerrillas. Many of these, however, were held in reserve at a base in Zaire. UNITA certainly had the smallest force, of roughly 1,000 men. Christopher Stevens, in a recent study, notes that "the MPLA was by late 1974 considerably weaker than the FNLA, which had larger and apparently more effective forces." See "The Soviet Role in Africa," in John Seiler, ed., *Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1980), 47.

[39] "Angola," in Colin Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1974–75* (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1975), B-527.

[40] The agreement, known as the Alvor Accord, provided for a coalition under formal Portuguese

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the "Vietcong," nor did its achievements by the time of the Portuguese coup entitle it to such a comparison. But by a complex convergence of prejudices and reflexes it somehow became seen as the natural, rightful, and invincible winner. It became like the Vietcong; or rather, it had similar characteristics thrust upon it.

By the same process, the United States inexorably acquired the reputation of having turned a peaceful decolonization into a major cold war confrontation. To Andrew Young and others in Congress, the United States was primarily responsible for introducing outside forces, and the Soviet Union and Cuba were merely reacting, opportunistically or not, to a clumsy CIA attempt to install its client, the FNLA, in power.[41] Kissinger, indeed, encouraged or provoked his critics by presenting the conflict as a simple superpower confrontation.[42]

Yet few scholars now seem to believe that the initial $300,000 grant made by the 40 Committee to Roberto's group triggered off the huge shipments of arms from the East that had become apparent in the spring of 1975.[43] As Colin Legum has pointed out, it was American liberals, not the Soviet government, who made this claim.[44] Although the Soviets had suspended military aid to the MPLA in 1973 (because of internal factionalism in the Angolan movement), their ideological commitment was never seriously in doubt, and the only question seems to have been what degree of support was practical and prudent. Certainly, the Soviets blamed American imperialism for the ensuing war, but on the grounds that it frustrated the ascent to power of the "progressive elements," not because it transgressed an abstract principle of nonintervention.

Kissinger's version may have been as oversimplified as that of his critics was misconceived. In both, a superpower conceit combined with the dramatic requirements of a medieval morality play to exclude the possibility of provoca-

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tutelage to administer the transition and the holding of elections for a constituent assembly in time for independence, scheduled for 11 November 1975.

[41] Andrew Young, then a member of the House, referred to military intervention "supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and above all the United States." *Congressional Record*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 16 December 1975, 40481–82. For similar attributions of responsibility, see Morris, "The Pathology of a Blunder," 21; *New York Times*, 19 December 1975. Marcum, who disapproved of the American intervention, accepted that "in October or November 1974, the Soviets themselves resumed modest arms shipments to the MPLA." Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," 413.

[42] Kissinger's position was that the United States was indifferent between the contending parties, but was not prepared to see the Soviet Union install the MPLA as its client. In his own words: "We are not opposed to the MPLA as such. We make a distinction between the factions in Angola and the outside intervention. We can live with any of the factions in Angola, and we would never have given assistance to any of the other factions if other great powers had stayed out of it." See *Department of State Bulletin* 74 (1976): 71. It should be noted that Kissinger here seemed to be implicating the Chinese as well as the Russians.

[43] See, for example, Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 81–99; Stevens, "The Soviet Role in Africa," 47–48. The 40 Committee comprised senior policymakers responsible for monitoring covert operations.

[44] Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola," in Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record*, A–3.

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tions and responses by third, fourth, and *n*th parties. In particular, the Americans ignored the Chinese, who by mid-1974 were training and arming the FNLA. In fact, according to one highly plausible account, the Chinese may have been decisive in provoking the Russians to intervene so heavily on the side of the MPLA.[45]

Kissinger and his aides may have exaggerated the extent to which the Cubans acted merely as proxies of the Soviet Union. His critics, in denouncing American intervention, completely overlooked the sustained, complex, and intense involvement in Angolan politics of factions within the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement. Portuguese intervention in the period between the coup of April 1974 and the January 1975 agreement alternately favored the FNLA and the MPLA. Since such intervention involved rather byzantine maneuvering in the corridors of Luanda, it was not widely reported in the American press. In any case, this maneuvering was overshadowed by the formal diplomacy of Portugal, which sought and achieved a united front comprising all the nationalist positions as a basis for reaching an agreement on independence.[46]

Yet arguably, the Portuguese factions contributed significantly to the fighting of 1975, since they encouraged all three Angolan groupings to go on believing in the possibility of taking power alone, perhaps with outside help. So, too, did some of the African states (notably Zaire, which was very anxious to see Roberto prevail) and liberation movements elsewhere (both FRELIMO in Mozambique and the PAIGC in Guine-Bissau openly sided with the MPLA).

What needs to be explained, therefore, is less the CIA's role or the Soviet resumption of aid than the inability of policymakers and commentators in the United States to perceive the Angolan crisis in terms other than those of primary Soviet or American responsibility. Neither policymakers nor critics, in their shared fixation with "the lessons of Vietnam," could allow a situation in Africa to escape the framework of their domestic preoccupations and to be complex and ambiguous on its own terms.

Only such a fixation can account for the subtle but inexorable movement of liberal opinion (following revelation of the CIA's role) away from the standard "regionalist" view—that Angola was a civil war, even an ethnic war, in which outsiders had no business—toward a view bestowing a presumptive legitimacy on the MPLA. To some extent, this view involved acceptance of a fait accompli, considering the rout of the FNLA and UNITA by Cuban troops and Soviet equipment. This acceptance was reinforced by the propensity of American Africanists to "follow African opinion," which as usual preferred any established government, however illegitimate, to civil war, however justified.

[45] Ibid., A-34-5; Legum, "A Letter on Angola," 17-18. See also Ebinger, "External Intervention," 686-92.

[46] Ebinger, "External Intervention," 686, 690; Testimonies of John Marcum, Gerald J. Bender, and Douglas Wheeler, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee of African Affairs, *United States Policy Toward Southern Africa: Hearings, June 11-July 29, 1975, an Overview of U.S. Relations With Southern Africa*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 92-93, 98, 111; Douglas Porch, *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution* (London: Croon Helm, 1977), 118.

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But such an explanation was hardly dignified for liberal lawmakers faced by conservatives exasperated at the curbs imposed by the Clark Amendment.[47] Thus, the myth of the MPLA's historic legitimacy arose, grounded in the endowment of virtue and authority that critics instinctively bestowed upon any victim of the CIA. How otherwise—when no elections had been held, when such authority as existed rested on firepower (mostly foreign), and when faced with the indeterminacy of mandate implicit in a civil war—could as honest and intelligent a congressman as Donald Bonker have concluded that "if anyone really has a legitimate claim to ruling Angola, it probably is the MPLA"? How else could he have decided that "the MPLA might not be so undesirable an alternative to the FNLA?"[48]

Reflexive dissent on the side of the critics was matched by a horror of vulnerability on the side of Kissinger. According to both Nathaniel Davis and Roger Morris, Kissinger's thinking about Angola was dominated by a determination not to seem irresolute, and this determination informed his application of the Vietnam analogy to central Africa. In autumn 1975 and early 1976, when news of the CIA operation had set every liberal nerve jangling, Kissinger repeatedly insisted that there was no possibility of direct American involvement in Angola. Yet earlier his view, in Davis's words, was that "if we go in, we must go in quickly, massively, and decisively enough to avoid the tempting, gradual, mutual escalation that characterized Vietnam during the 1965–1967 period."[49] Such escalation was, of course, exactly what his critics feared might be imminent, despite Kissinger's protestations that "in wars of national liberation, which have a largely local origin. . . the United States will not become involved simply because it prefers one group over another."[50] What actually happened was that both sides—possessed by the dread of further humiliation, and equally but differently preoccupied by the Vietnam precedent—ended up preferring one group. Kissinger seems to have done so in a spirit of desperate gambling, feeling, as Davis observed, that "it was better to roll the dice against the longest of odds than to abandon the competition against our great adversary."[51] The liberals backed "the tide of history" (Senator Dick Clark's chosen phrase), assuming

[47] The Clark Amendment prohibited the use of United States funds for operations inside Angola without express authorization by Congress.

[48] House Committee on International Relations, *United States Policy on Angola*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 26 January 1976, 34; *Congressional Record*, 12 December 1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 40426. On December 16, Bonker produced a fine example of warring analogies. Speaking of the American dilemma, he remarked: "if we simply abandon the field, the Soviet Union may get away with international thuggery and a reckless game of bluff and poker. . . . We are left to choose between *the quagmire of Indochina and the shame of Munich*." *Congressional Record*, 16 December 1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 41066 (emphasis added).

[49] Nathaniel Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (1978): 114.

[50] Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, *Angola: Hearings*, 25.

[51] Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1974," 123–24. For a shrewd commentary on the use of gaming metaphors in this period, see Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, "Poker-Chip Diplomacy," *The Nation*, 27 March 1976, 371–72.

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that it embodied, like the medieval ordeal, some imminent principle of justice, the working of which was somehow democratically confirmed by the African states' parallel preference for "winners."[52]

The Vietnam Metaphor in Decay?

Under President Jimmy Carter, the Vietnam War still exercised its hypnotic power over left, right, and center. The main change was that the diplomatic pragmatists (those who believed in "getting behind the Africans") were more influential within the administration, though their opponents (those who believed in some renewal of American initiative) were also strong, especially within the National Security Council. During this period, the liberals showed the same desire as before to identify with the "tide of history" and to discern putative Vietcongs floating along with it. The conservatives evinced their characteristic fear of seeming intimidated by the Vietnam experience and their same itch to show the Russians and Cubans that America was "still in the game."

With Carter's inauguration, the liberals were temporarily in control. Now, said *The New Republic* in May 1977, America had at last shown the African moderates that its policy in southern Africa was "firmly pro-black. We are not backing Nhus, Diems, Kys, and Thieus." Significantly, however, the journal rejected isolationism and rebuked those who wanted "to steer clear of every puddle in the street for fear it might be a quagmire." Indeed, it said the lesson of the Indochina conflict was not isolation, but involvement: "If we had acted self-confidently in Vietnam thirty years ago, we might not be so perplexed about Africa today."[53]

The Invasion of Zaire

The residual strength of the Vietnam reflex was shown, however, by reactions to the two invasions of the Shaba province of Zaire in March 1977 and May 1978 by dissidents based in Angola. These invasions highlighted the appalling condition of Zaire itself. Economically, because of Mobutu's profligacy and mismanagement, and because of falling copper prices, it was near to bankruptcy, despite (or perhaps because of) large loans from American and other banks. Politically, Zaire was corrupt and authoritarian.[54] As the economic situ-

[52] The basic contradiction between wishing to be seen to support self-determination (which implied neutrality between parties) and wanting to be found on the winning side is perfectly illustrated in a statement by Congressman Herman Badillo: "As in Vietnam, we proclaim the right of the people to determine their own future, and yet we have allied outselves with factions in Angola that are so weak that they are almost certainly doomed to failure." *Congressional Record*, 10 December 1975, 94th Cong. 1st sess., 41081–82.

[53] Editorial, "Africa Isn't Vietnam," *The New Republic*, May 14, 1977, 5–6.

[54] By 1977, Zaire had a foreign debt of $3 billion, and it was estimated that the living standard had fallen by 50 per cent since 1963. In 1978, Crawford Young, a highly respected American student of Zaire, suggested that Mobutu's personal property holdings in Europe were worth $25 million and

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ation worsened, critics began to warn of the danger of getting isolated with Mobutu, to note the reappearance of a "familiar" scene ("so reminiscent of Indochina and Angola"), and to worry that the United States had "learned nothing in dealing with 'Third World' phenomena."[55] The State Department seems to have been divided between those who wanted to put some distance between Mobutu and America's reputation and those who believed that Zaire was too strategically important for the United States to abandom him.

During the first invasion, known as "Shaba I," the distancing faction on the whole prevailed. The Carter administration affirmed its support of Mobutu, but refused his demands for increased military help (including one for $60,000 worth of Coca-Cola). Even so, worry about American involvement quickly mounted. Roger Morris wrote in *The New Republic*:

> In miniature—and with all the obvious differences in time and place—it is uncomfortably reminiscent of Southeast Asia. With nervous chuckles, officials refer to Kinshasa as "Saigon noire." . . . Once again, by sheer inertia, we are on a losing side. . . .[56]

"Shaba II" produced a sharply different reaction from the administration. Alarmed by Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa, it became briefly convinced that the Cubans in Angola had trained the rebels and were using them to destabilize Zaire. No evidence was produced in support of this rather impetuous charge, and the administration quickly went into an undignified retreat. Nevertheless, the old wound was inflamed. Lewis Le Droit remarked in *The New Republic*: "The official American attitude toward President Mobutu is a bit reminiscent of the sentiments once expressed about the old South Vietnamese government."[57] Though there was no suggestion of dispatching American troops, Senator Clark warned: "As we know from our recent experiences in Vietnam, small-scale assistance in an ongoing conflict can lead to a quagmire from which we cannot escape."[58] Senators George McGovern and Frank Church echoed these warnings.

Even the fact that the French undertook the "Stanleyville" role of landing troops to evacuate Europeans from Shaba did not quell the nervousness of liberal critics. One noted that since the French force was stretched to its limit, there was a risk that the administration might "submit an African edition of the Tonkin Gulf resolution to Congress," while another noted that "the last time

his cash holdings in Switzerland $70 million. At the same time, some 75 per cent of the population had no access to public health services and the amount of usable roads had gone down from 140,000 kilometers in the early 1960s to approximately 20,000 kilometers. Crawford Young, "Zaire: The Unending Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (1978): 173. See also Reed Kramer, "The African Tar Baby," *The Nation*, 30 April 1977, 521–22.

[55] Tad Szulc, "Our Man Mobutu: After Angola, Zaire?" *The New Republic*, 21 February 1976, 5–7.

[56] Roger Morris, "Our Man Mobutu," *The New Republic*, 7 May, 1977, 11.

[57] Lewis Le Droit, "The Mobutu Rescue," *The New Republic*, 10 June 1978, 8.

[58] Senator Dick Clark, "Angola Still Off Limits: Reaffirming the Clark Amendment," *The Nation*, 5 December 1978, 112.

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we started mopping up after the French, it cost us 55,000 American lives."[59] Yet on this occasion signs of dissent began to appear. The editors of *The New Republic* again stood apart from their contributors, arguing that if it was necessary to confront the Russians and Cubans, "Zaire is as good a place as any in Africa to do so."[60]

The Patriotic Front in Rhodesia

Even more significant stirrings of revisionism began to appear during 1978 and 1979 in debate about the Rhodesian conflict. The catalyst seems to have been the relationship that developed between the United States government and the Patriotic Front (PF), the union of guerrilla movements led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo.

In September 1977, the American and British governments proposed a scheme (the Anglo-American plan) for achieving a transfer of power in Rhodesia and a government based on universal suffrage. The strategy behind the plan was to create guarantees of impartiality (through the establishment of a British and United Nations presence) that would be so firm that all nationalist groups could be persuaded or cajoled into accepting the plan's provisions. Since incentives would also be offered to white Rhodesians, it was hoped that the plan would both isolate Ian Smith and bring the guerrillas into the political process.

Smith, however, managed to arrange an "internal settlement" in 1978 with two nationalist leaders, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole, and then to hold elections in 1979 under a constitution that left disproportionate power in white hands. Given the unsatisfactory terms of the settlement, it is not surprising that the Patriotic Front and many European and North American radicals and liberals rejected it as a "sell-out." But public opinion in the United States proved surprisingly divided. The Carter administration, in fact, had a tough battle to maintain sanctions against the Smith-Muzorewa government.

One reason for this change of mood in the United States was undoubtedly a feeling that the war had reached a particularly bloody and hopeless stage by 1978–79, and a recognition that people in the countryside were suffering badly and desperately wanted peace. However, a specific reaction against the Patriotic Front seems also to have set in. The cause had to do with the PF's attitude toward the Anglo-American plan and the PF's view of its own tactical strength. Between September 1977 and January 1978, Mugabe and Nkomo effectively threw the scheme back in the faces of its sponsors. They rejected any role for the United Nations, refused to meet the designated British representative (while simultaneously demanding that the British solve the Rhodesian problem), and denied Muzorewa and Sithole the right to participate in the talks, despite evidence that Muzorewa, at least, had a substantial following and organization

[59] Norman Birnbaum, "Tough Talk Is No Foreign Policy," *The Nation*, 1 July 1978, 17; Peter C. Bruce, correspondence, *The New Republic*, 24 June 1978, 7.

[60] Editorial, "Talking Tough Versus Acting Tough," *The New Republic*, 27 May 1978, 5.

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within Rhodesia. Mugabe and Nkomo demanded a simple transfer of control to their own army and, most damagingly, scorned the need for elections, a standard part of the British procedure for decolonization.[61]

The reasons for this intransigence were complex, but a major motive seems to have been the calculation that the British and Americans were so anxious for peace that they would countenance "another Mozambique"—that is, a direct transfer of power to the liberation movement. The Western powers feared "another Angola," with either Russian or Cuban intervention or a civil war between the Mugabe and Nkomo wings of the PF. The Organization of African Unity and the neighboring states—Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania—were behind the guerrillas and had, accordingly, delegitimized Muzorewa and Sithole.[62] Moreover, the PF claimed an entitlement to rule, both on the basis of its fighting record and on its "correct" ideological stance; the sacrifices of war and "progressive" credentials provided a mandate to rule superior to that given by what one sympathizer called "electoral procedures and the like."[63]

If the PF did see itself as next in the Indochinese apostolic succession, it was in for a disappointment. Mugabe and Nkomo may have been encouraged by the guerrilla cult in the United States to believe they were next in line, but FRELIMO—the true African Vietcong—quickly disabused them. Joaquim Chissano, foreign minister of Mozambique, remarked in November 1977 (when the PF was at its most intransigent) that, much as he sympathized with its struggle, the PF's hope of emulating FRELIMO was deluded. He argued: "The Patriotic Front has not beaten Smith. They are imitating FRELIMO's political tactics of 1975, without being in a position to emulate them effectively."[64] Though Chissano did not spell out the difference, it was that the PF not only had failed to achieve the same military dominance that FRELIMO had in 1974–75, but also had failed to achieve the unity or to demonstrate the type of political support that FRELIMO had gotten the Portuguese to acknowledge in Mozambique.

Chissano advised the PF to concede to the Anglo-American plan and to accept the verdict of elections. But by the time the PF did so, Ian Smith announced himself a convert to majority rule and made a settlement with Muzorewa and Sithole. In this sense, the PF, banking on the Vietnam reflex to get itself escorted into power, actually enabled Smith (apparently quite consciously) to imitate Anwar el-Sadat's 1977 passage into Israel. Just as Sadat had allegedly hoped to isolate the Arab radicals by negotiating directly with Menachem Begin, so Smith supposedly hoped to isolate the PF by making a deal with the "moderates," Muzorewa and Sithole. Thus, Smith was able to embrace

[61] President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia supported the rejection of elections.

[62] For the contribution of the African states to undermining Muzorewa and Sithole, see Chester A. Crocker, "Lost in Africa," *The New Republic*, 18 February 1978, 15–17.

[63] John S. Saul, "Portugal and the Mozambican Revolution," *Monthly Review*, September 1974, 64.

[64] Quoted in Conor Cruise O'Brien, "The End of White Rule?" *New York Review of Books*, 9 March 1978, 26.

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the very nationalism he had opposed since 1962.[65] One analogy thus trounced another! Smith also seems to have calculated that the PF, having mishandled the Anglo-American scheme, would become even more intransigent once the internal settlement had gone into effect and a black-led government was installed. He believed that Mugabe and Nkomo would step up the war, especially as it became clear that the outside world's sympathies were wavering. In desperation, they would eventually call in the Cubans and Russians. Then, given the Angolan precedent, the Americans would be forced to intervene on the side of Smith and Muzorewa.

In the event, of course, Lord Carrington's diplomacy prevented this engineered reenactment of the Angolan civil war from coming to pass. But the episode remains a splendid example of the power of historical precedent and of a clash between strategies based on different readings of recent history. It also illustrates the weakening of the Vietnam analogy. For one factor in the PF's miscalculation was its overestimation of its capacity to sway Western opinion. Indeed, by mid-1979, Smith and Muzorewa were clearly making inroads on the blocs of liberal and social democratic opinion that had previously tended to see the PF as the "wave of the future."

Was this change caused by observation of Rhodesian politics? Or was it due to the fading of Vietnam as an experience, a memory, and a source of hopes and fears? With the available evidence, it is possible only to speculate. But it seems that the baldly undemocratic posture of the PF may have jolted many non-Marxist critics in the United States, as well as democratic socialists elsewhere, into an awareness of differences among themselves, the Marxist Left, and some African nationalists with respect to basic values and assumptions. These differences had become blurred in the time of the Vietnam War, when any enemy of an enemy was a friend. During 1978–79, a distinctly skeptical and wary note about the PF was evident in such European socialist journals as *The New Statesman*.[66] More remarkable still was an article in *The New Republic* by Roger Morris, a veteran critic of United States African policy, despite his early associations with Richard Nixon. Writing after the April 1979 elections, which led to Muzorewa becoming prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Morris called on Americans not to make snap judgments about the situation in Zimbabwe and particularly not to yield to "the grip of some irrelevant experience":

[65] The theory that Smith was influenced by the Sadat initiative is advanced in Daniel I. Fine, "Ian Smith Times It Right," *The Nation*, 1 April 1978, 366.

[66] For example, in July 1979 David Caute, an editor of the *New Statesman* and a stringent critic of the internal settlement, remarked: "To appreciate the enormity of the Salisbury Agreement we need not pretend that Nkomo and Mugabe are dedicated democrats. . . . Mugabe, indeed, openly espouses a one-party state and makes no secret of the fact that any election won by ZANU [the Zimbabwe African National Union] would be Zimbabwe's last." "The Sham Election in Rhodesia," *The Nation*, 14 July 1979, 47. See also Christopher Hitchens (also of the *New Statesman*), "Zimbabwe Peace," *The Nation*, 29 December 1979, 679.

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The Patriotic Front is not, after all, the historically inevitable Vietcong of yesterday's imagination, and Bishop Muzorewa is not necessarily the doomed General Thieu, though the battle-scarred veterans of Foggy Bottom seem prone to draw parallels.[67]

Political Culture and International Relations

Whether or not the ghost of Vietnam has actually begun to lose its haunting power, it has clearly inspired fear, among other emotions, in groups of all political persuasions in the United States. These groups have reacted differently to the same stimulus, according to their values and assumptions and according to the ways in which they see the experience of Vietnam.

To identify the power and the effects of the Vietnam analogy is not, therefore, to suggest that liberals, or conservatives, were more affected in their judgments than any other group. Nor is it to say that analogizing per se is wrong: all thoughtful observers need to simplify, compare, and draw on past experience. The point emphasized here is that when countries are as different and as unequal as the United States and the sub-Saharan African states and when the difference of culture and historical experience are so great, the temptation to apply simple analogies—in order to bypass the labors of entering into another culture and of accommodating its world-view—is necessarily strong.

Some of the results of yielding to this temptation have been demonstrated here by indicating the consequences of semantically imposed historical analogies on Africa. The tendency to impose analogies is one aspect of a wider projection of values and concept—a more general propensity, however unconscious, to "intervene" morally and intellectually. Such a propensity is the cultural or conceptual counterpart of a political or strategic relationship, and the two phenomena reinforce one another. Moreover, all schools of thought are prone to use Africa for their causes, and to subject it to their values and assumptions. In examining American-African relationships, observers look deeply into American political culture: the values and assumptions invoked are basic to that culture, though their emphases and interpretations may vary.

A cultural focus would necessitate a broadening of American approaches to international relations by deliberately incorporating materials and concepts usually employed by anthropologists and linguists, as well as by historians of ideas and sociologists of knowledge. In the case of United States-African relations, it is certainly possible to understand the relations of, say, Zaire and the United States as relations of exchange and domination within the usual diplomatic, economic, and strategic categories. But they represent only the surface of a cultural encounter that has been rich, profound, ambiguous, and even traumatic, and that informs the substance of conventional international relations. Such encounters create many of those elements of incongruity or "irra-

[67] Roger Morris, "Rhodesian Shadows," *The New Republic*, 5 May 1979, 12.

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tionality" that often occur but that are commonly discounted or explained away.

Perhaps one of the main weaknesses of international studies as currently conducted—and of American foreign policy—is a cultural propensity to avoid the scrutiny of other cultures. Both students and policymakers seem to prefer solutions involving improvements of procedure or additions to technical capacity (such as more efficient ways of processing information, changes in organization, and even better military equipment) to solutions based on assessments of values and assumptions. Despite the findings of presidential commissions regarding the parochialism of American education, the attitudes forming current policymaking and diplomacy, apparently dominant in the general public, offer little hope of a culturally more sophisticated approach to international relations.*

* I would like to thank James S. Coleman, Alexander George, Robert Jervis, Colin Legum, William C. Potter, Richard Sklar, and M. Crawford Young for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as the Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, under whose auspices it was written.

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Vice-Presidential Influence Under Rockefeller and Mondale

PAUL LIGHT

Nelson A. Rockefeller and Walter F. Mondale were vice-presidents to Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter, respectively. Both Rockefeller and Mondale had access to the Oval Office. Both had the president's willingness to listen. Both had ample staff support from an expanded Office of the Vice-President.[1] Both had enough time, energy, policy expertise, and proximity to the president to play an advisory role.

Rockefeller and Mondale served as senior White House advisers, rather than as errand-boys, political hitmen, professional mourners, and incidental commission chairmen, as vice-presidents had for the preceding 200 years. Rockefeller and Mondale were never relegated to the isolation of the ceremonial vice-presidency. In terms of access to the president, they both operated somewhere on a continuum between cabinet members at one end and the inner circle at the other. Both had frequent one-on-one meetings with the president, and worked for influence across a broad range of issues. Whereas previous vice-presidents were frozen out of the advisory process, Rockefeller and Mondale sustained their input across the term. The major difference between the two vice-presidents, of course, was that Mondale had much more influence over policy outcomes than Rockefeller. Both were advisers, but only one had influence.

[1] Paul Light, *Vice-Presidential Power: Advice and Influence in the White House* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1984).

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The Changing Vice-Presidency

Although scholars such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., have found many faults with the vice-presidency—prompting Schlesinger to ask if it is "really necessary"—it remains the first in line for succesion.[2] Scholars may argue about the pros and cons of this constitutional hybrid, but in the realm of real-world politics, the vice-presidency remains firmly fixed in the presidential system. Whatever the checkered history of the office, it has become a primary recruiting ground for presidential candidates. Like the Senate, the vice-presidency is now an "incubator" of nominees. Of the last twelve party nominees, six were former vice-presidents, and another is a current front-runner for the Democratic nomination in 1984. Though no vice-president since Martin Van Buren has been elected to the presidency immediately following his term, the office currently offers greater visibility and access to party leaders than any other national or state position save the presidency itself. Thus, it should be of some interest to see just what kind of training these potential candidates have lately been receiving.

The vice-presidency also offers a rare opportunity for studying institutional evolution in the modern presidency. In 1974, Schlesinger wrote that "history has shown the American Vice Presidency to be a job of spectacular and . . . incurable frustration."[3] The Rockefeller and Mondale vice-presidencies suggest that Schlesinger was wrong. According to Mondale: "I learned in a way I could not have learned any other way, my sense of confidence and my ability to be President, to shape a government, where the talent is, how the Presidency works, my knowledge of adversaries as well as friends, my experience in international relations, dealing with intelligence problems and defense problems and Congress—all of that has been possible because I was Vice President."[4] There is little doubt that Mondale's vice-presidency was different from those of the past. Though Mondale faced his share of internal defeats, he never entered the "deep-freeze" of so many predecessors. Like Mondale, Rockefeller's frustration came less from the traditional vice-presidential isolation than from his inability to influence President Ford's agenda. Unlike previous vice-presidents, Rockefeller did not have to fight for airplanes, staff support, or access to the president. Like Mondale, Rockefeller operated at a different level from the historical norm. He was fighting for influence, not just the opportunity to give advice.

Rockefeller and Mondale were enough like other presidential advisers to shed some light on more generalizable patterns of advice and influence. What resources are needed for influence? What strategies increase impact? What cycles shape policy outcomes? The Rockefeller and Mondale cases should help answer some of these questions. There are, of course, important differences between vice-presidents and other advisers. Vice-presidents are rarely hired for their loyalty or even their expertise. They are usually selected to balance the presiden-

[2] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "On the Presidential Succession," *Political Science Quarterly* 89 (1974): 475–505.

[3] Ibid., 478.

[4] See Walter Mondale, Remarks at the University of Minnesota, 18 February 1981, press copy.

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tial ticket. Indeed, according to several aides to Richard M. Nixon, Spiro T. Agnew was selected primarily because he was the least damaging of all the vice-presidential possibilities. Once selected and elected, vice-presidents cannot be fired; they sign on for the duration. Further, a vice-president's efforts to build internal influence may be taken as a threat not just to the staff, but to the president himself. Also, if the vice-president is a defeated rival, his speeches may return to haunt him in office, as with George Bush's remarks about "voodoo economics."

Yet there are similarities that make generalization possible. Like cabinet members and other White House aides, vice-presidents are almost totally dependent on the president for their support. Like cabinet members and White House aides, vice-presidents function on the basis of changing customs and practices, with no constitutional mandate for policy input. Like other advisers, a vice-president's influence varies in different cycles and across different policy areas. And though cabinet members and White House loyalists generally have more advantages based on departmental staffs or formal powers, their ability to influence the policy agenda is very much a problem of persuasion, not formal prerogatives. Finally, like all White House players, the vice-president's influence rests on the president's own style. The president's view of the office, sensitivity to territorial threats, policy goals, management style, willingness to listen, even the ability to forgive past campaign indiscretions, all shape the vice-president's impact.[5] Thus, in terms of their dependence on the president, their reliance on changing roles, their need for a permeable decision-making system, and their need for basic influence resources, vice-presidents are very much like any other White House advisers who must use persuasion to shape the president's agenda.

A Definition of Influence

As an aide to Senator (and former Vice-President) Hubert H. Humphrey once noted: "Everybody says Mondale had a lot of influence. But you have to distinguish input and influence. Input is the opportunity to have your say. It's now a basic right in the Vice-Presidency, thanks to Rockefeller and Mondale. Influence is the ability to sway the President, to affect specific decisions."[6] In defining influence, the vice-president's act of giving advice has to be separated from the president's act of taking it. Advice rests on an actor's view of what should or should not be done. Lyndon B. Johnson advised President John F. Kennedy against the Vienna summit with Nikita Khrushchev, Humphrey advised President Johnson against the bombing of North Vietnam, and Mondale advised President Carter against the mid-summer cabinet firings in 1979. In each case, advice did not equal influence. Having the president's ear did not mean having the president's mind.

[5] See Richard Fenno, *The President's Cabinet* (New York: Vintage, 1950), for a discussion of the dependence of the cabinet on presidential style, etc.

[6] This article is based on interviews with presidential and vice-presidential staffs in 1980–81. Because all respondents were assured complete confidentiality, no names are linked to specific quotes.

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Influence thus rests on actual decisions, and involves the ability to change outcomes from what they would have been. Unlike more traditional definitions of the word—in which influence only exists if someone makes (coerces, manipulates, tricks, and the like) someone else to do something he or she would not have done—this definition involves a dynamic view of White House behavior. First, it allows for variations in influence by policy areas (such as domestic, economic, foreign, and defense) and by policy stages (such as agenda-setting, budgeting, and implementation). An adviser might have little influence over domestic agenda-setting, but considerable impact on economic implementation. The fact that Mondale had little influence on labor policy is not evidence that he did not shape policy on education. Second, this definition allows for influence arising from what Matthew Crenson has called "nondecision-making," or the suppression of ideas.[7] Mondale's control of the Carter agenda-setting operation, for example, provided opportunities to elevate or understate issues and alternatives. Third, this definition allows for influence arising from inaction. Doing nothing can often be quite effective in killing a proposal, particularly when active participation is essential for success. Finally, this definition allows for influence by degrees. Partial influence is still influence. Here, influence is not a zero-sum game, where one adviser's gain is always another's loss. Because an administration involves hundeds of decisions, influence will always ebb and flow across time.

The problem with any definition of White House influence is that it is almost impossible to give exact measures of success. There are no boxscores of internal victory, and still fewer objective indicators of influence—no rollcalls, majority opinions, conference reports. The problem is compounded by the fact that vice-presidents and other advisers are reluctant to provide measurements for social science research. Indeed, according to Mondale: "The only reason to state publicly what you have told the President is to take credit for his success and try to escape blame for failure. Either way there is no quicker way to undermine your relationship with the President and lose your effectiveness."[8] Faced with Mondale's low profile and restricted access to Rockefeller's vice-presidential papers, how can their influence in the White House be estimated?

One solution is to compare each vice-president's policy positions before entering office with the president's agenda after. If there are no matches, it can safely be assumed that the vice-president was not influential. Though this approach cannot provide absolute correlations of influence, it does provide some useful comparisons between advisers. Looking across Ford's policy agenda, for example, only three decisions bear Rockefeller's imprint: establishment of the Energy Independence Authority (viewed by many staff members as a hollow gesture to a frustrated vice-president); several pieces of regulatory reform; and a drug control initiative. Ford's tight budget policy did not fit with Rockefeller's

[7] Matthew A. Crenson, *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decision-Making* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970).

[8] Mondale, Remarks.

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expansionary agenda. Moreover, Rockefeller was effectively isolated from the economic and foreign policy arenas. His old friend and protégé, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, could not tolerate competition, even from Nelson Rockefeller. In contrast, Mondale was involved in a number of Carter decisions, such as the $50 tax rebate (which Carter eventually withdrew), the establishment of a Department of Education, welfare reform, expanded jobs funds, movement toward a Camp David summit between Menachem Begin and Anwar el-Sadat, the Vietnamese boat-people rescue, enactment of the Panama Canal treaties, cancellation of the B-1 bomber, expansion of the SALT II treaties, the development of an urban assistance package, and electoral reform. Mondale also persuaded Carter on a number of cabinet appointments, including Joseph Califano (secretary of health, education, and welfare), Bob Bergland (secretary of agriculture), Cyrus Vance (secretary of state), Michael Blumenthal (secretary of the treasury), Moon Landrieu (secretary of housing and urban development), and Neil Goldschmidt (secretary of transportation), as well as several key White House deputies including Charles Schultze (of the Council of Economic Advisers), Bertram Carp (deputy to Stuart Eizenstat), and David Aaron (deputy to Zbigniew Brezezinski). Whether Mondale was the swing vote on all of these decisions is doutful. However, it is highly unlikely that Mondale merely supported policies Carter already favored. As discussed later, Carter preferred to be pulled and pushed on most major decisions, leaving ample room for persuasion. Thus, on this first clue to influence, there is considerable evidence that Mondale was more influential than Rockefeller.

A second approach for measuring influence is simply asking the various staffs about the vice-president's influence. In all, over 100 presidential and vice-presidential aides were interviewed. Of the twenty or so top Mondale aides, eighteen were interviewed; of the twenty top Rockefeller aides, sixteen were contacted. In order to cross-check these responses, sizable groups of presidential aides were also interviewed. Together, twenty-six Carter and Ford assistants were interviewed about their respective vice-presidents. Only 33 percent of the Rockefeller staff and only 14 percent of the Ford staff said that Rockefeller had any influence over the Ford agenda. In contrast, 100 percent of the Mondale staff and over 80 percent of the Carter staff said that Mondale influenced Carter's agenda. Though there was predictable overstating of importance among the vice-president's staff, the interviews remain the clearest indicator of influence. Where the comparisons of policy agendas gives clues, the interviews give confirmation. Thus, if staff perceptions are accepted as an indicator of influence, Mondale emerges as a key player in the White House policy process, while Rockefeller does not.

None of this is to suggest that Rockefeller failed as an adviser. He performed that role well. He offered competing advice for the Ford agenda, and had independent access to the Oval Office. He added critical information and expertise to the Ford White House at a critical time. Yet Rockefeller was not as successful in winning Ford's support for his ideas as other advisers. Rockefeller had input, but not influence. The Rockefeller vice-presidency will be examined in more

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detail in the next section, along with explanations for his lack of influence in the Ford White House.

The Rockefeller Vice-Presidency

Upon accepting the appointment as vice-president in August 1974, Rockefeller had a number of reasons to expect substantive impact. He had Ford's assurances that he would be given a major role in domestic affairs. He also had the supreme self-confidence of a former governor of New York and of a member of the Rockefeller family. As James Reichley, a Ford assistant and political historian, argued:

> When Ford offered him the vice-presidency, it seemed to Rockefeller that he might after all have an opportunity to apply his vision and resources at the summit of national authority, even if not as president. (And if he were the incumbent vice-president, who could be sure what 1976 would bring?) He liked and respected Ford—"loved the guy"—but he probably shared Nixon's view that Ford was not likely to be a dynamic national leader. Rockefeller saw that the staff Ford was bringing to the White House would need a great deal of help in managing the executive branch. He anticipated a good working relationship with [Robert] Hartmann, whom he had first known as a journalist, and who he assumed would remain Ford's closest personal adviser. [Phillip] Buchen and [William] Seidman were members of the Grand Rapids affiliate of the eastern establishment that had always formed part of his constituency. He had also formed a friendly association with [Alexander] Haig, who he thought might be staying on as chief of staff.[9]

Moreover, though Ford had been a conservative on most policy issues, he was drifting toward a more liberal position at the outset of his administration. Ford had endorsed national health insurance following his inauguration and had sponsored a new amnesty program for Vietnam draft evaders. Who better than Rockefeller to anchor the liberal wing of a new Republican coalition?

During the first few months, Rockefeller succeeded in his advisory role. He won control of the Domestic Council following a bitter contest with Donald Rumsfeld, Ford's new chief of staff. He won Ford's signature on a massive Energy Independence Authority, which would have provided over $100 billion in federal loan guarantees for energy development, had not Ford later decided to abandon it in Congress. He also persuaded Ford to reestablish the position of a White House Science and Technology Adviser. In the first three months following Rockefeller's confirmation, the new vice-president was an active participant inside the White House. Yet, almost as quickly as he had risen, Rockefeller had lost most of his influence. As one Rockefeller aide argued:

> There were really two periods in the Rockefeller vice-presidency. The first ran only a couple of months and was one of influence. Rockefeller took over the Domestic Council and started producing some interesting programs. The second started in March

[9] James A. Reichley, *Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford Administrations* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), 299.

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1975, and lasted the rest of the term. The political staff was able to cut Rockefeller out and persuade Ford that he couldn't win in 1976 with Rockefeller on the ticket. After Rockefeller was defeated inside the White House, he spent the rest of his time on his policy forums. He'd get a few Cabinet members together and go out around the country on a "dog-and-pony" show.

There are at least six explanations for Rockefeller's problems in the Ford White House: the delay in his confirmation; his line assignments; strong opponents; Rockefeller's advisory style; the political context; and Ford's own style and policy goals. They will be examined in order of increasing importance.

Of the Ford and Rockefeller aides interviewed, 83 percent mentioned the long delay in Rockefeller's confirmation as a cause of his later frustrations. Rockefeller was nominated to the vice-presidency on 20 August 1974, but was not confirmed until 19 December 1974. According to Reichley's interviews with the vice-president: "Looking back, Rockefeller believed that if Congress had moved quickly to confirm him as vice-president, his relationship with the Ford White House, and perhaps the nature of the Ford presidency, might have been different."[10] Whatever the many causes for the delay—congressional curiosity about the Rockefeller fortune or a Democratic plot to keep Rockefeller from campaigning for Republicans in the 1974 midterm elections—the delay hurt the vice-president on a number of fronts.

First, the unexpected problems with Congress cost Rockefeller some internal support in the Ford White House. As one Ford assistant noted: "We did not expect him to have any troubles and all of a sudden he was embroiled in controversy. There were rumors about his family, rumors about books written by former aides to discredit opponents, rumors about his manipulation of Ford, rumors about his withdrawal. We had hoped for a clean confirmation, but ended up spending some capital rescuing him from Congress." Second, the delay effectively froze Rockefeller out of the domestic policy process during the first four months of the administration. During the hearings, Rockefeller did not engage in any policy planning, nor did he have much contact with the Ford staff. Though Ford offered him an office in the Executive Office Building, Rockefeller would not accept and Ford withdrew the offer. As an aide reported: "He was four months behind at the start and wasn't receiving any briefings to note during the period." Third, the delay meant that Rockefeller was absent from the White House during the critical time when working relationships and networks were being formed within the president's staff. According to a Ford aide: "A lot of things happened over the first four months. It was frozen in place by December. Rockefeller missed the opportunity to build from the ground up. The people who eventually gained the power to cut him off might not have been so successful with Rockefeller in place. Or, better still, they might have owed their jobs to him."

Whatever the costs of the delay in terms of capital or coalition-building, Rockefeller was also hurt by his acceptance of two time-consuming line assign-

[10] Ibid., 300.

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ments once he arrived—the chairmanship of Ford's Commission on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Activities and the vice-chairmanship of the Domestic Council. Both assignments involved significant commitments of time and energy; both involved high levels of internal conflict and placed Rockefeller in the middle of bitter bureaucratic infighting. Of the staffs, 77 percent mentioned the line assignments as a cause of Rockefeller's loss of influence.

According to several aides, Rockefeller accepted the assignments because he believed White House power flowed from formal positions. After all, his protégé, Henry Kissinger, had risen to his heights by using the National Security Council staff as a power base. An assistant to Rockefeller remarked: "He wanted a title beyond being vice-president. . . . He didn't think there was much power in just being vice-president. He wanted to be chairman of the Domestic Council or Chief of Staff. He was one who believed that his influence came from a specific duty. That makes some sense when you look back over his career." Indeed, experience as an assistant secretary of state (1944), under secretary of health, education, and welfare (HEW) (1953), or governor of New York might well lead any adviser to view influence as a product of position. Being a United States senator or representative might lead other advisers to different conclusions. As a Ford presidential assistant suggested: "If you've been in the House for twenty years, you sooner or later learn that power is fluid. It doesn't belong to the Speakership, but to the Speaker. . . . It's something that Nelson Rockefeller never learned. He thought that being vice chairman of the Domestic Council would be enough." The Domestic Council assignment became the most bitter episode in Rockefeller's term. The assignment pinned Rockefeller down to routine administrative chores, exposed him to unforeseen conflict, and exhausted his internal support.

Rockefeller also faced stiff competition inside the White House. Some of his competition came from a single player, Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld. Some came from fiscal conservatives at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA). Both constituted strong opposition to Rockefeller's ideas. It is important to note, however, that Rockefeller was not singled out for special conflict. Though Ford sought to project an image of calm, his White House staff was beset by territorial infighting long before Rockefeller arrived. When Rumsfeld assumed his duties as chief of staff in October 1974, he faced a staff composed of Nixon holdovers, old Ford allies, and a contingent of new Ford aides. Robert Hartmann, Ford's former chief of staff, had been quietly moved to a counselor's position, but refused to yield his old "turf" without a fight. Holdovers continued to belittle Ford's own staff, cabinet members were uncertain of the future, and new staff members were beset by considerable confusion. It should not have come to a surprise that Rumsfeld would try to consolidate his power as quickly as possible. When Rockefeller arrived with a planeload of aides in December, Rumsfeld faced the greatest challenge to his authority. If Rockefeller had succeeded in breaking Rumsfeld's system, the rest of the White House might have followed suit. In an administra-

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tion filled with latent conflict, Rockefeller was a threat, both administratively and politically.

In all, 53 percent of the Ford and Rockefeller staffs blamed Rumsfeld for the vice-president's problems. Some argued that Rumsfeld sealed Rockefeller from the policy process out of administrative pressure. As the chief of staff, Rumsfeld naturally wanted all of the paper to flow through him. Others pointed to Rumsfeld's own political ambitions as the source of conflict. As one Ford aide reported: "From everything I saw, Rumsfeld wanted the [vice-presidential] nomination for himself in 1976. From the first day, he was at Rockefeller's throat. He headed the group to dump Rockefeller and worked behind the scenes to embarass and humiliate the vice-president, using all of the old stereotypes about vice-presidents to Rockefeller's detriment." In the end, Rumsfeld possessed more bureaucratic weapons in the fight with Rockefeller. He had been in the administration longer, he controlled the paper flow, and he had allies on the Republican right wing.

Beyond his troubles with Rumsfeld, Rockefeller found few allies on the Ford staff. In a White House of isolated power centers, Rockefeller was unable to build strong policy coalitions. Only Rumsfeld succeeded in forming a powerful internal coalition, drawing on James Lynn and Paul O'Neill at OMB. It was this group that effectively worked for the spending freeze on domestic programs in 1975. At times, the Rumsfeld-Lynn-O'Neill coalition was joined by Alan Greenspan, chairman of the CEA. Together, this coalition persuaded Ford on the merits of a tight fiscal policy in the early months of 1975. Though the economy was in a recession by then, Ford's conservative advisers convinced him of the need for a tight budget in combating unemployment. Though Ford had initially proposed a $16 billion tax cut as a response to the recession, he eventually vetoed the cut because it was not accompanied by a spending ceiling. As a Rockefeller assistant remarked: "At exactly the time you would have thought Nelson Rockefeller would have had the advantage, Rumsfeld and Lynn were able to move Ford toward the right. If any economic climate favored Rockefeller, it was a recession, but Rumsfeld had already cornered Ford."

In addition, Rockefeller's competition in the White House was well organized, generally cohesive, and in place several months before he arrived. Since he found few ideological or political allies in an increasingly conservative administration, Rockefeller's opportunities for influence were limited. The competition gave little ground to the new vice-president.

Of the Ford and Rockefeller staff members, 85 percent mentioned Rockefeller's advisory style as a problem in his declining influence over the term. From the start of his brief tenure, Rockefeller worked as an advocate for specific policies, taking highly visible positions on a variety of issues. The Energy Independence Authority, for example, was clearly perceived as a Rockefeller program both inside and outside of the White House. Rockefeller's staff designed the proposal, argued for its internal adoption, worked for its passage on Capitol Hill, and took both the credit and the blame for the results.

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Rockefeller's highly visible advocate's style caused caused a number of problems in his influence. First, by taking open stands on most issues, Rockefeller allowed outsiders to measure his success. Instead of remaining discreet, Rockefeller was willing to tell the media just what programs he favored and opposed. In doing so, the media and Washington communities were able to calculate his relative success. As Rockefeller's defeats mounted, his reputation for influence dropped. Second, even though a number of White House staffers already opposed Rockefeller, his willingness to expose his positions may have created unnecessary opposition. "When Lynn or O'Neill found out that something was a Rockefeller idea," a Rockefeller aide reported, "that really made them jump. Nelson had a reputation for being a good salesman and that made everyone sit up and notice when his ideas came down the line. He might have been more successful by disguising his ideas and lobbying only with Ford. Whenever he circulated one of his proposals, the sharks would come in to feed." Third, Rockefeller's visibility created the kind of threat that released the natural protective instincts of the White House staff. Cartoons of Rockefeller working the strings of a Ford puppet, editorials praising the vice-president, leaks to the press, and the natural attraction of the dynamic vice-president all confirmed the worst fears of Ford's staff—that Rockefeller intended to run for the presidency in 1976.

Rockefeller's frustration also stemmed from his long-term association with the liberal wing of the Republican party. As a Ford aide argued: "1975 was not a good vintage for liberals. We had a very hard fight coming against Reagan in the primaries and had some tough economic problems. It wasn't a good year for Rockefeller or any of the liberals in the party." All totaled, 73 percent of the Ford and Rockefeller staffs pointed to the vice-president's liberalism as a problem in his influence over the term. Though many Rockefeller aides protested that the vice-president had been moving in a more conservative direction long before entering office, Rockefeller was still widely perceived as a liberal in an administration of conservatives.

When Rockefeller became vice-president, conservatives watched for any signs of his old liberalism. As a Ford assistant noted: "For a decade, Rockefeller had been a dirty word to Nixon and the conservatives. Rockefeller was in the White House with only one friend, Jerry Ford. Any conservative worth a grain of salt opposed Rockefeller." A second Ford aide agreed, emphasizing Ronald Reagan as a source of trouble: "You can't blame us for watching Reagan. He was giving all of the signals of a run for the nomination even before Ford was nominated as vice-president in 1974. We weren't running away from him in 1975 and thought it was important to position the campaign to meet the most obvious challenge." Unlike Mondale, who stood politically between Carter and Edward M. Kennedy in 1980, Rockefeller stood just to the left of Ford and far to the left of Reagan in 1975. Ford acknowledged the problems in his autobiography:

> In mid September [1975], 55 percent of the respondents to a Harris Poll gave him a negative job performance rating. Only 27 percent thought he'd done a good job, and

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> the rest said they weren't sure. Even more ominous, 25 percent of the Republicans polled said they wouldn't vote for me if Rockefeller remained on the ticket. I was sorely disappointed by those results, which were completely unwarranted. I couldn't believe they stemmed from anything he had done as Vice President. Rather, I thought they derived from things he'd said and stands he'd taken earlier in his political career. In his past Presidential campaigns, he'd established a reputation as a liberal, and he had outraged many ultra-conservative Republicans. Apparently, their antagonism wasn't going to fade away.[11]

Rockefeller was also affected by the political situation on Capitol Hill. Following the midterm elections in 1974, the Republican party controlled only 144 seats in the House, the lowest level of support for a sitting president in this century. Moreover, Ford's public approval rating had dropped 30 points between his inauguration in August 1974 and Rockefeller's confirmation in December. Ford was forced to build a veto strategy to maximize his limited political resources in Congress. Though the strategy produced a number of victories, it restricted Rockefeller's internal influence. Since the Ford administration did not have enough support to pass legislation, Rockefeller had few opportunities to argue for new domestic programs.

Throughout Rockefeller's trouble—the fights with Rumsfeld, his removal from the ticket in late 1975, and his decision to leave the Domestic Council after nine months—he shared a strong personal relationship with Ford. Not one Rockefeller or Ford aide mentioned any personal antagonism between the two individuals. Yet, despite Ford's personal liking for Rockefeller, he limited his vice-president's influence in two major ways.

First, Ford seemed to be unwilling or unable to discipline his staff once they began to freeze Rockefeller out of the policy process. On several occasions early in the term, Rockefeller asked Ford to order his staff to include the vice-president's office in the policy flow. Reluctantly, Rockefeller eventually concluded that Ford would not or could not give the signals needed for cooperation from Rumsfeld and other competitors. As his former chief of staff, Robert Hartmann, remembered:

> Ford's style worked superbly in his dealings with congressmen. . . . In the White House, it did not work as well. . . . Ford never came down hard on the way he wanted the White House to operate. He did not like a highly structured military kind of staff. He did not want channels. He delegated responsibility, but he did not delegate authority, which caused a great deal of frustration among some of his staff. . . . Ford did not want to have a true chief of staff—someone who could cast his vote except under direct instructions from the president. . . . When clashes developed, Ford used to complain about them. He used to demand that they be straightened out. But he never really did anything to straighten them out himself.[12]

Second, and more important, Ford adopted a highly restrictive policy agenda that limited Rockefeller's influence. Ford was not interested in the kinds of

[11] Gerald R. Ford, *A Time to Heal* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 327.
[12] Reichley, *Conservatives in an Age of Change*, 314.

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expansionary domestic programs that Rockefeller wanted. Once on the Domestic Council, Rockefeller forwarded new proposals on welfare, national health insurance, energy, social security, tax reforms, and deregulation. Ford did not adopt any of the ideas beyond energy and deregulation, and would not push energy programs on Capitol Hill. Because Ford had already accepted a tight budget as one component of his economic policy, he was not persuadable on the bulk of Rockefeller's agenda. Though he listened to Rockefeller's ideas, often presented as specific legislative drafts, Ford was unwilling to propose any new spending or large-scale programs. Facing the largest budget deficits in history to that time, Ford chose a "no new spending" rule instead. At least in the domestic arena, Ford did not have the political or economic resources to sustain a major legislative agenda.

The Mondale Vice-Presidency

Before turning to a model of internal influence, it is important briefly to review Mondale's relative success. When asked about Mondale's impact in shaping the Carter agenda, the staffs offered six explanations. First, two-thirds of the staffs argued that the merging of the Mondale and Carter campaign staffs in Atlanta helped set the stage for the vice-president's later involvement in substantive policy. Instead of operating two separate campaigns, the teams operated as one unit, allowing the vice-president's staff to build working relationships with future colleagues. Unlike Rockefeller, who suffered from a four-month delay, Mondale benefited from networks cemented in the months before inauguration. Second, some 75 percent of the two staffs suggested that Mondale's avoidance of line assignments increased his influence. In refusing such assignments, Mondale avoided bureaucratic infighting, while saving considerable time and energy for substantive policy interests. Third, Mondale had a number of allies on the Carter staff. Hamilton Jordan, Stuart Eizenstat, David Aaron, Bertram Carp, and Anne Wexler all provided support for Mondale's advisory role. Though Mondale faced ideological opposition, he had a number of close friends in the Carter inner circle. Fourth, over three-quarters of the two staffs mentioned Mondale's discreet advisory style as an advantage in his influence. Unlike Rockefeller, Mondale preferred to operate as a generalist, avoiding open advocacy of specific programs. This is not to argue that Mondale never acted as an advocate. Rather, according to the staffs, Mondale maintained a very low profile, opting for "covert" influence. Fifth, over half of the two staffs pinpointed Mondale's liberal ties in the Democratic party as a factor in his influence. Whereas Rockefeller's liberal ties were a hindrance, Mondale's liberal connections proved of some worth to Carter in rebuilding his electoral coalition to defeat Kennedy for the 1980 Democratic nomination. Sixth, Carter was willing to give strong signals to his staff that Mondale was to be involved in the policy process, and he adopted an agenda that increased the opportunities for Mondale's impact. Unlike Ford, Carter was persuadable on a broad range of issues. Together, these six explana-

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tions read as an inverse of Rockefeller's troubles. They also reinforce a model of internal influence that centers on resources, opportunities, and strategies.

The Sources of Influence

Obviously, the most basic difference between Rockefeller and Mondale is that one was appointed and the other elected. That meant that Rockefeller could not forge alliances during a campaign and could not bring votes to a ticket. However, the difference should not be overstated. Rockefeller did bring his public approval to the Ford White House. The delay in his confirmation, not the lack of an election, was the critical first problem in his lack of influence. Once both had been selected as senior staff members, even though both were always vice-presidents, the question is why Rockefeller and Mondale were so different in terms of impact on their respective administrations.

In searching for explanations of Rockefeller and Mondale's influence, three major factors emerge. First, just as vice-presidents and other advisers need certain resources to give advice—such as time, energy, information, and expertise—they also need resources for influence. However, the resources needed for advice-giving are not necesarily the resources needed for influence. Second, vice-presidents and other advisers need opportunities to persuade the president, whether they arise from policy vacuums or from the different cycles that shape the president's policy calendar. Third, vice-presidents and other advisers need strategies for converting resources and opportunities into influence. As Mondale learned, certain strategies exist that enhance an outsider's influence inside the White House. In part, Mondale's strategies were based on his interpretation of Rockefeller's vice-presidency and in part from Mondale's own long-term training as a political second. As one Mondale aide remarked, no politician in history was better schooled at being a vice-president. Thus, according to this theory of influence, line assignments and political conflicts become problems of resources; delays in confirmation, strong opponents, and conflicts over president's goals become problems of opportunities; and a vice-president's style reflects problems of strategies. Each of the three influence variables will be reviewed separately.

Resources

The Rockefeller and Mondale vice-presidencies illustrate the importance of four specific influence resources—information, persuasive expertise, internal capital, and the president's persuadability. Because all four exist in certain quantities at the start of the term, they can be seen as resources at the vice-president's disposal.

Information is the first building-block for influence. Since influence is sometimes based on the simple force of argument, information can be a source of leverage in the White House. According to John Kessel's study of the Carter

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staff, at least three members of the staff gained influence because of their expertise—Zbigniew Brzezinski, Charles Schultze, and David Rubenstein:

> Brzezinski's influence was close to an inversion of the "typical" pattern. Relatively few aides said that he was respected; more said that his opposition was substantial; half of those who mentioned him acknowledged his expertise. Further comments made it clear that his influence was limited to foreign affairs. The reputations of Charles Schultze and David Rubenstein, on the other hand, depended substantially on their knowledge. Another economist said of Schultze, "With Charlie, the professional expertise is always decisive." Stuart Eizenstat said simply: "I think Charlie Schultze is the most informed man in the White House." David Rubenstein was looked to, especially by other junior staff members, as a source of general information. One aide said, "He always seems to have a wealth of knowledge about what's happening in the White House decision-making process, even down to the latest gossip about the White House staff. Rubenstein is always well informed."[13]

Stuart Eizenstat also gained influence through knowledge. As one Carter aide reported: "I never saw him go into any meeting unprepared. Other people would show up and ask questions about this technicality or that problem. It was always Stu who was giving the answers. If you counted the number of times he asked a question to get the basic information versus the number of times he answered those questions, the ratio would be one to ten. He was the answer man."

Raw information about the policy issues can be a lever of influence on the presidential policy process, especially if opponents are underprepared. In the Carter White House, Mondale held some advantage simply from the lack of Washington experience among members of the president's staff. The relative gaps, however, did not cover all policy areas. Brzezinski in foreign affairs, Schultze in economics, and Eizenstat in domestic policy were all seasoned veterans of Washington politics. Mondale's strength became more apparent at lower staff levels. All of Mondale's policy lieutenants had past experience in Washington that gave them some advantage over their less experienced White House colleagues. Moreover, because Mondale had contacts on the White House staff, he was able to secure information on what his opponents were doing. Unlike Rockefeller, who took office four months later than his opponents, Mondale was well ahead at the start of the Carter administration.

Once an adviser enters the Oval Office, persuasive expertise comes into play. The degree to which the vice-president, or any other adviser, can apply persuasive skills has a direct bearing on influence. Among recent vice-presidents, for instance, two stand out as persuasive artisans: Hubert Humphrey and Rockefeller. Both learned the craft of interpersonal persuasion in long political careers. Unfortunately for Humphrey, Johnson rarely gave his vice-president the opportunity to ply his skills. Rockefeller, however, met with Ford at least once a week, prompting considerable worrying by the president's staff. Ford's aides saw the

[13] John A. Kessel, "The Structures of the Carter White House" (paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Denver, Colo., 31 August-3 September 1982), 19.

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weekly private meetings as opportunities for persuasion that they could not control. A Rockefeller aide concluded: "There was nobody in that crew who could top Rockefeller. . . . He was a remarkable persuader. If you met with him alone, you always came out in agreement. He just wouldn't let you say no. . . . That's why the Ford people wanted him in bigger meetings. He could convince anyone if he could get them away from the White House."

Mondale, of course, was also a skilled persuader. According to most staff members, he was generally liked and had an effective interpersonal style. However, Mondale did not have the same level of persuasive skill as Rockefeller. He could not rely on argumentative expertise alone. A Mondale aide remarked: "He was not the kind of person to stand around and chat. . . . He didn't get particularly close to anyone, though he was respected. He wasn't a backslapper or storyteller like Humphrey." If there was one theme in Mondale's persuasive style, it was caution. He was unwilling to press for victories in the short term if they meant a loss of support in the long term. As Mondale's biographer, Finlay Lewis, noted:

> Whatever Mondale's disagreements, he kept them private. Despite his unprecedented influence as vice president, Mondale sought only limited victories. His attitude about becoming a "kamikaze pilot" had not changed. He was still the same politician who sat on the Finance Committee to seek modest and pragmatic goals—goals that did not include taking on Russell Long or waging highly visible losing crusades for drastic tax reforms. He worked in the present tense, meaning he was content to go only for goals that were possible. As he had done throughout his career, he sized up the reality of the moment and then devised a strategy that would work—and would not pose undue risks.[14]

Internal capital is based on the vice-presidents' reputations inside the White House, rather than their positions or public standing. Internal capital reflects the staff's perception of the vice-president as an adviser who can be trusted. As such, internal capital remains difficult to measure, but nonetheless important. The more a vice-president or adviser can demonstrate loyalty and support for the president, the greater the internal capital.

The notion that advisers have internal capital was confirmed in the interviews with the Rockefeller and Mondale staffs. According to a Rockefeller aide: "The White House staff didn't trust Rockefeller. They saw him as trying to take over. They saw Kissinger as his protégé and his staff as disloyal. There was a complete lack of support or trust on the inside. That was the real problem." Rockefeller's shortage of internal capital came from several problems. First, Rockefeller expended a great amount of capital in the fight for control of the Domestic Council fight. Instead of taking a low profile in his first months, Rockefeller seemed to stake out an independent course. Second, Rockefeller's public support weakened over his first year. Though external support is different from internal

[14] Finlay Lewis, *Mondale: Portrait of an American Politician* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 278.

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capital—the former is based on public attitudes, the latter on White House staff attitudes—the two are often related. If the vice-president is under fire in the public, the executive staff will try to minimize damage to the president. As Rockefeller's public support declined, his internal support also fell. As a Ford aide acknowledged: "We might have been more enthusiastic about Rockefeller had he held his own in the polls. He was dropping like a rock in mid-1975. Maybe it was the confirmation hearings or a backlash against liberalism. But Rockefeller was definitely not helping the president in the polls."

Rockefeller and Mondale both understood the impact of internal capital on influence. At one level, internal capital affected the flow of information to the vice-president. Staff members are more interested in sharing information with trusted White House players. "The minute the vice-president leaks something to the press," a Carter aide noted, "the staff will stop talking to him. If he can't be trusted with sensitive information, he won't get any." At a second level, internal capital provides the fabric of White House coalitions. Since vice-presidents have few sanctions they can use inside the White House, they must rely on their store of capital with the president and the staff to build support for their programs. A Humphrey assistant commented: "We had nothing to trade with the President's people except our expertise on a couple of issues and some contacts on Capitol Hill. . . . If they weren't interested in talking with us, we had no options. We couldn't force them to call and couldn't bribe them with anything. Everything depended on their willingness to talk with us. And that depended on their trust."

Even if the vice-president has strong persuasive skills and sufficient internal capital, influence also rests on the president's openness to advice. Ronald Reagan, for instance, was not persuadable on the issue of eliminating the third year of his massive tax cut program. Even with near-unanimity among his policy advisers on the need for reducing the tax cut, Reagan remained unwilling to compromise. As Abraham Lincoln once said to his cabinet, "One Aye, Seven Nays. The Ayes have it."

This is not to argue that advisers have no impact on presidential decisions. Rather, the degree to which presidents are open to persuasion affects the impact of advice. Though Reagan was unwilling to compromise on his tax cut, he was willing to be persuaded on other issues, particularly foreign policy. Reagan was also open to influence on the specifics of his budget and tax plan, as long as the programs met his general view of government. Like Reagan, other presidents have been more persuadable in certain areas. Ford was not interested in any new domestic spending programs, but showed some flexibility on energy legislation. Rockefeller took advantage of Ford's persuadability to win the President's support for the Energy Independence Authority. Among recent presidents, perhaps Carter was the most persuadable across the widest range of issues. He gave clear signals that he was willing to be persuaded on policy, that provided Mondale and other advisers with more room for influence.

A president's persuadability rests on several factors. First, presidents vary in their commitment to an overriding ideology. If the president reduces each issue

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to the same ideological construct, there is less opportunity for persuasion. Second, presidents vary in their organization of information. Some break problems into separate components and solve each issue in sequence. Others work on the various components simultaneously. As John Kessel has noted, the first style "has some advantages; it prevents the lock-step of a too-rigid ideology. But it does not provide the intellectual coherence that would allow a president's staff to be serving larger political goals at the same time that they concentrate on their particular assignments."[15] Third, presidents obviously vary in the way they structure the decision-making process. A collegial decision style, with access from multiple advisers, presents greater opportunities for influence than a formalistic style, with limited channels into the Oval Office. As Alexander George has suggested:

> Executives who find personal contact with too many advisers inefficient or wearing, or who find exposure to the rough-and-tumble of vigorous debate within the advisory group incompatible with their habitual or preferred model of decisionmaking, will seek to limit their direct involvement with others in the search and evaluation phase of policymaking that precede final choice of action. The type of communication network that an executive develops around him will reflect not only his cognitive style but also his conception of the role he should play in the management structure.[16]

Finally, presidential persuadability rests on the chief executive's personality. Though it is difficult to pinpoint just what parts of the presidential character might be involved, different presidents may be persuadable by different kinds of advisers. Psychological factors, such as the impact of family poverty, overprotecting mothers, unpredictable fathers, the death of siblings, and childhood sickness on presidential persuadability cannot be measured, but certainly exists.

Opportunities

There are at least three cycles inside the White House that affect the opportunities for influence—the electoral cycle, the policy cycle, and the cycle of increasing effectiveness among the president's own staff.

One major difference between vice-presidents and other White House advisers is that vice-presidential influence follows the ebb and flow of seasons in the electoral calendar. Because vice-presidents now have political duties in the midterm elections, the electoral cycle affects their opportunities for influence. Vice-presidents lose opportunities for influence whenever they are absent from Washington. Moreover, because vice-presidents must campaign for their own renomination, the fourth year of the term also presents less potential for influence activity. Though vice-presidents can retain some of their opportunities for influence by building alliances on the White House staff, the electoral cycle makes the first and third years of the term the primary focus for influence.

[15] Kessel, "The Structures of the Carter White House," 28.

[16] Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 98.

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Because politics will dominate an administration the closer it moves toward reelection, vice-presidents and other advisers may have the best opportunity for influence in the very first months of the term. In the natural euphoria following the campaign, presidents are more willing to listen to advice. Kennedy moved Johnson from Capitol Hill to the Executive Office Building; Johnson asked Humphrey for help on civil rights legislation; Nixon even gave Agnew a West Wing office for the first three months; Carter included Mondale in the cabinet selection process. As a Humphrey aide remarked: "The vice-president has a honeymoon just like the president. It's a honeymoon with Congress and the White House staff. At the beginning, we all had White House passes. They took them away by 1966. At the beginning, we even had decent aircraft." In the first moments after the election, presidents also suffer from some confusion on their own policy agendas. As the administration starts to build a program, there is some opportunity for vice-presidents to offer advice. Since most transitions are characterized by very loose organizational structures, there is also ample opportunity for vice-presidents to infiltrate the staff system. At least for Mondale, the transition confusion worked in his favor. As Carter looked for candidates for White House and executive branch positions, Mondale was able to suggest Califano, Bergland, Aaron, and Carp, as well as a number of mid-level appointees.

As an administration moves closer to the fourth year, the vice-president may be unable to retain the image of a senior adviser. Polls are commissioned measuring the vice-president's political value to the ticket. Opposition may arise in the party. At the start of the term, the vice-president may be able to remain anonymous inside the White House. At the end of the term, there is no way to escape the political visibility. Arriving with only seventeen months before the Republican convention, for example, Rockefeller was forced to defend his political position from the very beginning. Unlike Mondale, who benefited from a "honeymoon," Rockefeller had to concentrate on renomination only months after being nominated in the first place.

The policy cycle also presents opportunities for influence, both for vice-presidents and other advisers. Policy entrepreneurs have their greatest opportunities for impact at the agenda-setting stage of the policy cycle, with additional opportunities at the budgeting stage. They face the lowest opportunities for influence at the implementation stage. As decisions move away from the White House toward Congress or the executive branch, vice-presidents lose opportunities for impact. They are limited by protocol in congressional lobbying and have no tools for shaping implementation. If vice-presidents are to have policy influence, it must come at the agenda-setting and budgeting stages, both of which occur in relatively close collaboration with the Oval Office. Moreover, as the policy cycle progresses, the cost of success increases. If an adviser does not win at the agenda-setting stage, the costs of success later are much higher, involving "end-runs" of the presidential policy process. Thus, much of Mondale's influence came from the fact that he was appointed to operate the White House agenda-setting process, by canvassing ideas and setting priorities for the Carter legisla-

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tive program. His appointment to the agenda operation in 1977 ensured additional impact over the rest of the term. Rockefeller also tried to control the agenda mechanism, hoping the Domestic Council would act as conduit for the Ford agenda.

The White House policy role cycle is the product of two interrelated calendars. The first cuts across the entire term, with agenda-setting in the first two years. Whereas Richard Neustadt has argued that the first year is a "learning time for the new President who has to learn—or unlearn—many things about his job," most White House advisers argue that the first year is for action.[17] The importance of the first year as a focus for agenda-setting limited Rockefeller's success. By the time Rockefeller joined the administration, the Ford agenda was already set for 1975. Rockefeller had not participated in the planning of Ford's first State of the Union address and had not been involved in the discussions of the fiscal program. Had Rockefeller been confirmed just two months earlier, he would have entered office in the midst of the policy debates for the first-year agenda. Mondale, in contrast, was on the scene from the very beginning and participated in the transition policy process.

The second calendar involves the within-year process. According to Kessel, Presidents have an annual program cycle that begins sometimes "after Labor day when programs to be proposed to Congress are readied. Fall is probably the time of the heaviest work load for the policy-staffer in the White House, because work is still progressing on Capitol Hill on the present year's program at the same time preparations for the next year are being made."[18] In the Johnson administration, according to Norman C. Thomas and H. L. Wolman, the policy process started in the spring with "idea gathering," followed by "internal discussions of ideas gathered" in July, "appointment of outside task forces" in August, "receipt and review of task-force reports" in the fall, "White House meetings, Final Presidential decisions" in December, and "Preparation of messages, Introduction of bills" in January, February, and March.[19] In any administration, the critical period for influence runs from July through December. Though staff members naturally want to be involved from beginning of "idea gathering" until final messages, if they need to be absent, the first six months of the year present the lowest risks. "Wintering" in Washington may be the most important initial factor in influence on the president's policy agenda, whatever the year in the term.

Vice-presidents and other White House advisers have greater opportunities for influence if they enter office with more expertise than their White House competitors. A major reason is the rise of policy vacuums. As a Mondale aide suggested: "Knowledge was power in the Carter administration, especially in the first year. There were so many areas where Carter and his staff had little back-

[17] Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 3rd ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), 149.

[18] John A. Kessel, *The Domestic Presidency* (Boston: Duxbury Press, 1975), 9.

[19] Norman C. Thomas and H. L. Wolman, "Policy Formulation in the Institutionalized Presidency," in Thomas E. Cronin and S. D. Greenberg, eds., *The Presidential Advisory System* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 132.

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ground that we had a number of vacuums. No one knew too much about electoral reform, so Mondale's chief counsel Michael Berman got involved. No one knew too much about handling Congress, so Mondale's chief of staff Richard Moe got involved." Policy vacuums are based on shortages of information and expertise among an adviser's competitors. Policy vacuums have several characteristics that make them particularly attractive to vice-presidents. First, because other aides are not actively involved in the area, there is less risk of infighting. Unlike Rockefeller, who moved into the Domestic Council by force, Mondale moved into policy areas because no one else was there. Second, because other aides were not involved, the vice-president can stake a claim to a policy area. Though Mondale avoided long-term policy assignments, he was willing to fill the gaps in certain areas. Third, policy vacuums have low resource costs. The vice-president can enter the policy process for a minimal price, retain a low profile, shape policies, and exit, all without extensive staff conflict.

However, as the cycle of increasing effectiveness adds to staff information and expertise, vacuums are closed. As a Rockefeller aide noted, the delay in confirmation "hurt us because of the short take-off in the administration. There was a big vacuum at the start of the term. Rockefeller could have filled it, but he came late to the party. The administration had already started to gel by the time Rockefeller was confirmed." The greatest number of vacuums in any administration exist at the very beginning. As an administration matures, the cycle of increasing effectiveness ensures learning. If vice-presidents and other advisers are able to take advantage of policy vacuums, it is usually at the start of the term.

Strategies

Strategies involve an adviser's plan for using resources and opportunities inside the White House. A vice-president may have numerous advantages, but may be unable to devise strategies for using them. Mondale offered his own list of strategies after leaving office in 1981: "One. Advise the President confidentially. Secondly, don't wear a President down. He should be bright enough to catch your meaning the first time. Third, as a spokesman for the Administration, stay on the facts. Fourth, understand your role as a spokesman. Fifth, avoid line authority assignments. Sixth, the Vice President should remember the importance of personal compatibility."[20] Though each vice-president must tailor a strategy to fit each specific situation, there are at least four general approaches that emerge from the Rockefeller and Mondale experiences—setting priorities, building coalitions, adapting from offensive influence to defensive influence, and using "hidden-hand" channels.

Priority-setting is the most basic of the four strategies. As vice-presidents move through the policy process, they are encouraged to save their resources for the issues they see as most important. Since they cannot possibly win on all issues, they must conserve for specific goals. Mondale used this strategy through-

[20] Mondale, Remarks.

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out his term. Instead of concentrating on a broad range of policies, Mondale adopted a generalist strategy, moving in and out of a restricted number of policy areas. Since he did not have the resources to occupy any single policy area for the long term, he adopted a "floater" approach. According to his staff, Mondale set his priorities on the basis of three criteria. First, he tried to estimate Carter's persuadability on given issues. On certain policies, Mondale knew that Carter was unwilling to change. Second, Mondale estimated the strength of his opposition inside the White House. Even though Mondale had considerable expertise in congressional relations, he would not move against Frank Moore, Carter's long-time friend and beleaguered liasion director. Third, though the Carter staff was often criticized for a lack of sensitivity to Congress, Mondale set his internal agenda with legislative success in mind. He looked at the potential for passage outside the White House as one guide to persuasion inside the administration.

Rockefeller and Mondale differed on their willingness and success in building policy coalitions inside the White House. Part of the difference was that Mondale simply had more allies to begin with. Bertram Carp and David Aaron provided easy connections between Mondale and other allies. Part of the difference was that Mondale had more attractive positions on major issues. Unlike Rockefeller, who was a liberal awash a sea of conservatives, Mondale had a number of ideological companions. Part of the difference was in Mondale's image as an influential player. Unlike Rockefeller, who was defeated on a number of highly visible policy stands, Mondale never gave his opponents cause to doubt his impact on Carter in his private meetings. Ironically, Mondale's covert style led at least some presidential staffers to overestimate his influence on a broad range of decisions, thus increasing his actual influence on a more limited agenda.

Coalition-building inside the White House depends on political exchange. No one will join a coalition with the vice-president or other adviser without some benefit. If the exchange is one-sided, the coalition cannot last. There were several reasons for Mondale's value as a coalition member. First, as Carter tightened his policy process over the term and reduced the number of aides with direct access, Mondale's weekly private meetings took on added significance with the White House staff. Mondale became one of the few players who could lobby the president in person, not on paper. There is no evidence that Mondale ever promised anyone that he would raise an issue with the president in those meetings, but his continued access meant that he was a valued member of policy coalitions. Second, Mondale had a store of personal loyalty from his former staff members stored away in the executive branch and the White House. Their respect for the vice-president meant that he was automatically included in most policy debates. Third, Mondale did have at least one vantage point to use with other senior advisers—the agenda-setting mechanism started during the 1977 transition. The agenda process eventually became the primary tool for setting legislative priorities in the Carter White House. Each year, Mondale and his staff canvassed the White House and the executive branch for legislative proposals, and divided the total set into three categories—presidential items, White House staff items,

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and executive branch items. The list of presidential priorities became the basis for the State of the Union address. By elevating ideas on the annual agenda document, Mondale could reward allies and punish opponents. In sum, Mondale was in a much stronger position to make policy exchanges than any of his vice-presidential predecessors.

As the vice-president's opportunities decline with the passage of time, the electoral cycle, and the cycle of increasing effectiveness of the president's staff, a defensive strategy becomes more attractive. In contrast to offense, where advisers push for adoption of their ideas, defense involves the effort to stop or modify competing proposals. As a Carter aide suggested: "Mondale was more successful in moderating extreme policies, rather than getting his own programs across. He kept several very bad policies off the agenda, but had trouble getting good things on later in the term. Unless the balance of forces on the staff are cancelled out, it's difficult for the vice-president to take the initiative." For example, Mondale was unsuccessful in stopping Carter's midsummer cabinet firings in 1979, but was successful in toning down the "malaise" speech. He was unsuccessful in stopping a hardening of U.S policy toward Israel, but was able to moderate Carter's attitudes toward Prime Minister Begin. Because Mondale and his liberal allies were frequently in the minority later in the term, defense was the most viable strategy. A Mondale aide argued: "We didn't have the edge on the budget after 1978. . . . The only choice was to work to keep the cuts from going too deep. We couldn't stop the cuts from happening. . . . The best way to go was to keep some of the amounts down." Like the minority party in Congress, Mondale and his allies did not have the internal capital to win on most major issues. Their best approach was to modify the programs they opposed.

At the start of the term, Mondale was more successful with an offensive strategy. He worked for the adoption of a number of Carter programs, including increases in domestic spending. His early approach was the by-product of the first-year policy vacuums. Since there was room on the Carter agenda for competing programs, Mondale was able to win support for electoral reform and the establishment of the Department of Education as administration priorities. As the economic climate worsened and as the legislative program stalled in Congress, Mondale was forced to change his influence strategy to defense. In such a strategy, Mondale had three basic options. First, he tried to stop competing programs completely. If he could not win, perhaps he could stalemate the opposition. Second, after failing to stop the competition, Mondale tried to modify competing programs. By amending and adjusting opposition programs, Mondale could still gain a measure of influence. On Carter's Middle East policy, for example, Mondale was able to moderate administration policy by compromising with hardliners. Third, after failing to stop or modify, Mondale tried to delay competing programs. As Mondale had learned in the Senate, delays of weeks or months could mean the difference between legislative success and failure.

Hidden-hand influence rests on "covert" activity. Though the vice-president

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may have considerable influence over policy, credit-claiming and posturing are highly threatening to the White House staffs. The vice-president must generally sacrifice visibility for impact. This trade-off between notice and influence applies to most White House advisers, and even applies to presidents. According to Fred Greenstein's portrait of Eisenhower:

> In his private assertions and actions, Eisenhower consistently preferred results to publicity when strategic and tactical maneuvering was not required. He deliberately cultivated the impression that he was not involved even in the most successful of the maneuvers in which he directly participated. Presidents like Kennedy (for example, in the campaign early in his administration to expand the House Rules Committee and his assault on the steel industry) and Johnson (for example, in his highly visible mediation of the railroad strike, early in 1964) deliberately sought to enhance their professional reputations as political operators. Eisenhower seems to have had neither a need nor a desire to do so. He employed his skills to achieve his ends by inconspicuous means and was aware that a reputation as a tough political operator could be inconsistent with acquiring and maintaining another source of presidential influence, namely public prestige.[21]

For Mondale, hidden-hand influence rested on a number of separate tactics. At all times, Mondale kept his advice to Carter private. He was unwilling to speak at cabinet meetings and did not want his staff taking high profile stands. Mondale also preferred to have his allies represent him in speaking out on major policies. If Mondale could not win in his private one-on-one meetings with Carter, he turned to his former aides, Aaron and Carp, to work the larger meetings. Mondale absolutely refused to take any credit for Carter programs, a strategy that helped him retain his access during the term, while avoiding blame for Carter mistakes after the administration left office. Moreover, Mondale's hidden-hand approach allowed him to build the reputation of influence. As Mondale argued after the election: "The perception by others that I was close to the President, that I enjoyed his confidence, that he had trust in me . . . this understanding by others made it possible for me to speak for the President with authority and to act on my own with influence."[22]

The main advantage of the hidden-hand strategy for Mondale was that he was not drawn into any major White House fights. Though Mondale did disagree with a number of Carter decisions, he did not become embroiled in the internal debates. An economic aide remarked: "I never saw him hit by anyone. . . He couldn't be hit because he never made a clean target. He was moving in and out of issue areas, and didn't stay long enough to get hurt. He was a genius at staying out of the line of fire." Even on issues where Mondale took a stand, he allowed other players to take the lead. His willingness to submerge his short-term reputation in favor of greater influence over policy was a key to hidden-hand impact.

[21] Fred I. Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Winter 1979–80): 597–98.

[22] Mondale, Remarks.

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Conclusion

This article has focused on the nature of influence inside the White House. Through an examination of the Rockefeller and Mondale vice-presidencies, at least three factors that affect influence can be identified—resources, opportunities, and strategies. It is important to recognize that the three factors are highly interrelated. Resources shape opportunities; opportunities affect strategies; strategies can conserve resources. Thus, Mondale's strategy might have changed under a different political context or under a different policy cycle. Perhaps he would have made Rockefeller's attempt at a major line assignment had he faced the same lack of opportunities.

Does this model apply to other White House advisers? The answer is a qualified yes. Though the strategies will vary from one actor to another, all White House advisers have the same need for persuasive expertise, internal capital, and presidential persuadability as Rockefeller and Mondale. Though some White House advisers may have less need for persuasion because of their formal positions, all require opportunities and strategies. For vice-presidents, the key strategy may remain hidden-hand influence. For others, open conflict may be the key. However, the problem for future research is to start identifying just how the various influence factors interact. What strategies fit with what resources? What opportunities fit with what strategies? At the very least, the vice-presidencies of Rockefeller and Mondale reveal a great deal about how vice-presidents win and lose in the White House. They can also indicate how outsiders in general might persuade the president. Finally, they provide the starting point for a more detailed model of influence inside the presidency.

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President Carter, the Congress, and NEA: Creating the Department of Education

DAVID STEPHENS

Reorganizing the machinery of government in Washington is not a job for presidents alone, however much they might like it to be. Most presidents have wanted to bend the executive branch closer to their wishes, but all have found it difficult to do so. While procedural requirements have varied from time to time, presidents invariably have had to work with Congress, either because a new arrangement required legislation or because executive reorganization authorities were subject to a legislative veto.

Giving Congress a role opens Pandora's Box: myriad interests must be channeled through a Congress in which party discipline is usually weak; the rules of debate are generous; and public participation is encouraged. Such is inevitably the case when institutions, groups, and individuals share power, but it can lead to much anguish for a president committed to reorganization, as was Jimmy Carter. Like other presidents before him, he discovered that his plans had to accommodate many other actors. In this article, I will examine how the Department of Education emerged from the relationships among the president, his officials and his party, the Congress, and an important interest group, the National Education Association (NEA).

The Commitment: the 1976 Carter Campaign

In the mid-1970s, the idea of a federal department of education was common in a limited circle, but it was hardly an idea whose time had come. Calls for a

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separate cabinet department had been heard intermittently for over a century, ever since a tiny sub-cabinet department had existed briefly in 1867–68. The department had become a bureau and ultimately the Education Division of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Meanwhile, few of the dozens of bills referring to a separate department had aroused much congressional enthusiasm. Since 1953, not one of them had received a hearing in a House or Senate committee.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle faced by the supporters of a federal department was the American tradition that education was a state and local matter. Although Washington was spending some $25 billion annually on education by the early 1970s, this represented less than ten percent of total education spending by all levels of government. Many federal programs were meant to supplement state and local ones or to achieve non-educational goals of the federal government, such as civil rights, defense, rehabilitation of veterans, and equality of opportunity for the disadvantaged. The programs were spread over more than twenty federal departments and agencies.[1]

The base for Jimmy Carter's long and successful campaign for the presidency was not the traditional Democratic party machine, but a widespread ad hoc grass-roots organization of politically active people. The time was ripe for such an organization. The Democrats had reformed their presidential nominating process since 1968 to meet complaints that it did not elect candidates who represented the will of the party's rank and file. The new system was based on mass participation, particularly through primary elections for delegates to local, congressional district, state, and national conventions. The number of state primaries grew from sixteen in 1964 to thirty-five in 1976, and the proportion of national convention delegates elected at state primaries grew from one-third to almost three-quarters. Since winning the nomination depended on winning a majority of the votes of national convention delegates, it became important for presidential hopefuls to build grass-roots organizations. Because the system was based on proportional representation, winning a majority of delegates at local meetings ensured a majority at each higher level, provided the delegates remained loyal to the candidate once they were elected. Effective mass organization could also pick up delegates in states that used local and district caucuses rather than primaries to determine their representation at the national convention.[2]

In two campaigns for the governorship of Georgia, Jimmy Carter made con-

[1] A summary of the history of the federal education function can be found in Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Department of Education Act of 1978: Report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs to Accompany S. 991 to Establish a Department of Education and for Other Purposes Together with Additional Views*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, Report No. 95-1078, 13–15.

[2] See, for example: William J. Crotty and Gary C. Jacobson, *American Parties in Decline* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980); Robert A. Goldwin, ed., *Political Parties in the Eighties* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980); Gerald M. Pomper, "The Decline of the Party in American Elections," *Political Science Quarterly* 92 (1977): 21–41; idem, "New Rules and New Games in Presidential Nominations," *Journal of Politics* 41 (1979): 784–805.

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tact, either personally or through his family and close lieutenants, with hundreds of thousands of people. As governor after 1971, he further broadened his organization. He angled unsuccessfully for the Democratic nomination for vice president in 1972, but secured election as chairman of the Democratic campaign committee for the 1974 congressional elections. This job allowed him to travel widely and meet many possible future supporters. One of the groups he and his staff courted along the way was the National Education Association (NEA), the nation's largest union of elementary and secondary teachers.

Carter, the NEA, and the Democratic party's new rules were well suited to one another. In 1976, the NEA had about 1.8 million members spread across every state, averaging 4,000 members to every congressional district. No other union was at once so large and so widely spread.[3] If, as William J. Crotty and Gary C. Jacobson have suggested, the decision over the nomination was indeed in "the hands of those who take the trouble to participate in the process," the NEA's teachers were ideal potential participants.[4] They had free time, were well educated, were accustomed to speaking in public, and were experienced at organizing and at working by rules and under discipline. Since sixty percent of them were women, they were also well placed to take advantage of affirmative action rules for the election of Democratic delegates. The NEA also had some 300 full-time and over 1,000 part-time organizers outside Washington, a staff of 1,000 in Washington, good connections with other large unions, and long experience of legislative lobbying.[5]

The revision of campaign finance laws to the advantage of political action committees gave the NEA another avenue into electoral politics. The NEA Political Action Committee (NEA-PAC) was formed in 1972 to elect pro-education candidates to federal office. Similar committees worked in the states and locally. Workshops trained NEA members in political organizing, and the association built up files of people who could work in nomination and election campaigns by attending meetings, voting, speaking, staffing telephones, writing letters, knocking on doors, and performing clerical and publicity tasks.

The political loyalties of the mass membership of the NEA did not differ greatly from those of the nation as a whole: a survey of NEA members in 1976 showed that 43 percent of those polled claimed to be Democrats, 30 percent Republicans, and 26 percent independents.[6] About one-fifth of the 300 pro-education candidates supported by the NEA in 1976 were Republicans. The NEA's leadership believed, however, that Democratic administrations were more sympathetic than Republican ones to public education and to the liberal social goals of the NEA. Consequently, they directed the association's efforts into the process of nominating the Democratic presidential candidate. In 1975, the NEA

[3] The Teamsters No. 1 union is larger but its membership is more concentrated.

[4] Crotty and Jacobson, *American Parties in Decline*, 250.

[5] For a debate between the NEA's executive director and a critic, which touches on the association's recent history, see Eugene H. Methvin and Terry Herndon, "Annotating a *Reader's Digest* Article—'The NEA: A Washington Lobby Run Rampant,' " *Phi Delta Kappan* 60 (1979):420–23.

[6] *New York Times*, 29 June 1976.

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and eight other generally liberal unions, including the United Automobile Workers and the Communication Workers of America, formed the Labor Coalition Clearinghouse (LCC), which deployed finance and personnel in both primaries and caucuses. About 400 of the 3,000 delegates to the 1976 Democratic National Convention were elected with LCC support. NEA members formed the largest single group within this bloc and provided Carter with a disciplined force of 172 votes, his largest group of delegates.[7]

The convention merely confirmed what the primaries and caucuses had made obvious: that Jimmy Carter would be the Democratic nominee. The convention's other task was to choose Carter's running mate. Not the least of front-runner Walter F. Mondale's advantages for this position was his close connections with organized labor, including the NEA, which supported him strongly for the nomination. He was a fervent supporter of the federal role in education and of a federal department of education. His brother was an NEA official in the Midwest. His selection by Carter put the seal on the NEA's active support for the Democratic ticket. In September 1976, the association made the first endorsement of a presidential candidate in its history.

Not surprisingly, the NEA expected to be rewarded for helping to secure the nomination for Carter. The association had many goals, among them increasing the federal government's share of national education spending to one-third, collective bargaining legislation for public employees, affirmative action, and integrated schools. A separate education department was only one of a number of NEA objectives, but it was one that Carter could easily endorse. As early as the end of 1974, he agreed with the NEA's leaders that a separate department was a good idea. He repeated his support for the concept at education forums and in position papers late in 1975 and throughout 1976. Some observers suggested later that Carter saw the department as an alternative to promising to increase federal education spending to the extent desired by NEA. Still, the idea of a separate department had been around for a long time and clearly appealed to Carter. His own experience might have encouraged him to support it even without the need for the NEA alliance. As a state senator and governor interested in education, he had seen how federal education programs were fragmented among various agencies and how slow moving the HEW machine was in delivering services to the states and localities. While he promised to clear up the bureaucratic "mess" in Washington by slashing the number of federal agencies, he tried to justify a new department on the grounds of consolidation of programs and efficiency of management.[8]

[7] Bernie Aronson, "A New Coalition is Born as Labor Looks for a Candidate," *Democratic Review* 2 (1976): 113–16; and *New York Times*, 11 April 1976.

[8] Carter developed a particular vocabulary early in the campaign and used it repeatedly: Jimmy Carter, "If I am Elected," *Change* 8 (1976): 11; *The Presidential Campaign 1976, Volume I: Jimmy Carter* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), 251–52, 609, 841.

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Hesitation and Resistance: 1977

The NEA at all levels had spent some $3 million supporting Carter and Mondale during the 1976 campaign, and NEA members had worked hard getting out the vote for the Democrats.[9] The NEA might reasonably have expected early fulfillment of the commitments it believed the new administration had made. Instead, the Carter administration was so slow to deliver that some of the strongest supporters of the separate education department feared that it might have been forgotten. The NEA found that campaign promises do not become pieces of legislation through their own momentum alone.

The problem was not so much President Carter as his chief advisers. The secretary of HEW, Joseph A. Califano, Jr., had worked in Lyndon Johnson's White House and had become convinced that presidents should have as few people as possible reporting directly to them. Controlling access to the Oval Office conserved the president's precious time and avoided the need for him to umpire battles between departments representing relatively narrow interests. Large departments like HEW allowed adjustments to be made internally. Califano also argued that locating education with health and welfare allowed better coordination of programs for children, such as immunization, health care, and drug education. He believed that any necessary improvements in the delivery of health, education, and welfare could be made by internal reorganization of HEW. Califano urged Carter to look at other options rather than to proceed directly to a new department.[10]

The HEW secretary's arguments were sympathetically received in other parts of the administration. The career staff of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the part of the Executive Office of the President that was responsible for government organization, were generally opposed to new departments. Carter's appointee as director of OMB, T. Bertram Lance, was persuaded by Califano that the issue should be examined with no presumption in favor of a separate department. The management experts recruited for the President's Reorganization Project (PRP) within OMB had less commitment to campaign promises than to organizational schemes that seemed likely to work efficiently. In addition, there were some people within the administration who wanted to make the three parts of HEW into "departments within a department," like the services departments within the Department of Defense. There were others who believed that a department of education of any kind was a low priority, perhaps something for the president's second term, if at all.

Yet keeping campaign promises was basic to Carter's populist style of poli-

[9] See Michael J. Malbin, "Labor, Business and Money—A Post-election Analysis," *National Journal*, 19 March 1977, 412–17; Methvin and Herndon, "Annotating a *Reader's Digest* Article," 421; James W. Singer, "Carter in 1980—Not Ideal, but Maybe Labor's Best Hope," *National Journal*, 28 July 1979, 252–55.

[10] Joseph A. Califano, Jr., *Governing America: An Insider's Report from the White House and the Cabinet* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), 276–77.

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tics, especially when the commitment matched his own preferences and his experience in Georgia. Around the White House, admitted one staff member, they said three things: " 'In Georgia we did . . . , ' 'We promised . . . , ' and 'Jimmy says. . . . ' "[11] Commitments to groups that could deliver large blocs of convention delegates and get out the vote were even more important. Yet Carter was reluctant to rush ahead against the lack of enthusiasm among his advisers. Vice-president Mondale, supported by Hamilton Jordan, the president's closest lieutenant and his chief political strategist, urged that the campaign promise be reaffirmed and implemented, but Mondale eventually agreed with Califano and Lance that OMB should make a broad study rather than simply investigate the possible composition of a separate department and the timing of its implementation. After some consideration, the president decided in June 1977 that the reorganization staff in OMB should examine "whether or not it was feasible to have a separate Department of Education."[12]

The NEA was worried at the turn events were taking and made sure its feelings showed. Knowing that the administration recently had been reluctant to agree to another NEA goal, increased education spending, the NEA requested its members in the states to write to the president urging him to keep his promise about the education department. The association's chief legislative lobbyist said that if Carter changed his mind a lot of NEA members would feel "double-crossed." NEA called together its closest allies among education interest groups to organize a lobbying campaign, and it promoted and financed the establishment of a "citizens committee" of prominent people in education, labor, civil rights, government, and business for the same purpose. When the PRP team insisted to the NEA that the question was still the feasibility of a department, not its details, NEA asked Hamilton Jordan, with whom it had maintained contact since 1974, to try to influence the study's direction. OMB Director Lance, who had been unenthusiastic about the department, had to turn most of his attention to answering charges about his business dealings. The PRP staff began to realize that the department was on the administration's political agenda regardless of management considerations. In September 1977, PRP and NEA staff met to begin planning strategy for passing legislation to establish a separate department.

The final OMB report to the president on the nature of any education department presented options and arguments but no recommendations. The first option was a "narrow" department comprising the Education Division of HEW and a few education-related programs from elsewhere in HEW and from the National Science Foundation (NSF). The second option added to this core the school lunch program from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), some

[11] Bruce Mazlish and Edwin Diamond, *Jimmy Carter: A Character Portrait* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 281.

[12] Testimony of James T. McIntyre, Jr., House Committee on Government Operations, *Establishing a Department of Education: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations on H.R. 13343 to Establish a Department of Education and for Other Purposes*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 17, 21, 31 July and 1-2 August 1978, 431. Hereafter cited as *House Hearings: 1978.*

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training programs from the Department of Labor, Native American schools from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and some other programs. The third option, perhaps in recognition of Califano's continued opposition to the dismantling of his department, actually preserved HEW, and simply combined the senior offices of Assistant Secretary for Education and United States Commissioner of Education to end some overlapping responsibilities and unclear lines of command.

The president received the OMB report on November 28 at a meeting with the OMB staff, White House aides, Mondale, and Califano. Those who attended this meeting have conflicting memories of the president's reaction. Califano recalled that Carter kept his own counsel, but others who were present gained the clear impression that the president had committed himself to the separate department, though he remained uncertain about its timing and contents. Others were sure not only that the president wanted the department, but that he was determined to "reach wide," that is, to have a broad department bringing together programs from a number of agencies, as he seemed to envisage during the election campaign. In any event, informal remarks and a passing mention in his State of the Union message in January 1978 soon revealed that the separate department would go ahead even if its shape remained uncertain. In a message to Congress on 28 February 1978, the president said:

> I have instructed the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to work with Congress on legislation needed to establish a Department of Education which will:
> -let us focus on Federal educational policy, at the highest levels of our government;
> -permit closer coordination of Federal education programs and other related activities;
> -reduce Federal regulations and reporting requirements and cut duplication;
> -assist school districts, teachers, and parents to make better use of local resources and ingenuity.[13]

The feasibility of any new arrangement rested heavily on the support of the groups it served. Interest groups established connections and ways of working with bureaucrats and with congressional committees organized along functional lines. Reorganization meant new lines of command, new procedures, new faces, the reshuffling of committee responsibilities, and the possibility, during the bureaucratic shakedown and in the future, that interest groups would lose their access to power. If these groups could persuade legislators that the interests of the groups—and thus ultimately the interests of the legislators in reelection—would suffer from change, the extent of change was likely to be severely limited.

Once the administration had committed itself to a new department, the battle over the department's shape intensified. The broad goals in the president's message could have been implemented in a number of ways. While simply excising the Education Division from HEW might have discharged Carter's

[13] House of Representatives, *Elementary and Secondary Education: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting his Proposals to Strengthen the Major Elementary and Secondary Education Programs*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, H. Doc. No. 95-296.

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campaign undertaking and would have aroused the least group opposition, such a change would have provoked criticism for proliferating departments without any compensation in administrative rationalization. White House aides and some OMB officials leaned towards a narrower department, while other OMB people believed both the president's wishes and the desirability of grouping like functions dictated a broader department. The potential program losers in the bureaucracy argued, often compellingly, that programs should be left where they were. USDA said that the government could best serve producers and consumers by leaving all food-related programs in one department rather than by moving the school lunch scheme. On the other hand, an equally plausible argument could be made for shifting the scheme if one believed its purpose was educational rather than nutritional. Similarly, the BIA believed Native American schools should be left with the bureau in the name of self-determination because it allowed these communities to control their own schools, rather than be moved to serve the management goal of consolidating education programs. Finally, interest groups worked both independently and with their bureaucratic allies to influence the administration. Veterans drew an assurance from the president that he would not move veterans' education and training schemes from the Veterans' Administration (VA). Other groups and the government agencies serving them—scientists and the NSF, parents benefiting from Head Start and the HEW Head Start Office, and farmers and the Senate Agriculture Committee and the USDA—also fought to preserve the status quo.[14]

The War of Attrition in Congress: 1978

The difficulties of gaining agreement on what should go into the new department, as well as the lack of time to spare from more pressing executive business, stayed the administration's hand through the early weeks of 1978. Meanwhile, Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.), a former HEW secretary and the Senate's staunchest supporter of the separate education department, had commenced hearings before his own Governmental Affairs Committee on the most recent of many bills he had introduced to establish an education department. The White House decided not to introduce its own bill but to support the Ribicoff bill in a submission at the hearings. The fear that interest groups and government agencies would carry their fight to preserve the status quo into Congress had persuaded OMB, now headed by James T. McIntyre, Jr., to agree with Jordan and the president's Domestic Policy Staff (DPS) that the administration should seek a department based on the Education Division of HEW with a few noncontroversial additions, rather than risk a long and debilitating battle to include many other programs. While McIntyre himself would have preferred a broader department for management reasons, the more immediate consideration in the

[14] For descriptions of this period, see: Harrison H. Donnelly, "Separate Education Department Proposed," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 22 April 1978, 987-91; Joel Havemann, "Carter's Reorganization Plans—Scrambling for Turf," *National Journal*, 20 May 1978, 788-94.

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view of the White House strategists was to fulfill the commitment to the NEA and its allies.[15]

A few hours before McIntyre was to testify to the Ribicoff committee, the president was at last able to give thorough consideration to the proposed submission. He insisted on the department having more responsibilities than his advisers suggested, asking McIntyre to add more non-Education Division programs to the list in the submission. After some rapid rewriting, the list that McIntyre presented to the committee ran to 167 programs from 7 departments and agencies. Ribicoff, who had been expecting a narrower department than the one proposed in his own bill, found that his and the administration's lists were almost identical.

Neither list included all of the education-related programs of the federal government—far from it. The White House bill embraced only about 30 programs from outside the Education Division, leaving untouched between 100 and 200, depending on how one defined "education-related." The PRP team had looked at some 40 programs and decided to leave them out because they were too closely connected with the "missions" of other federal departments and agencies. It also looked at the clients the programs served and the functions performed. Judgments were made in each case whether a program served primarily educational purposes or whether it merely provided education to serve another purpose. Thus, while Califano complained later that only 1 of 55 student aid programs outside HEW that had been identified by PRP had been included, PRP staff could argue that these schemes were serving non-educational goals, such as veterans' rehabilitation and equality of opportunity for the disadvantaged. Of course, the vehemence of the opposition to transfers also influenced PRP's decisions.

Despite such omissions, the supporters of the bill argued that the new department would improve management coordination by bringing together previously scattered programs. They argued, too, that education could no longer be the "poor relation" in HEW. Education bore a disproportionate share of HEW budget cuts, mainly because many federal education programs involved discretionary expenditure rather than expenditure to which recipients had a continuing entitlement. The placing of education with health and welfare was illogical anyway, the critics argued, since the three areas had little operational connection. Education in HEW also suffered from continual organizational upheavals, unclear lines of authority, and rapid turnover at the top. Education policy was in the care of third- and fourth-rank bureaucrats who had little claim on the time of HEW secretaries, let alone presidents.

These arguments were echoed by many of the Senate committee's witnesses, representatives of education groups (including the NEA), legislators, public administration experts, and former commissioners of education. In addition, supporters of the department argued that a separate department in the cabinet

[15] For two versions of events in the administration, see: Califano, *Governing America*, 282; Havemann, "Carter's Reorganization Plans," 791.

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would bring education the national prestige and "visibility" it deserved. The secretary of education would be an advocate before the president for the 65 million Americans who were connected in some way with education. But some people, opponents as well as supporters, believed that the department would also be a trophy that the strongest supporter—the NEA—could use to show off its new power in national politics.

The main casualty of the legislative battle of 1978 was the administration's goal of coordination. Important non-Education Division programs were whittled away, first in the Senate, then in the House, through the combined efforts of client groups and the legislators to whom they spoke. The biggest skirmish was over Head Start, the social and educational development scheme for disadvantaged children, which was a HEW responsibility outside the Education Division. President Carter had insisted that Head Start be included in the new department, apparently against the arguments of most of his advisers.[16] He was said to believe that the scheme's ideal of community involvement would set a good example to the rest of the new department. Ironically, this very involvement enabled those who believed Head Start should remain where it was to mount a strong lobbying campaign through the early months of 1978.[17] The vast majority of groups served by Head Start opposed transferring it, arguing that its purpose was not education but child development. When the Ribicoff committee began "marking up" or amending the bill after the hearings, the transfer of Head Start was deleted without dissent.

More programs were similarly deleted on the Senate floor. Senator Charles Percy (R-Ill.) had narrowly failed in the committee to remove the school lunch program from the bill, but he gathered sufficient support between June and September to have the program deleted by voice vote in the full Senate. A motion to delete the BIA Native American schools was defeated comfortably in the committee but, thanks to the efforts of Native American groups and Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), it was carried just as comfortably on the floor. Without the additions that had provoked so much opposition—but that had also provided some support for the administration's argument for coordination—the bill was relatively unobjectionable. It was passed by the Senate on September 28 by 72 votes (48D, 24R) to 11 (4D, 7R).

The companion bill in the House of Representatives was late getting under way but it followed a similar course. In June, President Carter asked Congressman Jack Brooks (D-Tex.), the chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, to introduce an administration bill similar to the Ribicoff bill, except that Head Start had been omitted. The arguments put to the House committee were similar to those posed earlier in the Senate hearings. The result,

[16] See the exchange between Senator Percy and OMB witnesses in Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Department of Education Act of 1977: Hearings before the Committee on Governmental Affairs*, pt. 2, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 20–21 March, 14, 18, 27 April, and 8, 16–17 May 1978, 671–74. Hereafter cited as *Senate Hearings: 1978,* pt. 2.

[17] Harrison H. Donnelly, "Lobbying Blitz Blocks Transfer of Head Start Program," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* 15 July 1978, 1769; *New York Times*, 28 May 1978.

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too, was similar—the removal from the proposed department of some programs whose inclusion had helped the coordination argument. But the vote was much closer. Where the Senate committee had reported its bill without dissent, the House committee did so by 27 votes to 15, after deleting the transfer of Native American schools, school lunches, and a number of NSF science education programs.

The closer vote in the House committee reflected not so much opposition to particular transfers as uneasiness about the idea of the department itself. This uneasiness was growing inside and outside the Congress, even among groups and individuals that traditionally had been regarded as friends of education. For example, the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) argued that too much concern with structures drained effort from more important battles for more money and better policies for education. These battles were best fought by a coalition of education, labor, civil rights, and welfare groups dealing with a conglomerate HEW.[18] The AFL-CIO's views reflected those of its affiliate, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), which also feared that a separate department would be dominated by the much larger NEA. Other opponents denied that a new, "visible" department could improve the quality of education unless it was accompanied by improved policies. Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-N.Y.) noted that " 'visibility' and 'status' are undefined catch phrases which hardly justify creation of a cabinet level department of education," which, he argued, should be set up "only where there is a major national policy to carry out."[19]

Some people claimed that a national education policy was contemplated even if it did not yet exist. To them, the proposed department was a back-door method of ensuring that the education policies favored in Washington became those of the entire nation. The spectre of federal control loomed ever more distinctly in the congressional discussions during 1978, especially for Republicans from the Midwest and the West and for southern Democrats. Despite the administration's promise that it was committed to pluralist and decentralized education, the Senate committee felt obligated to adopt a series of amendments to strengthen the provisions of the Ribicoff bill referring to the rights of state and local governments. The House committee reported that "one of the most persistent fears expressed [during the hearings] was that creation of such a department would lead to Federal control of education," and it inserted at the beginning of its bill an express prohibition of federal direction, supervision, or control of local education programs.[20] Even with this precaution, the spectre remained. According to one opponent of the bill, "the question that Congress must now decide

[18] Andrew J. Biemiller (director, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO) to Senator Abraham Ribicoff, 16 May 1978, *Senate Hearings: 1978*, pt. 2, 746–48.

[19] Statement by Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal, House of Representatives, *Department of Education Organization Act: Report Together with Additional and Dissenting Views to Accompany H.R. 13778*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, Report No. 95-1531, 39.

[20] Ibid., 13.

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. . . is simply how much influence should the Federal Government have on education in this country?"[21]

If federal control was indeed the issue, it was not to be decided in 1978. The department's opponents in the House had threatened to hold up other bills of higher priority if the department bill was brought on. They had also foreshadowed dozens of amendments that threatened to prolong the floor debate. The Democratic leaders in the House did not force the bill onto the floor, the House adjourned, and both Senate and House bills lapsed.[22]

The NEA, the education department's strongest supporter, was exasperated at the death of the bills. Throughout the year, the association's Washington office had kept in touch with legislators, meeting members and staff of the Senate and House committees, writing letters and making telephone calls to support transfers and oppose amendments, meeting the staffs of over fifty senators to urge passage of the bill, holding a reception for members of Congress, and attending a White House rally where supporters of the legislation were addressed by the vice-president. NEA officials held frequent meetings with OMB and White House staff and kept the House committee staff informed of congressional views on the bill. Late in September, they met administration officials and House Democratic leaders in a last effort to get the bill through in the Ninety-fifth Congress.

The NEA knew it could do more. Reviewing 1978, NEA officials believed the association had paid too little attention to presenting its case to lawmakers face-to-face in their constituencies and in their Washington offices. Heretofore, NEA grass roots contact with legislators had been mainly through intermittent letter-writing blitzes in response to head office requests, and visits to Washington by teachers from the states of legislators who were undecided before crucial votes. The mid-term elections provided the perfect opportunity to heighten congressional awareness of the grass roots. NEA members dogged candidates and incumbents, seeking their views on association goals, including the education department. NEA Political Action Committees (NEA-PACs) at all levels raised over $3 million for sympathetic candidates. Incumbent members of Congress who had favored the education department bill received between them perhaps five times as much financial support from the NEA as those who had opposed it.[23] The NEA was regrouping for a new assault.

The Illusory Victory: 1979

Neither the administration, its legislative allies, nor their interest group supporters let the matter rest with the death of the 1978 bills. Advocates devoted the

[21] Statement by Rep. Peter H. Kostmayer (D-Penn.), in ibid., 43.

[22] Harrison H. Donnelly, "Education Department Opponents Force Bill off House Schedule," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 October 1978, 2752–53.

[23] Methvin and Herndon, "Annotating a *Reader's Digest* Article," 422; *Washington Post*, 5 June 1979. The estimate of five times is based on figures for the period 1974–78.

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remainder of 1978 and the early weeks of 1979 to understanding the lessons of the experience and planning a new campaign. These lessons were reflected in the new bills presented to the Ninety-sixth Congress, the arguments used in support of them, and the strategy used to gain their passage through both houses.

The bills that Senator Ribicoff introduced on 24 January 1979 and that Congressman Brooks introduced on behalf of the administration on 27 February 1979 differed only slightly. (In fact, the administration bill was later introduced in the Senate, too, and hearings were held on it simultaneously with the Ribicoff bill.) The administration bill did not include some Rehabilitation Services Administration programs that appeared in the Ribicoff bill, and the administration bill gave the secretary of education greater discretion over the organization of his or her department. Neither bill tried to reverse the whittling down process of 1978; both settled for roughly the list of programs left in the 1978 Senate bill. There was no desire to begin again the battle with groups and agencies that had characterized the previous year.

A subtle change was also wrought in the arguments used by the bills' supporters, particularly in the administration. While the list of advantages claimed for the department in 1979 was similar to that of 1978, more emphasis was now placed on the better delivery of federal assistance for the educational efforts of the states and localities and the greater accountability of education bureaucrats once they had been dragged from the protective HEW jungle, than on the management advantages of the proposed structure for the executive branch. The education department's advocates hoped that stressing its supportiveness and accessibility would allay fears of federal control. The administration agreed that the new department must incorporate machinery for close liaison with other levels of government and for monitoring federal impacts on state and local education systems. Administration witnesses before the congressional committees also pointed to the likelihood of reduced costs and staff savings, hoping to tap a mood that had been detected in Congress and the constituencies in favor of fiscal and staffing responsibility. Finally, less use was made of the "visibility" argument, which had often seemed merely to draw attention to the intensity of interest group support for the department and to cause uncommitted legislators to fear that the new agency might become the captive of the NEA and its allies.[24]

While the president was wary of being seen to pander to education groups, he knew that the creation of an education department—*any* education department—might hinge on the ability of the most powerful of those groups, the NEA, to deliver the votes of wavering legislators. The NEA, for its part, knew it had to become a less conspicuous supporter of the administration to avoid the charges that the new department would be a puppet of the NEA and that the

[24] For an example of administration testimony along these lines see Testimony of James T. McIntyre Jr., House Committee on Government Operations, *Department of Education Organization Act: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations on H.R. 2444 to Establish a Department of Education, and for Other Purposes*, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 26–27 March and 5 April 1979, 55–68.

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legislation was a "payoff" for NEA help to Carter in 1976. (The latter charge worried many people in the adminstration as well.) NEA knew arguments along these lines might dissuade lukewarm supporters of the department just as easily as its own persuasion could win them. Consequently, the association tried to submerge its public lobbying efforts in a loose coalition of some 100 education and other groups. It kept firm control of the coalition's Washington lobbying, however, and provided most of the coalition's finance and staff, as well as most of its lobbying infantry outside Washington. About twelve groups in the coalition worked hard for the department, but NEA still worked hardest of all.

In addition, the White House began to devote more resources to the fight for the new department. A task force was established to lobby legislators. It comprised members of the White House's legislative liaison team, the DPS, other White House units, and OMB, and could call on the president and vice-president when a member of Congress required special attention to ensure his or her vote. The task force was to cooperate closely with Ribicoff and Brooks (the floor leaders of the legislation), with NEA, and with the other leading supporters of the separate department. As the legislative activity intensified, representatives of the task force met the interest groups two or three times weekly to discuss tactics and exchange information. Vice-President Mondale devoted part of almost every working day to the battle, and the president reviewed progress with the task force at least weekly. Ultimately, the president was to devote more time to lobbying for the bill than to any other lobbying effort of his administration, except for the Panama Canal treaties.

The House and Senate committee hearings on the 1979 bills and the subsequent legislative sessions raised few new issues, but they saw some altered emphases. On the pro-department side, the main task was to allay fears of federal control, the bogey that had loomed ever larger in 1978; on the anti-department side, it was to add amendments to the legislation that would cripple it. So worrisome had the federal control issue become that the Senate committee went out of its way to play down the likely effects of the legislation. The department, it said, "should not directly . . . improve American education. It is not intended to do so, because that is really the province and duty of the States and localities."[25] The committee added yet more amendments to the bill to guard against federal encroachments. On the staffing side, the Senate committee limited the number of high-level employees the department could employ and required Congress to establish each year a staff ceiling for the whole department. No other federal department had faced such a restriction on its size.

Once the bill reached the Senate floor it almost stumbled over an unexpected obstacle when Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) tried to attach an amendment that effectively would have allowed voluntary prayer in public schools. Helms was opposed to a greater federal role in education, but he also saw the education

[25] Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Department of Education Act of 1979: Report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs to Accompany S. 210 to Establish a Department of Education Together with Additional and Minority Views*, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, Report No. 96-49, 15.

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department bill as a chance to gain ground for a moral and religious cause. His amendment was so unpalatable to some Senate liberals, who were only tepid supporters of the education department in any case, that it might have turned them against the bill. However, the amendment was removed from the bill by 53 votes to 40 after adroit maneuvers by the Democratic leadership (assisted by NEA officials) and telephone calls to wavering senators from Carter and Mondale.[26] Once the amendment was removed, the bill passed comfortably through the Senate by 72 votes (48D, 24R) to 21 (5D, 16R).

At every stage in two years of struggle for the education department, the House provided a sterner test than the Senate. House members were closer than senators to anti-federal control sentiment at the grass roots and, facing elections every two years, they were more likely to respond to it. But they were also closer to the pro-department lobbyists, who worked hard to pick up the few votes that might mean victory. Early in 1979, great interest centered on how the four new members of the House Government Operations Committee would vote. The NEA and other supporters of the department had established contact with the new men soon after their arrival in Washington, and they were believed to have secured the votes of the three Democrats. The new Republican, Lyle Williams of Ohio, was still undecided, along with two old members. The committee was neatly balanced, with eighteen votes for the bill and eighteen against.

According to one account, the stalemate was broken by "lobbying and the addition of tight limitations on bureaucratic growth of the new department." These "proved to be the crucial factors in winning over undecided members and holding on to wavering supporters."[27]

The lobbying came from the president in Washington, and from NEA officials and their pro-department allies in the constituencies. The limitations, opposed by the White House but adopted comfortably by amendments in the committee, held the administration to its assertion that establishing the new department would enable the same programs to be administered by fewer people (ultimately, the figure was set at five hundred fewer). Secondly, Congress gave itself the authority to veto all regulations of the department. While it had espoused the virtues of frugality and accountability for its department, the executive branch would have preferred a bill that left the secretary more leeway for putting these ideals into practice. Still, the losses were thought worth sustaining if they won the vital votes for the department. On May 2, the committee reported the bill by a single vote, 20 (18D, 2R) to 19 (7D, 12R).

The close committee vote foreshadowed an equally close result in the full House. The uncertainty about the outcome was increased by the efforts of an anti-department coalition outside Congress. The AFT continued to believe that the separate department was the wrong goal pursued by the wrong organization

[26] Harrison H. Donnelly, "Education Department Survives Prayer Fight," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 14 April 1979, 694–95.

[27] Harrison H. Donnelly, "Education Department Survives by One Vote in House Committee," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 5 May 1979, 836.

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(the NEA). The AFT had directed most of its lobbying energies in 1978 not against the department, rather against what it saw as a more important target, tuition tax credits. Then, the AFT and NEA had been allies. By 1979 they were opponents. The Committee against a Separate Department of Education, formed in April 1979, was a loose grouping of the AFT, civil rights and labor groups, Roman Catholic education authorities (who believed the department might discriminate against private schools), some leaders of the Senate minority against the bill, some conservative organizations, and the heads of a number of colleges (who feared an education department might favor elementary and secondary over higher education.)[28]

Despite their late start, the anti-department forces seemed to be affecting the opinions of the uncommitted and the unenthusiastic in Congress. In New York, where almost 90 percent of teachers were members of the AFT, the resistance of Democratic representatives to the department was strong and growing.[29] Legislators from predominately Catholic areas in some states found their mail running heavily against the bill. Some members received calls from bishops. To counter these efforts, NEA used the Easter recess and congressional weekend visits home to keep the issue in the minds of legislators. The association's head office gave extra coaching to members of "Congressional Contact Teams," teachers in each congressional district who had been chosen for their activism and their closeness to individual House members and who kept in touch with them in their constituencies and in Washington. These teachers would communicate grass roots opinion, supply information, and seek commitments on legislation that the NEA supported. NEA headquarters also sent kits to local education associations that suggested ways of publicising the department to build up a groundswell that might attract the attention of legislators.

Now was the time when this grass-roots activity was most needed. The bill's opponents hoped to delay the floor debate long enough to allow the anti-bill forces to build opposition in the constituencies over the Fourth of July recess. They moved a number of amendments so conservative and so opposed to the interests of civil rights groups—such as restricting the department's authority to bus students to achieve racial integration, restricting its ability to impose racial quotas, committing it to support voluntary prayer in schools, and limiting its possible involvement in abortions—that they threatened not only to delay debate but potentially even to strip some liberal and black support from the bill. As it turned out, the continued steady work of the NEA and its allies more than matched the last ditch efforts of their opponents during the recess. Teachers on vacation followed many legislators through their rounds of summer engagements, keeping the department of education in their minds and cementing previous commitments. NEA's opponents often found the lead was too long to overcome. Commitments to NEA, once made, were hard to budge.

[28] Harrison H. Donnelly, "Colleges Join Opponents of Education Department," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 28 April 1979, 794–95.

[29] Eventually twenty-three of twenty-six New York Democrats voted against the bill.

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When Congress resumed, administration lobbyists increased their contacts with wavering members. Earlier lobbying had relied heavily on OMB staff, the writers of the legislation, to inform lawmakers of the details of the bill to try to counter their misgivings, and to fill the gaps in their knowledge in ways that cast the bill in a favorable light. Now the pressure increased. At Camp David that July, the president took time off from reappraising his presidency to call individual representatives. Vice-President Mondale spent hours on the telephone and walking the corridors of Capitol Hill drumming up support. HEW Secretary Califano, who had done little since 1977 to disguise his opposition to the new department, reluctantly urged members to support the president.[30] Other cabinet members joined in. Undecided liberal legislators were told that any conservative amendments could be removed from the bill in the conference. NEA staff prepared "target lists" of key legislators to be visited by the Washington lobbying team of the pro-department forces, including specially flown-in teachers, administration lobbyists, and the floor leaders for the bill. To make sure that some members did not resolve the conflicting pressures on them by staying away from the House, NEA and administration officials checked attendances at each vote. The margin seemed to be so narrow that to have even one missing person might prove fatal.

These efforts paid dividends at last. On 11 July 1979, after more than thirty hours of debate, the House passed the education department bill by 210 votes (175D, 35R) to 206 (89D, 117R). Rarely could such a hard fought vote have been won so narrowly.

The battle was not yet over. The legislative conference had to produce a version of the legislation to put to both Houses. The Senate and House committee staffs began to work out agreements to reconcile the differences between the two bills, while the NEA's Washington staff worked with the White House, OMB, some lawmakers, and civil rights groups to produce an acceptable formula for an affirmative action amendment. The main difference between the two bills was the set of conservative amendments in the House version, but the preparatory work managed to strip these away. The conference adopted the agreed version of the bill easily and the bill completed its passage through the Senate on September 24 by 69 votes (51D, 18R) to 22 (5D, 17R).

Now the final assault on the House of Representatives commenced. The pro-department forces knew that deleting the conservative amendments in the conference might cost a few conservative votes, but they hoped the deletions would bring some liberal votes back. While conservative Republicans worked on their party colleagues to maximize the losses, the administration and its allies launched a thorough last-minute drive. Some representatives were followed almost to the door of the chamber.[31] The president entertained some of the undecided Democrats at the White House. Some representatives received com-

[30] Califano, *Governing America*, 291. Califano was dismissed soon afterwards, partly because of his lack of cooperation in the fight for the department over the last two years.

[31] *Washington Post*, 28 September 1979.

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mitments from the president on other legislation, or on federal benefits for their districts, in exchange for their vote for the education department. NEA Congressional Contact Team members made hurried final trips to Washington and NEA staff huddled with House members over cocktails.

When the vote was taken on September 27, the number of those who had moved into the pro-department camp more than balanced those lost after the conference changes to the House bill. The House adopted the conference report by the relatively comfortable margin of 215 votes (185D, 30R) to 201 (77D, 124R). The bill had been passed. Victory—of a kind—had been won.[32]

Conclusion

The story of the creation of the department of education is, first of all, a study in the dynamics of coalitions. A coalition is a sharing and joint use of resources to influence a decision or series of decisions, in this case a series of decisions in relation to a bill before Congress.[33] A coalition is not an alliance among organizations with similar goals. Fellow contributors of resources to one coalition may contribute to opposing coalitions on another decision. They may simultaneously be allies and opponents, as the AFT and NEA were on tuition tax credits and the education department, respectively. Because the goals of the contributors to a coalition may be diverse, the contributors often have different sets of reasons for seeking to influence the decision the coalition is trying to achieve. The desire to, for example, have a bill passed or defeated may be the only thing on which all contributors can agree unequivocally. All contributors believe passage or defeat will do something for them or their organizations, but one contributor's "something" may be nothing like another's.

The proposed education department was supported and opposed by shifting, loose coalitions that comprised interest groups, elected politicians, bureaucrats, newspapers, and television stations. All parts of each coalition agreed at least that the department should or should not exist, but beyond that they differed. They differed over what were the issues in the contest and they had differing goals. On the pro-department side, some were always most interested in "status" and "visibility" for education in Washington. Others gave more weight to improving the quality of education administration at the center. Still others wanted most of all to reduce the burden of federal red tape and regulation on classroom teachers.

Few of the participants in the pro-department coalition saw only one issue or sought a single goal. Rather, they perceived a number of issues and pursued a number of goals, but some issues and goals were given a higher priority than

[32] The department as constituted had a budget of $14.2 billion and a total staff of 17,000 to administer 152 programs, 140 of them from the old Education Division. (The latter accounted for over 90 percent of the department's budget.) See n.a., "Congress Creates Department of Education," *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 35 (1979):465–66.

[33] See William A. Gamson, "Coalition Formation," in David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 17 vols. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), 2:530–31.

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others. Similarly, contributors to the anti-department coalition gave different degrees of importance to goals like "local control," "curbing bureaucracy," "freedom of choice," and "defeating NEA." Many protagonists redistributed their priorities over time as circumstances changed. The rhetoric of the battle reflected these shifting balances. "Coordination" became less important in the OMB lexicon as the likelihood of great coordination being achieved receded. Perhaps by 1979, the president's desire for reelection outweighed everything else in the White House's approach to the legislation, and the president's lieutenants used the arguments that seemed most likely to achieve this goal. Among the department's conservative opponents, "federal control" and "controlling the bureaucracy," even "protecting the family" (the abortion and prayer amendments), became more important as debating points once they were perceived to be somehow connected with the proposed department. Indeed, so anxious were some of the department's supporters to placate its opponents that some apparently conservative goals—such as the limits on staffing and the congressional veto on regulations—became important on both sides of the fight. Supporters were forced to seek the same goals as opponents, but with less enthusiasm.

Contributors to both coalitions eventually found themselves working to achieve ends rather different from those that they were seeking at the beginning of the contest. This development underlined the fact that the battle itself produced new issues and new goals. It was irrelevant for OMB people to say that some of these new arrivals were extraneous. The purpose of legislation, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder, and some lenses, ground by states rights ideology, moral fervor, or the desire to ride a vote-winning bandwagon, enable their wearers to see what they want to see. The flexible congressional rules about the germaneness of material allowed all kinds of conservative amendments to be moved, but the problem would have existed even without the amendments. The AFT had good reasons to oppose the NEA, regardless of the details of the bill. Catholics had long-standing educational goals that they believed were threatened by the department. Some people would have opposed "yet another department," no matter what it was, or "more bureaucrats," regardless of where they were to work, because the size of government was an issue that they raised at every opportunity. Supporters of the bill, who had started out looking for ways to streamline the administration of education or to raise the status of education in Washington, had to devote more and more of their resources to answering the "extraneous" arguments of their conservative opponents. They came to see that reorganization is often a "garbage can" into which people throw many problems, some of which have little to do with reorganization. Problems become attached to solutions (bills and amendments in this case) in a way that seems quite haphazard to those who have not traced the intricacies of the legislative struggle. The results are never quite what anyone intended.[34]

Another characteristic that stands out in the story is the role of intelligently

[34] See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), 314–37.

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marshaled information in influencing House members and senators. Investigations in 1976 suggested that the majority of federal legislators had no strong feelings for or against a separate department, and this seems to have remained true at least through the Ninety-fifth Congress.[35] Government reorganization was a low-key subject under normal circumstances, and an education department seemed both less urgent and less likely to lead to great changes in government operations than, say, the Department of Energy in 1977. Some legislators, particularly in the Senate, firmly believed in the department, but many others would have echoed Congressman John Conyers (D-Mich.):

> Although I can't say with any conviction that the creation of a Department of Education will be harmful in any important ways to education at state and local levels, I can't say with any assurance that it will have any tangible benefits, in the short- or long-run.[36]

In part, this attitude reflected a characteristic of government reorganization: to the neutral observer, an equally plausible case can usually be made for a number of different arrangements for performing the same function. The inconclusiveness is increased if the arguments turn on claims about the "purpose" or "mission" of programs or of executive departments or agencies. The discussion here of events in 1977–78 showed that there are slippery concepts involved. Furthermore, the same agreed fact may be read in different ways. The new department could be supported because the changes proposed seemed to be small and likely to mean little disruption to the access of groups to government. The department could be opposed for the same reasons: if it is so trivial, then why bother at all?

Where general arguments tend to cancel each other out it may not take much to convince legislators in either direction. The field is open for committed, knowledgeable, and politically resourceful interest groups to provide information on the bill and its merits and to secure commitments from legislators. "Pressure" is frequently an inaccurate description of what legislators receive from groups. As Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter have noted:

> To many congressmen, the interest organization is a source of information about the attitudes of significant groups in his [sic] public, a source of research data and speech material, and an unofficial propaganda ally to help him put his own case forward.[37]

The NEA's importance as an information provider was even greater because it was the first to lobby strongly on the issue. The proponents of the department built up support almost before some legislators had realized that their support

[35] Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Department of Education Act of 1977: Hearings before the Committee on Governmental Affairs*, pt., 1, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 12–13 October 1977, 221.

[36] *House Hearings: 1978*, 615.

[37] Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), 440–41.

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for the department might incur costs with groups like the AFT and the Catholic educators.

Of course, the possibility of election campaign opposition from the NEA would have helped to stiffen the resolve of some legislators, even when they knew the views of other groups. By the time of the final votes in 1979, few members of the House of Representatives could have been unaware of the specific arguments for and against the department and of the relative strengths of the pro- and anti-department lobbies in their districts, but many members could only say to the opponents of the bill: "I committed myself on this one long ago." For those who remained undecided to the last, regardless of the information they had received and of their calculations of costs and benefits, the telephone call from the White House, awakening the desire to "do something for Fritz [Mondale]," or not to let the president be defeated on something he obviously wanted badly, was often enough to tip the balance from indifference to support.

The final concluding point recalls the lack of proportion between the efforts of the supporters of the legislation and the extent of the reorganization that the legislation achieved. The original bill proposed a fairly narrow department; the legislative process whittled away even this modest conception. Yet it seems that in the White House, where the deployment of resources in proportion to benefits should have been of the highest concern, the question "Is it worth it?" was never seriously asked or considered. Or if the question was asked, the answers of those who looked at the costs and benefits from a management perspective alone were outmaneuvered by those who raised other considerations. Indeed, the force of these other considerations was the very reason why the administration refused to be deterred by the changes in the department's conception during 1978 and 1979, and why it gladly accepted the department that emerged.

These other considerations were three. First, there was the strong commitment of the president and vice-president to a separate department as a symbol of the administration's determination to raise the status of education in Washington and to increase the attention devoted to it by the federal government.[38] The "visibility" argument rather sank from view in the committee rooms and chambers of Capitol Hill, but it remained important for both Carter and Mondale. Carter had the stubbornness and Mondale the contacts in Congress to continue the fight for the extra chair at cabinet meetings, regardless of the powers its occupant might wield.

Second, while the White House had not worked as hard in 1978 to pass the legislation as it did in 1979, it had invested too many resources to pull back. The obvious time to assess costs and benefits was the turn of the year. To the extent that such an assessment was made, it was concluded that giving up the depart-

[38] For a similar argument, see Willis D. Hawley and Beryl A. Radin, "Reorganization Goals, Political Processes, and Organizational Outcomes: Understanding the Organization of the U.S. Department of Education," (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, N.Y., 3 September 1981). See also Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 63.

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ment would reduce the administration's ability to fight and win other battles in Congress. Potential allies would not trust it; potential foes would gain confidence; waverers would remain in their tents. Then, as 1979 wore on, the impossibility of retreat became the pressing need for a victory. The president was unpopular in the country, a challenge from Senator Edward M. Kennedy was looming, and the administration had gained a reputation for ineptitude in its relations with Congress. A win might boost the president's prestige and build up his resources for the last third of his term. It was no coincidence that the strongest push for the department came during one of the crises of the Carter presidency—the reappraisals and reprisals at Camp David in July 1979.

Third, the White House fought so hard for the reduced department because the likely political rewards seemed worth the effort. Among the many influences on the outcome of the battle, there stands out the relationship—past, present, and future—between the Carter camp and the National Education Association. Other presidents have had strong interests in government reorganization but few can have been so locked into a concept that eventually made so little difference to the structure of the federal government. Carter was locked in so securely because of the nature of his power base and the need to retain it. The new nomination rules of the Democratic party effectively replaced the old power structure in the party with the power of large, disciplined, and, most of all, dispersed organizations like the NEA. Carter, "everybody's second-best candidate" in 1976, whose support was "a mile wide but an inch deep," joined forces with an organization that was also thinly spread everywhere, to support something that aroused strong emotions among few Americans and made little difference to the machinery of their government. Many other groups supported the separate department of education but none had so much influence with the Carter White House as the NEA. Its skill in organizing the grass roots continually reminded Carter's team that the NEA was useful, powerful, and indeed indispensable. One Carter campaign aide commented:

> The NEA is a full partner in our campaign. They have a full field organization everywhere we go. We just plug them in wherever we are weak and they do a job.[39]

The NEA again endorsed President Carter and worked for him against Senator Kennedy during the Democratic primaries. It again gave him his largest bloc of delegates at the Democratic National Convention in 1980.

Once the renomination was assured, the NEA, having been legislative partner and nominating bloc, could become again a surrogate party organization on election day. In November 1980, however, it became clear that "surrogate" did not mean "real." Real party organizations deliver bloc votes of their own members; they do not contain substantial minorities that vote for the opposition. According to one writer, Carter picked up just 52 percent of the votes of NEA

[39] Walter Moore, quoted in the *New York Times*, 3 February 1980.

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members in 1980.[40] Real party organizations also provide a buffer against interest group demands; they do not demand delivery on specific promises as a condition of support. What they want from their politicians is partisanship—favoring over the long haul the party's own support groups rather than its opponent's—not advocacy of causes. A president who maintained a solid base of loyalty and support through thick and thin because he was a Democrat (or a Republican, for that matter), as well as because of the promises he had made to interest groups, could place support from an organization like the NEA in perspective. An organization like the NEA would be a great asset for a president who drew enough power from other sources to be able sometimes to decide that the costs of its services were too high. For Carter, the cost of access to NEA's organization as candidate was the narrowing of his room to maneuver and to allocate his resources as president.*

[40] Stanley M. Elam, "The National Education Association: Political Powerhouse or Paper Tiger?" *Phi Delta Kappan* 63 (1981): 173.

* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the following people, who gave interviews, provided documents, or read drafts of this article: Rachelle Horowitz, Steve Daniels, Marilyn Harris, Bob Heffernan, Mikel Miller, Rochelle Stanfield, Jim Green, Stan McFarland, Ken Melley, Floyd Tomkins, Pat Gwaltney McGinnis, Jim McIntyre, Harrison Wellford, Beryl Radin, Bert Carp, Stuart Eizenstat, Les Francis, Terry Straub, Chris Arterton, Ed Lindblom, and Dick Nelson.

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Woodrow Wilson, Alice Paul, and the Woman Suffrage Movement

SALLY HUNTER GRAHAM

Historians have traditionally argued that Woodrow Wilson's attitude toward the woman suffrage movement was one of benign neglect.[1] Since the president believed that the extension of suffrage to women was the prerogative of the individual states, he refused to recommend a federal constitutional amendment to Congress throughout his first term in office. Although the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) eventually persuaded him to endorse the constitutional amendment in 1918, he remained a reluctant reformer who was prodded into action only by a groundswell of public support of woman suffrage.

But in a 1981 article, Christine Lunardini and Thomas Knock attempted to revise this traditional approach.[2] They contended that Wilson's attitude toward woman suffrage was transformed not only by NAWSA's gentle persuasion but also by political pressure from the militant National Woman's Party (NWP). They emphasize, however, that Wilson's personal commitment to social justice and progressivism, as well as political expediency, led him by 1918 to play a vital part in the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.

While Lunardini and Knock deserve credit for placing Wilson's activism after 1918 in its proper perspective, they incorrectly attribute his change in attitude to an ideological commitment to social justice. His motives were in fact far less

[1] See, for example, Eleanor Flexner, *Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1959), ch. 21, 23.

[2] "Woodrow Wilson and Woman Suffrage: A New Look," *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (Winter 1980-81): 655-71.

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altruistic. In 1917, Woman's Party propaganda stressed the inconsistency between Wilson's strident advocacy of democracy abroad and his administration's indifference to democracy at home. Wilson first attempted to silence this embarrassing criticism through manipulation of the press and public opinion. The president underwent his sudden conversion into a suffrage advocate only after these attempts failed. By 1918, support for the amendment resolved the contradiction that had threatened the integrity of his administration, and had become a necessary, if unintended, consequence of Wilson's democratic war aims.

Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party

NWP leader Alice Paul was born in Moorestown, New Jersey, in 1885, the daughter of Quaker parents. After receiving her master's degree in sociology from the University of Pennsylvania in 1907, she traveled to England to do settlement work. In London, she joined the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU), the militant wing of the British suffrage movement. Under the tutelage of WSPU leader Emmeline Pankhurst, Paul learned lessons in militant activism that would dramatically alter the woman suffrage campaign in the United States.

By 1917 Woodrow Wilson was well acquainted with Alice Paul, at least by reputation. Upon her return to America in 1910, she completed her Ph.D. degree and continued to pursue her interest in woman suffrage. In 1913, she became the chairman of the National American Woman Suffrage Association's Congressional Committee. Unlike NAWSA strategists, however, she became convinced that concentration on suffrage by state constitutional amendments was a waste of time. Consequently, in April 1913 she formed the militant Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage (CU) to work for a federal suffrage amendment. The CU's strategy, based on partisan politics and coercion, was anathema to NAWSA, and in 1914 the two groups went their separate ways.

Paul's political theory was founded on a single premise: electoral survival determines political behavior. From that departure point, she reasoned that politicians could be convinced of the political expendiency of suffrage in less time than it would take to convert each congressman to the principle of woman suffrage. Central to Paul's concept of a suffrage pressure group was the importance of publicity and public opinion. Her organization used publicity in two ways: to "sell" the suffrage issue to the American people; and to coerce politicians to support the federal amendment.

In an effort to force the majority party to act on the amendment, the Congressional Union and, after 1916, the National Woman's Party, campaigned against all Democratic candidates in the 1914 and 1916 elections. Although this maneuver caused some consternation within the party and some embarrassment to the president, few if any Democrats were defeated solely because of the militants. Undaunted, Paul remained committed to her two principles. She believed that the president's support was vital to the suffrage movement's objec-

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tive, and that political pressure was the only method that would ensure his support. In December 1916, Paul began to formulate a new plan of attack. She decided to picket the White House. Paul explained her strategy in this way: "If a creditor stands before a man's house all day demanding payment of his bill, the man must either remove the creditor or pay the bill."[3] As another militant later noted, "at first Wilson tried to remove the creditor; later he paid the bill."[4]

On 10 January 1917, Alice Paul's pickets appeared at the White House gates. The women carried banners that asked: *"MR. PRESIDENT, HOW LONG MUST WOMEN WAIT FOR LIBERTY?"* [5] At first Wilson was courteous to the pickets, tipping his hat in passing and once even inviting them into the White House on a cold day. With America's entry into World War I, however, Wilson's casual acceptance of the suffragists was soon altered.

Woman's Party strategists led by Alice Paul welcomed Wilson's new status of world leader. As one woman activist observed, "his own statements of faith in democracy and the necessity of establishing it throughout the world left him open to attack."[6] Paul decided to mount the attack on the administration's weakest point: the hypocrisy of waging a war for democracy abroad while denying the vote to women at home. Most woman suffrage associations, including NAWSA, supported the war effort. They hoped to convince the president and Congress that as patriotic citizens they were entitled to the ballot. Paul's group, however, remained a single-issue organization throughout the war. NWP members used Wilson's war goals to point out his hypocritical attitude toward woman suffrage, but refused to lend their services in any way to the war effort. "We will not bargain with our country for our services," a NWP official stated. "We will not say to our government: 'give us the vote and we will nurse your soldiers,' but we will insist on suffrage now."[7]

Throughout May and June 1917, Woman's Party pickets carried banners that bore excerpts from Wilson's writings on democracy. One sign, taken from the president's war message, read: *"WE SHALL FIGHT FOR THE THINGS WE HAVE ALWAYS HELD NEAREST OUR HEARTS—FOR DEMOCRACY."* [8] On June 20, suffragists greeted a Russian delegation from the Alexander Kerensky government with a banner that proclaimed: *". . . TELL OUR GOVERNMENT THAT IT MUST LIBERATE ITS WOMEN BEFORE IT CAN CLAIM FREE RUSSIA AS AN ALLY."* [9] After the Russians had passed, a group of

[3] Quoted in Inez Haynes Irwin, *The Story of Alice Paul and The National Woman's Party* (Fairfax, Va.: Denlinger's Publishers, 1977), 202.

[4] Ibid., 202.

[5] Doris Stevens, *Jailed For Freedom* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1920), 66; *New York Times*, 12 January 1917.

[6] Stevens, *Jailed For Freedom*, 84–85.

[7] *New York Tribune*, 1 March 1917. This policy met with criticism from the press. See, for example, *Chicago Tribune*, 22 June 1917.

[8] Stevens, *Jailed For Freedom*, 84; National Woman's Party Press Release, 22 June 1917, Woodrow Wilson Papers, microfilm, reel 209, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

[9] *The Suffragist*, 30 June 1917, 6–8.

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enraged bystanders, led by Mrs. Dee Richardson, attacked the pickets. Mrs. Richardson reportedly scratched and clawed her way to the suffragists. Leaping astride one unwary picket, shrieking "You dirty yellow traitor," the irate woman snatched the banner from the picket and hurled it to the mob. The crowd quickly destroyed the banner, while the police packed Mrs. Richardson away in a paddy wagon.[10]

Shortly after the rioters were dispersed, Major Pullman, District of Columbia police superintendent, called on the White House. After a conference with Wilson's secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, Pullman announced that there would be no change in police policy regarding the pickets. The superintendent guaranteed that the suffragists would be allowed to display their banners "unless the police department is requested to alter its policy by White House officials."[11] By the next afternoon, however, the Wilson administration had apparently changed its mind. Police arrested two pickets for obstructing the sidewalk and ordered that the picketing of the White House cease. A Washington newspaper reported that the police had received a tip either from the White House or from the district attorney to arrest the suffragists.[12]

Alice Paul was pleased with the newspaper coverage of the banner incident and ensuing arrests. Every major newspaper on the East Coast carried reports of the riot, often on the front page. While some newspaper stories cast the pickets in an unfavorable light, most reporters used lengthy quotes from the women to "flesh out" their copy. In a press release on 22 June 1917, Paul commented:

> It is those who deny justice, and not those who demand it, who embarrass the country in its international relations. . . . The responsibility, therefore, is with the government and not with the women of America, if the lack of democracy at home weakens the government in its fight for democracy 3000 miles away.[13]

The suffragists' cause was also furthered when newspapers published pictures of the pickets' arrest for obstructing the sidewalk. The photographs of the two women, surrounded by a mob of rowdies, cast doubt on the validity of both the charges and the arrests.[14] Even NAWSA's condemnation of the NWP actions could not dim the glow of publicity that the pickets prompted. Moreover, Paul's strategy received praise from a leading American radical, Max Eastman. In a telegram to Paul, Eastman effused: "Magnificent. Perfect from every point of view. Endless admiration."[15]

Although Wilson declined to comment on the June suffrage riots, the subsequent publicity disturbed the administration greatly. Eight days after the Rus-

[10] *Washington Times*, 21 June 1917.
[11] *Evening Star* (Washington, D.C.), 20 June 1917.
[12] *Washington Times*, 22 June 1917.
[13] National Woman's Party Press Release, 22 June 1917, reel 209, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.
[14] See, for example, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 23 June 1917.
[15] *Washington Times*, 21 June 1917.

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sian envoy incident, Mrs. Ellis Meredith, head of the Woman's Bureau of the Democratic National Committee, wrote to Wilson's secretary Joseph P. Tumulty:

> As long as they [the pickets] can get on the front page of the papers they will keep up their present tactics . . . Mr. Creel [chairman of the Committee on Public Information (CPI)] tells me he can get the Associated Press and the other two news organizations to suppress anything concerning them, but that the relations between himself and the local press are not such that they will relegate the stories about the women to a line or two in police news.[16]

Mrs. Meredith went on to suggest that, by taking away the militants' "meal ticket" with the press, they would "dwindle and fade into obscurity."[17]

Censorship and Press Manipulation

The groundwork for press censorship and administrative public opinion management had been laid in April 1917 with the creation of the Committee on Public Information. Wilson had taken care to point out that CPI censorship duties would apply only to information directly affecting the conduct of the war. As early as April 25, he had reassured a nervous newspaperman that he would not permit censorship legislation or CPI activities to act as a shield against criticism of his administration: "I can imagine no greater disservice to the country," he wrote, "than to establish a system of censorship that would deny to the people of a free republic like our own their undisputable right to criticize their own public officials."[18]

In the weeks that followed the Russian envoy incident, however, Wilson's views on censorship and free speech underwent a startling transformation. In spite of the June 21 arrests, NWP members had continued to picket the White House unmolested by the police. In late June, the police superintendent warned Alice Paul that arrests would begin again unless the pickets were immediately withdrawn. Undaunted, thirteen pickets arrived at the White House the next day and were promptly arrested.[19] The superintendent and arresting officers conferred for several hours before announcing that the women were charged once again with obstruction of the sidewalk. Alice Paul concluded that the resumption of arrests was an indication that her strategy was working. Wilson had apparently hoped that by ignoring the pickets, they would grow frustrated

[16] Mrs. Ellis Meredith to Joseph P. Tumulty, 28 June 1917, reel 209, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Woodrow Wilson to Arthur Brisbane, 25 April 1917, case file 3896, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress. The text of this letter was written by Joseph P. Tumulty and copied almost verbatim by Wilson. See memorandum by Tumulty to Woodrow Wilson, 20 April 1917, box 47, Joseph P. Tumulty Papers, Library of Congress.

[19] The date of this arrest is uncertain. Both Alice Paul and Doris Stevens place this event in the last week of June 1917. See Stevens, *Jailed For Freedom*, 93; and Alice Paul, interview by Amelia Fry, 1976, transcript, Oral History Project, University of California at Berkeley, 213.

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and leave. When this failed, he sought to silence them by engineering their arrest. Wilson's hard line approach, however, played directly into Paul's hands.

Throughout the early days of July, picketing and arrests continued. When the first suffragists were sentenced to lengthy jail terms in mid-July, the injustice of the situation so angered one Wilson political appointee that he requested an interview with the president to tender his resignation. Collector of the Port of New York Dudley Field Malone charged in a meeting with the chief executive on July 18 that the women were jailed as a result of "carefully laid plans by the District Commissioners of the City of Washington," who were Wilson appointees. Malone also told Wilson that

> newspaper men of unquestioned information and integrity have told me that the District Commissioners have been in consultation with your private secretary, Mr. Tumulty, and that the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. [William Gibbs] McAdoo, sat in a conference when the policy of their arrests was being determined.[20]

Malone also pointed out the difficulty of the administration's position if he were "compelled to remind the public" that the commissioners were Wilson appointees, and subject to his instructions. Although the president protested his ignorance of the matter, he pardoned the jailed suffragists within twenty-four hours of his interview with Malone.

Given the close relationship between Wilson and his secretary, and more importantly, McAdoo (also his son-in-law), it is unlikely that the president was in fact ignorant of the conspiracy to which Malone alluded. It is also improbable that Wilson granted his pardon strictly because of his professed sympathy for the pickets. Only hours after his interview with Wilson, Malone met with the suffragists' attorney to discuss plans for an appeal of their conviction. Chairman of the CPI George Creel joined the men as an uninvited guest. Although there is no record of their talk, the plans of Malone and the National Women's Party probably found their way to Wilson through Creel.[21] Thus informed of the plan to appeal and conscious of Malone's threat to make public what he considered an administrative conspiracy, Wilson deemed it wise to end the matter with a quick pardon.[22]

The Wilson administration, however, did not intend to "pardon" Dudley

[20] *The Suffragist*, 28 July 1917, 4; and Stevens, *Jailed For Freedom*, 159–160.

[21] *New York Times*, 19 July 1917. Creel's official relationship to the president was confirmed in an undated directive from Wilson, possibly in response to criticism of CPI activities. Wilson stated that: "I would suggest that Creel say that the Committee on Public Information was created by me, [and] that Mr. Creel is my personal representative. . . ." George Creel Papers, vol. I, Library of Congress.

[22] District Commissioner Louis Brownlow's recollection of the arrests and Wilson's reaction is in agreement with the above conclusions. Brownlow relates that Wilson was enraged by the arrests, and told the commissioner that "we have made a fearful blunder, that we never ought to have indulged these women in their desire for arrest and martyrdom, and that he had pardoned them and wanted that to end it." The president then ordered Brownlow to refrain from arresting the pickets without notifying the White House first. Louis Brownlow, *A Passion For Anonymity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 74–82.

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Field Malone as quickly. Malone had been a Wilson supporter for many years, and after his campaign work in the West during the 1912 election, had been appointed collector of the port of New York, an important patronage position. Malone had many influential ties within the Democratic party, and Wilson was doubtlessly concerned when the collector began to make speeches criticizing the administration's handling of the pickets. Accordingly, a few days before his outburst to the president, Malone became the target of a Secret Service investigation. Secret Service agents shadowed the collector from July 15 until the end of August 1917, and their weekly reports were sent to Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo. Agents noted both the time Malone spent at work and the time he spent in Washington, where he engaged in pro-suffragist activities. They also recorded his arrival and departure dates at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington from 1913 through August 1917.[23] On 7 September 1917, McAdoo sent a condensed version of these reports to President Wilson.

Whether the investigation was instigated by McAdoo or the president himself, the agents' reports clearly indicate that Malone's suffrage activities and charges of administrative conspiracy disturbed Wilson. It is also noteworthy to compare Malone's suffrage work before and after his meeting with Wilson and the onset of the investigation. During the four-week period of surveillance, Malone abruptly ended his association with the suffragists. While there is no evidence that the administration applied political coercion to this wayward Wilsonian, it is curious that such an ardent spokesman for the pickets would retreat into virtual anonymity within a fortnight of the onset of a Secret Service surveillance.[24]

After the presidential pardon took effect on July 20 and the eleven militants were released from jail, Alice Paul announced in a press statement that picketing of the White House would continue. "Picketing has accomplished just exactly what we wanted it to accomplish," she stated, "and picketing is going to end in forcing the issue."[25] Paul was closer to the truth than she realized. The cumulative effect of picketing, arrests, and the subsequent publicity, intensified by Malone's accusation to Wilson of administrative conspiracy, forced the president to deal with the suffragists—but not with the suffrage amendment.

Wilson's secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, received a letter on July 20 that would

[23] Secret Service Reports, dated 30 July, 3 August, 6 August, 13 August, and 27 August 1917. See also a copy of a condensed version of the above reports, 7 September 1917. (The original was sent to Woodrow Wilson at the direction of Secretary McAdoo.) Box 187, William Gibbs McAdoo Papers, Library of Congress.

[24] After 28 July 1917, Dudley Field Malone's name ceased to occur in stories concerning the woman suffrage movement. Neither Doris Stevens nor Inez Irwin mention him in their memoirs after the above date, nor do the newspapers listed in footnote 29. By the fall of 1918, Malone was tentatively reinstated in the good graces of the Wilson administration. Apparently his overtures failed to win over Edith Wilson, but Secretary Tumulty, more politically astute than the first lady, urged the president to forgive Malone, but to treat the collector in such a way as to emphasize that "he was still under probation." Memorandum, Joseph P. Tumulty to Woodrow Wilson, 7 October 1918; Joseph P. Tumulty to Edith Wilson, 30 September 1918, Joseph P. Tumulty Papers, Library of Congress.

[25] *Evening Sun* (Baltimore), 20 July 1917.

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provide the president with a weapon to use against National Woman's Party agitation. Arthur Brisbane, editor of the *Washington Times*, echoed the plan suggested in June by Mrs. Ellis Meredith, Woman's Bureau chairman. Brisbane wrote to Tumulty:

> Mr. [Frank] Noyes of the [Washington] *Star* has just discussed with me the wisest manner of dealing with the suffragette problem. His desire is that the newspapers, by a pact and agreement, refrain from giving the suffragette ladies any publicity . . . I told Mr. Noyes that I wanted to do exactly one thing, namely whatever *you* as representing the person most directly interested might think wise.[26]

Although he offered to omit all reference to suffragist agitation from the *Times*, Brisbane noted that the women might become suspicious of an "evident conspiracy of silence."

Tumulty submitted Brisbane's letter to Wilson for appraisal. In an undated memorandum to his secretary, Wilson proposed a compromise plan:

> There is a great deal in what Mr. Brisbane writes about entire silence on the part of the newspapers. . . . My own suggestion would be that nothing that they do should be featured with headlines or put on the front page but that a bare colorless chronicle of what they do should be all that was printed. That constitutes part of the news but it need not be made interesting reading.[27]

Wilson's intentions were carried out by at least one editor. Brisbane sent to Tumulty the following instructions that he had issued at the *Times:*

> Please have nothing about the picketers *or* what they do in prison or anything else on the front page of the paper. Tell the news in two sticks, not farther forward than the fourth page until further notice, no matter what happens or what they do, and a small head over the two sticks, *never* a display head.[28]

While there is no conclusive evidence about the extent of compliance with Wilson's scheme by other editors, a random check of newspaper coverage of three significant dates indicates that editors were loathe to pass up a good story, even if their actions angered the president.[29] Nevertheless, the Wilson-Brisbane scheme indicates a startling change of opinion on censorship by the administration. To assess Wilson's complicity in a scheme to manipulate news of a non-

[26] Arthur Brisbane to Joseph P. Tumulty, 20 July 1917, reel 209, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

[27] Memorandum by Woodrow Wilson to Joseph P. Tumulty, undated, reel 209, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

[28] Arthur Brisbane to Joseph P. Tumulty, 9 November 1917. Case file 1215, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

[29] The following newspapers were checked for their coverage of significant suffragist events for 20–23 June 1917 (White House riots), 18–20 July 1917 (arrests and riots), and 14–18 August 1917 (arrests and riots): *Evening Star* (Washington), *Washington Times, Washington Post, New York Times, New York World, New York Tribune, New York Herald, Baltimore Sun, Chicago Tribune, Philadelphia Inquirer,* and *Cleveland Plain Dealer*. None of these newspapers refrained from front page coverage of the above events, despite the efforts of Creel and the Wilson administration.

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military nature, several threads must be woven together to bring forth the pattern of events.

First, one must recall Mrs. Ellis Meredith of the Democratic National Committee and her letter to Tumulty on June 28. Mrs. Meredith had been assured by George Creel, CPI chairman, that Tumulty could rely on the Associated Press and the two other wire services to suppress news of the Woman's Party pickets. Frank Noyes, *Washington Star* editor and Associated Press correspondent, had suggested to Brisbane the creation of a pact of silence on the suffrage demonstrations. It is probable that Noyes was Creel's contact at Associated Press. At Creel's instigation, Noyes had organized the pact, drawing Brisbane into the group in July. Creel, then, was the link between the White House and the press. Through his position as head of the governmental censorship agency, he had access to both editors and to press correspondents. Creel could implement a scheme of censorship that would have proved awkward for Wilson to initiate alone.

Thus, the wartime censorship agency had assumed a new and unconstitutional function by July 1917, that of censoring material critical of the Wilson administration but not critical to the war effort.[30] In light of his previous statements on freedom of speech and press, Wilson may have found the inherent hypocrisy of the situation uncomfortable. As he explained to Louis Wiley, editor of the *New York Times*: "The matter of censorship is growing daily more difficult and more important, because there are certain hostile and disloyal elements in the press of the country which are taking advantage of the present situation and are doing the most dangerous and hurtful things."[31] In a note to Creel three months later, the president declined to meet with representatives of a free speech group, stating that "it would be extremely difficult to state correctly and wisely my views about free speech right now."[32]

Woman's Party pickets continued to carry banners to the White House throughout August. When on August 14 pickets unfurled a banner addressing *"KAISER WILSON,"* an angry mob of sailors and government workers attacked the suffragists. Rioting continued the next day; the Woman's Party headquarters was vandalized, with several pickets injured and over $1,000 in damages incurred. Police made no effort to halt the riots or to apprehend the members of the mob. Six pickets, however, were arrested for obstructing the sidewalk.[33]

[30] These findings refute the thesis proposed by Steven Vaughn in his treatment of the CPI's wartime censorship activities. For a more benign view of Creel and his committee, see Steven Vaughn, *Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).

[31] Woodrow Wilson to Louis Wiley, 23 July 1917, box 185, William Gibbs McAdoo Papers, Library of Congress.

[32] Memorandum, Woodrow Wilson to George Creel, 5 November 1917, reel 355, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

[33] *The Suffragist*, 18 August 1917, 4; *Washington Post*, 15 August 1917; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, 15 August 1917; *Chicago Tribune*, 15 August 1917.

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Riots continued for four more days, and daily the police shouldered their way through the mob to arrest the handful of pickets for blocking the walkways. The injustice of the situation angered some bystanders, however. Representative Charles A. Lindbergh (R-Minn.) wrote to Wilson his impression of the August riots, commenting that the mob was composed of office-workers from the State, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments' executive divisions.[34] Lindbergh also charged that the police, though sufficient in number to have quelled the riot, "actually encouraged it by rough-handling anyone who . . . sympathized with those who were being attacked." The congressman also observed that there were "just enough designing persons in this mob to give it direction and positive control," and concluded that

> mob violence was being used as a brutal subterfuge to avoid a fair . . . test of the Right of Petition in the form that picketing takes. It is impossible to see, Mr. President, how you could escape from direct responsibility in these things.[35]

Another congressman, John M. Baer (R-N.D.), was also alarmed by the violence and injustice done to the pickets. On August 17, Baer introduced a House Resolution that called for a Congressional investigation of the White House riots.[36] The resolution was never acted upon, however, since the riots abruptly ceased on the day it was introduced. Whether Wilson was in fact responsible for the riots or their cessation, as Representative Lindbergh had charged, is impossible to determine. Nevertheless, the spectacle of government employees attacking gray-haired women at the White House gates implicated the Wilson administration's policies, if not its personnel.

The August suffrage riots made front page headlines in many East Coast newspapers, indicating that few editors were willing to bury a good story, even at the president's request. *Washington Times* owner and editor Arthur Brisbane, however, wanted both a lead story on the riots and presidential approval. Brisbane sent a letter to Treasury Secretary McAdoo two days after a telephone conversation with him. "I should like yourself and the President to know," he assured McAdoo, "that in the *Washington Times* . . . there is a newspaper that wants to interpret the work that this Administration is doing, . . . and to give unlimited publicity whenever it can be of use."[37] Brisbane added that he had instructed the *Times* managing editor "to make sure that any matter interesting to you received prompt publication . . . and *AS YOU WANT IT*."[38]

[34] Charles A. Lindbergh to Woodrow Wilson, 27 August 1917, reel 209, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress. For background on Lindbergh and the suffrage movement, see Bruce L. Larson, *Lindbergh of Minnesota: A Political Biography* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 205–206.

[35] Larson, *Lindbergh of Minnesota*, 3.

[36] *New York Herald*, 18 August 1917. See also Resolution 130, 17 August 1917, introduced by Representative John Baer of North Dakota, quoted in Stevens, *Jailed for Freedom*, 351–53.

[37] Arthur Brisbane to William Gibbs McAdoo, 18 August 1917, box 185, William Gibbs McAdoo Papers, Library of Congress.

[38] Ibid., 2. Emphasis in original.

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Brisbane enclosed the noon and final editions of the 18 August 1917 *Washington Times* in his correspondence to McAdoo. The noon edition carried a front-page story of the suffrage riots written from a distinctly critical point of view. The article stressed the defiant attitude held by the National Woman's Party, and praised Major Pullman for handling with "commendable restraint" a problem "filled with complications and danger."[39] In the evening edition, a front-page story covered the trial and subsequent sentencing of the pickets arrested four days earlier. Again, the coverage was biased in favor of the police. The reporter pointed out the weak defense presented by the pickets, and ridiculed the women's charge that the police had "framed-up" the crowd in order to arrest the pickets for obstructing the sidewalks.[40]

Brisbane's correspondence with McAdoo, coupled with the *Times* coverage of the suffrage riots, is indicative of the newspaperman's efforts to ingratiate himself with the Wilson administration. The White House was fully aware of the editor's obsequious behavior, and made use of his self-serving nature whenever possible.[41] Given the failure of the scheme to suppress news coverage of the militants, the Wilson inner circle welcomed Brisbane's offer of self-censorship.

It is unrealistic, however, to assume that Brisbane acted without administrative prompting or guidance. Although the subject of McAdoo's telephone conversation with Brisbane on August 16 is unknown, the editor's subsequent letter and enclosures suggest that the call concerned the suffrage riots.[42] The White House was embarrassed by the daily outbreak of the rioting, especially since the pickets carried banners bearing presidential statements on democracy and free speech. It is reasonable to conclude that McAdoo informed Brisbane of the administration's predicament, and solicited his help in the form of censorious press coverage. Seen in this light, Brisbane's letter proffering "unlimited publicity . . . *AS YOU WANT IT*" was not an offer of the *Times* services, but rather an assurance of services rendered. Whether Brisbane acted alone or with McAdoo's prompting, it is clear that the Wilson administration openly or covertly approved of purposeful distortion of news that concerned the militant

[39] *Washington Times*, 18 August 1917 (noon edition).

[40] *Washington Times*, 18 August 1917 (final edition).

[41] In June 1917, Brisbane had offered to sell a 6,000 acre tract of land to the government for one dollar. In July of the same year he proposed to Joseph P. Tumulty that the secretary run for the Senate as soon as his "present term of incarceration is ended." See Arthur Brisbane to Joseph P. Tumulty, 4 June 1917, reel 361, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress; Arthur Brisbane to Joseph P. Tumulty, 9 October 1917, box 44, Joseph P. Tumulty Papers, Library of Congress.

[42] McAdoo's telephone call to Brisbane was mentioned in a letter to the secretary from a New York suffragist, Mrs. Norman Whitehouse. Although Mrs. Whitehouse does not relate her impressions of the conversation, she apparently believed that Brisbane and McAdoo were close friends. In her letter to McAdoo, she wrote: "We asked his [Brisbane's] good offices in obtaining your assistance in our campaign." Mrs. Whitehouse was chairman of the New York State Woman Suffrage Party, a NAWSA affiliate, and heartily opposed the NWP activities. Mrs. Norman Whitehouse to William Gibbs McAdoo, 17 August 1917, box 185, William Gibbs McAdoo Papers, Library of Congress.

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suffragists. Thus, presidential public opinion management encompassed not only suppression of the news but manipulation of news coverage as well.

Continued Agitation and Wilson's Conversion

Arrests continued throughout the fall, and by October longer jail sentences were handed down. After Alice Paul was arrested for carrying a banner emblazoned with Wilson's Liberty Bond slogan (*"THE TIME HAS COME TO CONQUER OR SUBMIT"*), she was sentenced to seven months in the District jail. Ironically, it was there that Paul implemented the plan that would at last convince the president to submit. Her plan was based on a tactic used to great effect by British militant suffragists: Paul and the other suffrage prisoners would refuse to eat. After several days, prison officials began to forcibly feed the women three times a day by naso-gastric tubing. In an effort to discredit her leadership, the officials also transferred Paul to the psychiatric ward and placed her in solitary confinement.[43] Although denied her right to consult an attorney or receive visitors, Paul managed to smuggle notes describing her treatment to Woman's Party members outside the jail. In her messages, she demanded to be treated as a political prisoner, a strategy calculated to provoke public sympathy for the alleged "victims of political oppression" and thus to embarrass the Wilson administration.

National Woman's Party members publicized the poor jail conditions endured by the militants throughout the fall of 1917. A "Prison Special," comprised of suffragists dressed in prison uniforms, toured the United States, and party organizers mailed form letters describing the plight of the imprisoned pickets to thousands of Americans. As a result, numerous letters critical of the government's treatment of the militants poured into the White House. The treasurer of the Woodrow Wilson Independent League protested to Wilson that:

> It is absolutly essential that the American people be united at this time. But unity is not to be obtained by dragging women to filthy jails for the crime of bearing banners upon which are inscribed the words from the President's lips![44]

Another Wilson Democrat, on learning of Paul's intention to "permit herself to be starved to death for the suffrage cause," urged the president to act on the suffrage amendment immediately.[45]

Without doubt, the National Woman's Party protests concerning the treatment of the jailed militants generated a great deal of publicity that proved embarrassing to the White House. The validity of the Woman's Party charges, however, requires further comment. As public protest over prison conditions

[43] *The Suffragist*, 3 November 1917, 8–9; and 10 November 1917, 4–5, 7.

[44] John R. Haynes to Joseph P. Tumulty, 13 November 1917, reel 110, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

[45] Michael Frances Doyle to Joseph P. Tumulty, 10 November 1917, reel 110, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

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mounted, District Commissioner Louis Brownlow asked two suffragists to tour the jail facilities and report on their findings. On September 25, Mrs. Beulah Amidon issued a preliminary report that denounced the treatment of the incarcerated militants. Brownlow quickly consulted the president and was instructed to conduct a full investigation of the prison.[46] Although Brownlow would claim many years later that the prison's conditions were excellent, his first acts were to relieve the prison superintendent of his duties and to supervise the installation of new bedding in the suffragists' quarters.[47]

In November, the investigatory commission, comprising a district commissioner, three physicians, and several members of the Board of Charities, issued its report. The investigators found that the prison was sanitary and that the food was "all that could be expected." Although the report stated that the National Woman's Party charges of ill treatment were unfounded, it unwittingly testified to one case of injustice. While the investigation was in progress, Alice Paul was held in solitary confinement in the psychiatric ward. The investigators noted in their report to Wilson that "there is no evidence of nervousness on the part of [Paul]; [she] seemed perfectly calm, but very determined."[48] A lengthy statement by Paul on the benefits reaped by the NWP from the publicity of picketing and imprisonment was also included in the report. The clarity and logic of her strategy, coupled with the investigators' remarks on her condition, point out the flagrant attempt by prison officials to undermine Paul's effectiveness by questioning her mental stability.

By November 1917, many Americans were alarmed at prison conditions and angered by Wilson's apathetic attitude toward the federal suffrage amendment. After hearing a NWP organizer speak on the pickets' hunger strike, the president of the Democratic Club in Alameda, California, telegraphed Wilson that "the speech did much harm."[49] Even Secretary Tumulty wrote to Wilson that "it is my opinion that the time is soon coming when we will have to seriously consider this matter."[50]

Tumulty's advice was apparently heeded. One night during the third week in November, a late-night visitor awakened Alice Paul in her cell. An associate of Paul's later identified the man as David Lawrence, a journalist with close ties to the Wilson administration.[51] Lawrence denied that he was an emissary from the

[46] Memorandum attached to a letter from Gilson Gardner. The Gardner letter contained Mrs. Beulah Amidon's report. See Gilson Gardner to Louis Brownlow, 25 September 1917, forwarded to Woodrow Wilson, reel 204, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

[47] Louis Brownlow to Woodrow Wilson, 27 September 1917, reel 204, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress. For Brownlow's later favorable account of prison conditions, see Brownlow, *A Passion For Anonymity*, 74–82.

[48] Report on the District Jail (Occoquan Prison), District Commissioner W. Gwynn Gardiner to Woodrow Wilson, 9 November 1917, reel 210, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

[49] Telegram, Mrs. S. G. Harrison to Woodrow Wilson, 18 November 1917, reel 210, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

[50] Memorandum, Joseph P. Tumulty to Woodrow Wilson, 9 November 1917, reel 210, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

[51] Editorial, "A Dramatic Celebration," *Milwaukee Leader*, 18 November 1917. (A copy may be

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White House, but betrayed an intimate knowledge of Wilson's views on the suffrage issue. During the interview, Lawrence reportedly asked Paul if she would agree to abandon the picketing in exchange for a guarantee from the administration that the suffrage amendment would pass through Congress by 1919. The reporter outlined the course that the administration would pursue: pushing the amendment through one house of Congress next session; and if sustained on its record in the 1918 elections, passing it through the other house in early 1919. What Paul replied to Lawrence's offer is unknown, but her answer can be surmised from the following events.

Alice Paul's sentence was commuted on 28 November 1917. On her release, she was asked by the press if picketing would continue. She replied: "The attempt to suppress legitimate propaganda has failed. . . . We hope that no more demonstrations will be necessary. But what we do depends entirely upon what the Administration does."[52] On 9 January 1918, Woodrow Wilson announced his support of the federal woman suffrage amendment. The next day, the Nineteenth Amendment passed the House and was approved by the Senate in June 1919. Lawrence had proved an extraordinary prophet.

In 1918, Woodrow Wilson acted with zealous determination to assure the passage of the woman suffrage amendment. But what conclusions can be drawn about Wilson's actions in 1917? First, it is clear that the Lunardini-Knock thesis is flawed. Wilson did not advocate the amendment out of a personal commitment to social justice and progressivism. His support was instead motivated by a grudging recognition of political reality. Wilson realized by late 1917 that in order to maintain the integrity of his demands for democracy abroad, he would have to acknowledge the right of women to democratic participation at home.

Second, the Wilson administration used the official wartime censorship agency to pressure editors to suppress or distort news of the militant suffragists. Presidents had traditionally attempted to shape public opinion, but had confined their efforts to securing positive press coverage of favored issues. In 1917, Wilson broke with this pattern and urged influential newspapermen to ignore, downplay, or distort the news of the militant crusade. The president, eager to deflect criticism of his administration, found in his wartime censorship powers a handy weapon to be used against domestic dissent. This shift from positive to negative presidential public opinion management constituted an ominous por-

found in reel 210, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress); Stevens, *Jailed For Freedom*, 226. Although David Lawrence denied that he was an emissary from the president, NWP charges to the contrary were strong enough to convince the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage. In January 1918, this organization issued a formal apology to Alice Paul for accusing her of "circulating a falsehood" about the incident. The *New York Times* reported that "the apology resulted from a denial of a story by the antis' that an emissary of the Administration had visited Miss Paul in prison. . . ." *New York Times*, 27 January 1918.

[52] *New York Times*, 28 November 1917.

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tent for the future of American democracy.[53]

It is more difficult to draw conclusions about Wilson's part in the July arrests, the August riots, and the November meeting in prison with Alice Paul. It could be argued that the allegations of Port Collector Malone and Representatives Lindbergh and Baer were motivated by personal or political animosity, and that Lawrence's late night visit was as apocryphal as the midnight ride of Paul Revere. These arguments are weak in themselves. Malone was a Wilson supporter; Lindbergh was an eyewitness to the White House riots; Baer, though a Republican, was hardly a crank; and Lawrence was admitted at midnight to a jail that had turned away all other reporters arriving at conventional times. More important were the effects of the three men's actions. Malone's interest in the pickets' treatment resulted in Secret Service surveillance of himself, and his accusations led to an immediate pardon of the suffrage prisoners. Baer's investigation caused the cessation of rioting. Lawrence's visit was followed by an end to the picketing that Wilson desired, and by the presidential support Alice Paul demanded. Were these results merely coincidental?

A strong chain of circumstantial evidence links high officials in the Wilson administration, including Wilson himself, to an attempt to subvert the militant suffrage campaign. Charges of a conspiracy to undermine the militant cause were levied at the president throughout 1917. Whether the riots, arrests, and late-night visitations were planned by the administration or not, Wilson was accused of planning them and was forced to deal with the charges to salvage the credibility of his war aims. While it seems that the accusations against Wilson were justified, the truth may never be known about this matter. No one can doubt, however, that Alice Paul's tactics placed Wilson in an untenable position. The president, in order to maintain at least the appearance of integrity and consistency, made a political rather than a principled decision to support the woman suffrage amendment. Wilson had styled himself as the apostle of world democracy. In 1917, he learned that democracy, like charity, must begin at home.

[53] An excellent study of presidential public opinion management is David Hilderbrand, *Power and the People: Executive Management of Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 1897-1921* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981).

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(*Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685*)

1. Title of publication: *Political Science Quarterly*. (a) Publication number: 437260.

2. Date of filing: November 4, 1983. 3. Frequency of issue: Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. (a) Number of issues published annually: four. (b) Annual subscription price: individuals, $19.50; institutions, $26.00. 4. Location of office of publication: The Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025-0148. 5. Location of the general business office: same as 4. 6. Name and address of publisher: same as 4; name and address of editor: Demetrios Caraley, same as 4; name and address of managing editor: Lesley A. Rimmel, same as 4.

7. Owner: The Academy of Political Science (nonprofit corporation).

8. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities: none.

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An Immodest Agenda for Rebuilding America: A Review Essay

AARON WILDAVSKY

Amitai Etzioni's new book, which covers, among many other things, neighborhoods, cities, regions, the nation, deferment of gratification, "me-ism," education, housing, transportation, human capital, financial capital, the work ethic, laziness, research and development, irrationality, individualism, community, mediating institutions, public spending, consumerism, wealth, poverty, intellectual and moral leadership, and the counterculture, is not easy to summarize.[1] Etzioni reviews the rag-bag of material about the malaise of American life that nowadays comes across the desks of political scientists. One consequence of his regurgitative approach is that the readers are left puzzled about whether they are being confronted with a "master menu"—the nouvelle cuisine of social and industrial reconstruction (healthier but even more tasty)—or a "warmed-over stew," in which a thick glop covers over whatever distinctiveness the innumerable ingredients ever possessed. Etzioni's strategy is to place himself in the middle of two unpalatable courses (evident in his earlier work on "mixed scanning"), and thus to allow himself to combine the best while ostensibly avoiding the worst features of each.

In his wide-ranging "review of the contemporary American condition," Etzioni finds that, though Americans have suffered from "excessive governmental intervention in private lives," their "economic, social, political, and

[1] *An Immodest Agenda: Rebuilding America Before the Twenty-First Century* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1983).

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ethical vigor" will not be restored by "merely slashing the government."[2] He sees this decline in the quality of American life as a result of two faulty visions—the "excessive individualism" of what he calls the "New Whigs," who oppose "any government action that reduces the differences among people"[3] and that of the "New Tories," who "are willing to use the government to impose what they consider morally right."[4] Etzioni believes that there is not much to choose between the Tory supporters of social and moral hierarchy who, aside from being "authoritarian," are "socially incompetent,"[5] and the Whig libertarians who, under the guise of a volunteer army, would engineer a depression while reducing social programs so that "the black poor . . . must enlist or starve."[6] Whether one's criterion is viciousness or foolishness, the political cultures of social hierarchy and economic markets stand condemned.

Even if readers accept Etzioni's call for enhancing the emotional bonds of mutuality and his communitarian desire for civility, the question would remain of which way or ways of life, alone or in combination, would contribute to these ends. His chief complaint highlights the problem:

> We have experienced a hollowing of America, in which community was whittled down. Greater reliance on government has been accompanied by promotion of a particular brand of individualism best labeled egotism. . . . Thus the decline of the family was accompanied both by a growing demand for government to take care of sick older persons (in publicly financed nursing homes) and by a lessened sense of children's duty toward their elders. Similarly, the growing demand for the government to provide day-care centers for children was accompanied by parents' lessened ability, and sometimes lessened willingness, to care for their children. The demand for more police was accompanied by less neighborly vigilance, and the demand for more government imposition of ethical standards, by less ethically committed individuals.
>
> Conservatives will argue that the rise of government has diminished individuals. Liberals may argue that weakened individuals required more reliance on the state. Actually, the two forces feed into each other: More government lessens the individual, and diminished individuals foster more government.[7]

Who would want to increase demands on government *and* make it more difficult to fulfill them or to enhance the role of government *and* simultaneously refuse it authority over the individual to carry out its commands? Not the Whig market individualists; they oppose government action in the first place, except to enforce the sanctity of contracts. Not Tory supporters of hierarchy; they would give the government authority commensurate with its responsibilities.

There must be more in the way of political cultures to choose from than hierarchies and markets, and there is—that of the sectarians, who wish to live by the norm of equality of result so as to legitimize a life without authority. They want

[2] Ibid., xi.
[3] Ibid., 9.
[4] Ibid., 15.
[5] Ibid., 16.
[6] Ibid., 12.
[7] Ibid., 3–4.

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government to diminish differences among people without themselves accepting coercive authority. In this way, they can simultaneously show that existing governmental authority is illegitimate and ineffective (because it makes phoney promises), and maintain their ideal of equal outcomes against "the system," the hierarchies and markets that prevent its realization.

If the Tory hierarchs and Whig individualists are not responsible for making contradictory demands (though they undoubtedly are responsible for other evils), it follows that bettering their behavior, however desirable this might be, cannot, by itself, alleviate the difficulty. Alleviation can only be accomplished by strengthening the political cultures of hierarchy and markets while weakening the opposition of sects.

If ways of life are in contention, there must be conflict as well as consensus. This result differs from the pretty picture of civility that Etzioni presents, if only because the concept of civility rationalizes different kinds of behavior in different cultures. Adherents of the hierarchical solution to social order through institutionalized inequality consider civility to be acceptance of the different statuses and roles that society in its wisdom assigns to individuals. Market libertarians conceive of civility as acceptance of the unequal rewards of competition. Sectarians think of these sorts of civility as passive acquiescence to domination by a vicious system. For sectarians, civility can come only through the legitimacy earned by the continuous exercise of equal shares of power, in turn based on equal possession of resources—conditions that cannot be accepted by adherents either of markets or hierarchies without losing their entire rationale.

While Amitai Etzioni is aware that choices are being made among competing social visions, he does not admit so great a prospect of political conflict. In his valuable chapters on the history and current condition of industrialization, he takes a position common to politicians who are urged to move both to the Right and to the Left. He urges Americans to move first in one direction (production) and then in another (consumption). This may be good advice. But on what is it based?

Etzioni believes that America has abandoned its romance with production, while finding "quality of life," if not unlovely, then at least not worthy of a permanent liaison. Fair enough. He prefers "an active reaffirmation of the high production project" with more of a social conscience.[8] Why reindustrialization? The United States, in his opinion, cannot afford both to reindustrialize and to help the poor and improve environmental quality. Therefore, he argues that America should sacrifice by reducing consumption to build up its industrial base for at least a decade, by which time it can afford more social and environmental programs.

A solution is looking for a problem. Industrial policy is fast becoming a litmus test for determining the diverse political agendas its varying sponsors have in mind. The assumption of industrial degeneration is dubious. (Would the people of Massachussets have been better off subsidizing failing shoe factories and

[8] Ibid., 292.

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textile mills in the 1960s and 1970s or making room for the high-tech industry it has now?) Once the assumption is made, however, one's favorite nostrums, from "disciplining" industry or labor to workplace democracy to expanding or contracting welfare or defense spending, can easily be said to serve the policy purpose. It is to Etzioni's credit that he is open in his policy preferences. But, then again, he really does not need the supposition of industrial decay to advocate his agenda.

Aware that attempting to target funds by picking the industrial "winners" of the future is perilously close to the type of planning that brought economic disaster to Poland, Etzioni chooses a "semi-targeted" policy (placed, naturally, between central planning and laissez-faire), whose purpose would be to direct resources away from consumption and toward "the productive sectors of the economy."[9] He has in mind such measures as federal funds for research and development and financial incentives for savings and investment.

My own view is that semi-targeting toward infrastructure and capital goods is just another futile way of trying to outguess markets. After observing the unfortunate effects of right- and left-wing "fine tuning," when eighth and twenty-eighth order effects displace the first and second order ones that policymakers wrongly thought they understood, I would much prefer simple across-the-board tax cuts for industry and individuals. After all, if the end desired is economic growth, why not rely on the institutions aimed at that end, namely capitalist markets? The more pertinent query for a book on rebuilding America before the twenty-first century, however, is what would be the reaction of the various political cultures to the author's suggestions for reindustrialization?

Etzioni's new Whigs would be divided two ways on semi-targeting. Among business forces, capital goods industries would be in favor while consumer goods corporations would be opposed. Among liberatarian intellectuals, ambivalence would reign, with satisfaction at support for economic growth modified by dismay at governmental guidance of what should be consumer sovereignty. An industrialization policy seems better suited to those who favor hierarchical rule, including deference to expertise (how else could a country engage in targeting?) and the sacrificial ethic concerning the duty of the individual to the collective. Insofar as there are important parts to be played by government and industry, semi-targeted reindustrialization is part of a policy pursued by the long-standing alliance between hierarchical and market forces.

Thus, Etzioni's industrial strategy, like the Establishment for which it stands, is likely to be rejected by sectarians, who will see it not only as a palliative, sacrificing more victims to an insatiable system, but also as a retrograde step, elevating science, expertise, consumption, wealth, and ultimately war (made more possible by riches) to the highest values, when these rationalizations for inequality are actually leading to America's downfall.

"For reindustrialization to take place," Etzioni concludes, "there must be

[9] Ibid., 315.

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parallel changes in American power relations, institutions and mentality."[10] Writing sometime during the second year of the Reagan administration, he is worried, not that the president's exemplification of economic markets and social hierarchy will prove too weak, but that it will prove so strong as to lead to "corporate disregard of shared needs, mutuality and civility."[11] Time will tell whether Etzioni is right to be concerned about a resurgence of the capitalist ethos or whether its manifestation early in the Reagan administration will turn out to be merely a slight detour to travel in the opposite direction. If it is not his New Whigs or New Tories (or their red, white, and blue), but the sectarian political culture of the West German Greens that is on the ascendance in the U.S., Americans may yet look back with nostalgia to the comparative civility of recent decades.

[10] Ibid., 342.
[11] Ibid., 350.

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Book Reviews

Reaganomics: A Midterm Report *edited by Wm. Craig Stubblebine and Thomas D. Willett. San Francisco, ICS Press, 1983. 232 pp. $14.95.*

How successful are the Reagan administration's economic policies, after two years of experience? *Reaganomics* provides a lively, fair and candid summing up by prominent supporters and critics in a paper and discussant format. I enjoyed it, and think that undergraduates as well as scholars will find it useful and informative. Most contributors favor Reagan's basic goals; most also find many of his policies troubling; some, including Reagan supporters, make severe criticisms.

The book's contents may be conveniently summarized under three policy headings—macroeconomic policy, tax-expenditure policy, and regulatory policy. Reagan entered office promising to revitalize the economy with a new "supply-side" economics, and the public will probably judge him largely by his macroeconomic record. Willett calls Reagan's original policies "rosy" and "based on suppositions inconsistent with historical experience" (p. 12). Reagan also promised in 1981 to end inflation without a recession. Nevertheless, Willett argues that—perhaps willy-nilly—the administration and the Federal Reserve are pursuing a sound strategy of disinflation through monetary contraction and recession, although "*the current recession has probably been more severe than would be optimal*" (p. 22). He also contends (correctly, in my view) that "popular arguments that the large budget deficits will strangle the economic recovery do not find support in conventional economic theory" (p. 17). Supply-siders Richard W. Rahn and Arthur B. Laffer argue that the Reagan tax cuts, when they take full effect, will cause an enormous expansion of the economy, and blame the recent recession on the tax cuts' gradual introduction.

Two major goals of Reagan's tax-expenditure program were to reduce government spending as a share of gross national product (GNP) and to reduce deficits. Attiat F. Ott points out that current and projected budgets do just the opposite. Richard A. Musgrave calls the Administration's fiscal policy "bad economics, based on wishful thinking" (p. 116). The Administration began by deploring Carter's deficits, then found itself facing

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massive deficits of its own creation, and is now trying to argue that such deficits are really all right. Musgrave favors curbing inflation with a "moderate form of income policy" (p. 119). He calls the 1981 depreciation rules highly arbitrary; effective tax rates on new investments now appear to vary from 37 percent to -82 percent, and should severely distort investment behavior. Further, negative tax rates on so much investment has made corporate taxes negative for many firms. Finally, the New Federalism reverses the principle that local governments should provide local public goods (such as regulation of hospitals) and national government should provide national public goods (such as income redistribution and support for the poor). Wallace E. Oates agrees, and expects that New Federalism would reduce help for the poor (p. 154). However, Michael J. Boskin argues that, by improving incentives, Reagan's program may raise average incomes sufficiently that the poor will do better in the long run.

While deregulation was one of the Reagan campaign's major promises, Thomas Gale Moore finds its performance to date mixed. On the positive side, several examples of over-regulation and over-zealous antitrust action (the International Business Machines [IBM] and cereals cases) were stopped, and oil price controls were lifted. Moore approves of the Reagan administration's attempt to evaluate regulations using cost-benefit analysis, but notes that the first major rule so evaluated elicited cost-benefit ratios varying by 8,000 percent. On the negative side, the administration has adopted a narrowly "pro-industry" stance in regulating industries, favoring regulations that reduce competition and opposing deregulation that might increase competition. Thus price-fixing by international airlines and by ocean shippers has been encouraged, while entry into broadcasting and trucking has been discouraged. Susan Feigenbaum worries that the administration assumes consumer protection to be inherently unnecessary, although industry's lower cost of developing product information implies that government should require information disclosure. Finally, Robert Tollison, formerly of the Reagan Federal Trade Commission (FTC), argues for the meat-axe approach to regulatory agencies—cutting budgets and "raising hell with the bureaucracy. . . . Fewer lawyers and fewer economists" in government means "fewer rules, regulations, and cases" (p. 175).

In summary, *Reaganomics* provides a superb contrast of the views of the Administration's friendly critics, its opponents, and its remaining stalwarts.

KENNETH J. KOFORD
University of Delaware

The Nuclear Future: Toward a Strategy of Uncertainty *by Donald M. Snow. University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 1983. 189 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $12.95.*

Whatever the speed of events in the current technological time, it is no substitute for the cumulative knowledge that historical experience provides. This fact means that we are in the babbling period of the nuclear age, still trapped by perplexity, overwhelmed by the apparently multiple irony of this gift, for the time being more powerful than our management capability and our fanaticism for utility.

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This situation might account for the ultimate propositional irrationality of a book so rationally and by and large so pragmatically premised. There is no way that operational strategists, strategy and defense analysts and policymakers, or even scholars and students—in search of better understanding—will accept "uncertainty and unpredictability as governing strategic principles" (p. 167). Uncertainty and unpredictability are by their own merit, together with complexity, the determinant constraints on strategic decision-making, nuclear or otherwise. It follows that only in pursuance of the logic of the *reductio ad absurdum*—such as that of the old radical skeptics—may anyone wish to enhance these constraints. Nevertheless, such an unusual desire does not necessarily preclude the speculative interest of the exercise.

In fact, the intellectual perplexities produced by this crawling period of nuclear thinking probably account as well for the paradox that this book's irrational conclusions are preceded by highly informative descriptions, strongly pondered explanations, and well estimated inferences. These qualities are sufficient to make it a useful manual in military and political science departments.

Snow carries out a thorough and creative description of the state of the art in strategic analysis and theory building. He furnishes a critical examination of the already obsolete assumptions of past deterrent doctrines and of the potentials of the emerging factors to shape, or at least to modify, strategic doctrines and policies. After an overview of the shortcomings of the premises of assured destruction and Presidential Directive 59, the author engages into a systematic analysis of the MX-MPS (Multiple Protective Shelters) responses, showing convincingly that both comport "separate physical and conceptual propositions responding to different problems, and [how] one does not necessarily imply each other" (p. 55), and that therefore "the desirability of MX should be decided on its own merits . . . not on the basis of the cost-effectiveness of MPS" (p. 62).

This analysis and his ensuing discussion of the basing systems provide the theoretical-technological and logistical framework for the most interesting suggestions of the book. First, there is the emergence of counterforce capability—made possible by the improvement in targeting accuracy and thus of damage limitation, and reinforced by the fast developments of directed energy transfer systems, and therefore by the renewed feasibility of active defense. Second, the author scrutinizes the prospects for a combined, multi-layered approach, places them within the intellectual departing perspective of the Triad's planned redundancy, and gives them a more definite, model-oriented formality. Yet he still provides a cautious and tentatively advanced proposal, under the nomenclature of force diversification, to deal with the Soviet Union's own counterforce capability.

This scenario, admittedly speculative—"and based on a number of assumptions and technologies not yet in being," but under which the author regards that "it is possible to describe how such a system might operate" (p. 108)—nevertheless falls well within the lineage of the Triad. As such, the scenario would add new logistic dimensions to national defense policy. Together with other proposals currently in debate, the scenario should pave the way to that strategic superiority that Donald Snow falls short of coming to grips with, however indisputable an aim of real security.

LEOPOLD G. LOVELACE
University of California, Santa Barbara

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Russian Roulette: The Superpower Game *by Arthur Macy Cox, with a Soviet commentary by Georgy Arbatov. New York, Times Books, 1982. 248 pp. $14.95.*

Arthur Macy Cox sets forth an explanation of the current impasse in Soviet-American relations and proposes a possible solution. The American contribution to the impasse has included multiple warheads, doctrines of limited nuclear war, and plans for the MX, Pershing II, and ground-launched cruise missiles. Cox worries that both sides will adopt launch-on-warning, increasing the chance of accidental nuclear war.

According to Cox, the Soviet contribution to the crisis does not lie in its substantial deployments of military forces. Indeed, he concludes that "throughout the SALT negotiations the Soviets have rejected the quest for nuclear superiority" (p. 117). Rather, the Soviet transgression consists primarily of interventions, directly and by proxy, in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan—interventions that violated the American understanding of détente. Partly as a consequence of Soviet adventurism, there arose in the U.S. prominent voices (especially those of the Committee on the Present Danger) advocating a tougher approach to the Soviet Union. It was the "combination of the campaign of the American hawks and aggressive Soviet adventures in the Third World" that finished off détente (p. 85).

Cox's proposed solution to the crisis is the negotiation of a U.S.-Soviet "military nonintervention pact" covering "the Middle East, all Africa except South Africa, Southwest Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia" (p. 157). A second negotiation would seek to reduce the number of weapons on both sides, freeze them at that level, ban new nuclear weapons, and restrict weapons systems to those that "can be verified by existing means of intelligence" (pp. 167–68). At the end of the book there is a brief commentary by Georgy Arbatov, director of the Institute on the USA and Canada in the USSR. Predictably, Arbatov fails to note Soviet contributions to U.S.-Soviet discord but agrees with much of Cox's indictment of American policy.

In view of the low priority the Reagan administration assigned to arms control in its first two years, Cox's frustration about the course of American policy is understandable. But such frustration is no excuse for advancing dubious propositions and seriously oversimplifying reality. Among the most dubious statements in the book is Cox's lament that the U.S. is not selling "our more advanced computers" to the Soviets to upgrade their command and control capabilities (p. 26). Such sales would also enhance other Soviet programs, such as ballistic missile defense, that, if deployed, could have profound consequences for the strategic balance.

Cox's discussion of the NATO decision of December 1979 is particularly superficial and inadequate. But perhaps the most serious oversimplification is his discussion of nuclear strategy. He is committed to the policy of assured destruction. He quotes Colin Gray in a way that makes it seem as if his rather extreme "war-winning" views are becoming administration policy. In fact, it appears as if nuclear strategy is much the same, two years into the Reagan administration, as it was in the Carter administration.

This similarity, however, will be little consolation to Mr. Cox, whose disdain for the Carter administration's Presidential Directive 59 is only slightly less severe than his scorn for the ideas of Colin Gray. Cox fails to see that the American move toward flexible

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nuclear options was a decade-long response to mounting evidence that the assured destruction threat was insufficiently credible to deter the broad range of threats the Soviets might pose. He argues that the Soviets share U.S. strategic assumptions without adequately rebutting those who claim that they do not.

The good points in this book (such as the discussion of the Team B intelligence estimates in 1976) are unfortunately overshadowed by the weaknesses noted above. In his zeal to expose the deficiencies of the policies of the "hawks," Cox adopts tactics many of them employ—such as highly selective use of evidence in support of quasi-theological arguments.

ROBERT C. GRAY
Franklin and Marshall College

Oil and Turmoil: America Faces OPEC and the Middle East *by Dankwart A. Rustow. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1982. 320 pp. $14.95.*

Rustow's objective is to explain the thirty-year evolution toward American recognition of the Arab world. The U.S. directed little more than side glances toward Islamic nations in general during the 1940s. Yet in 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger would be compelled to state that the Persian Gulf was so vital, the U.S. would defend it militarily, if necessary. Rustow argues that this emerging recognition is the product of three forces: the rapid decline in European imperial presence, occurring in the midst of Arab political modernization; the growing strategic importance of the region in East-West relations; and oil. This book demonstrates how well prepared Rustow is as a student of political development and international affairs to be able to describe the interworkings of these forces.

Rustow labels the late and half-hearted European incursions into the Middle East as "pussyfooting imperialism." These incursions took the form of a number of Western nations descending on the region simultaneously. This in turn enabled Arab nations to play England, France, and other powers off against one another, and, particularly after each of the world wars, to play the more distant United States off against all of them. The resulting power struggles were aggravated by internal barriers to nation-building, says Rustow, and the inability of any single country, such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt, to impose political unity on the area.

Invitations to American intervention that these factors offered were complemented by the Middle East's growing strategic importance after 1948. The U.S. viewed itself as responding only to Soviet expansionism. Nassar's closing of the Suez Canal, Arab-Israel confrontations, and other crises were judged by the U.S. primarily in terms of the opportunities they created for Soviet influence. Rustow does not minimize the importance of the Middle East in this regard, and endorses Carter's position that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan warranted dramatic reply.

Rustow argues that American diplomacy did not follow the lead of U.S. oil companies that sought to tap rich Persian Gulf and Libyan reserves. In fact, American officials were tardy in appreciating the degree to which control over production and price levels, negotiated away by the majors, would affect American interests. He doubts that jumps in

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oil prices during the 1970s were the result of conspiratorial activity by American companies, even though one consequence of those jumps was skyrocketing increases in the value of domestic reserves. In this vein, Rustow correctly suggests that analysis of Mideast oil politics has placed too much emphasis on the 1973 oil embargo that followed the Yom Kippur War. The pattern of oil company concessions to Arab price demands had already been established. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), formed in 1962, had already been able to escalate oil prices 129 percent in the three years prior to the embargo. And by removing import quotas in 1971, U.S. policy had already contributed significantly to OPEC's ability to dictate world prices.

Rustow is not an alarmist or doomsayer. If anything, he underestimates the economic and social impact that disruptions in supply and increases in prices have had on inflation, employment, budget deficits, and the migration of American capital. But he wonderfully untangles the web of factors that handed the oil weapon to Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani and Muammar Qaddafi in the first place. Wisely, he warns against extrapolating too boldly from the crises of the immediate past. New oil discoveries outside OPEC, enhanced supplies likely after resolution of the Iraq-Iran war, and continued sluggishness in Western economies all point to a period of moderation in oil prices. Domestic reserves are shrinking, says Rustow, and improved efficiency in automobile transportation remains extremely important. But he is reluctant to announce the decline of the West.

STEPHEN R. LEFEVRE
University of Texas at Tyler

The United Nations and the Control of International Violence: A Legal and Political Analysis *by John F. Murphy. Totowa, N.J., Allanheld, Osmun and Co., 1983. 212 pp. $32.50.*

This is a curiously patchy book, with extremely sketchy introductory chapters on the background of the United Nations and on its formal scheme for the maintenance of peace and security, followed by brief treatment of selected cases of international conflict handled by the major organs of the United Nations. The Arab-Israeli conflict is presented as a discontinuous series of episodes, and the chapter on the secretary-general simply devotes some three or four pages to each of the men who have held that office. Both of these devices contribute to the chopped-up quality of the book. Readers who lack basic familiarity with the record of the United Nations on war and peace issues will be well served by Murphy's case studies, which avoid unnecessary detail and state the issues with fairness and balance. Better informed readers will find little that is new in this section of the book, but will profit from Part Two, which concerns "nontraditional international violence," including revolutionary warfare, war-by-assassination, terrorism, and the like. The special merit of the work lies in its recognition that violence of this latter variety is no less a problem for the international system than the more orthodox sort of warfare.

The author aspires "to bridge the gap between the approach of the social scientist to the United Nations and that of the international lawyer" (p. 2), and he succeeds reasonably well. For better or for worse, he is lawyer-like, but he also demonstrates an understanding

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of political factors that saves him from excesses of legalism. He is shrewdly aware, for instance, that resort to the World Court is not invariably the most promising approach to settlement of a dispute, and that international legal formulations are sometimes worse than useless. Indeed, Murphy is happily free of the disease that infects too many scholars of both legal and political persuasions—single-minded devotion to a particular formula for saving the world, be it adjudication, collective security, arms control, promotion of human rights, or world federalism. He offers no striking insights into the problem of world order, but neither does he purvey a pat solution.

One might wish that the author had been disposed to grapple more seriously with the crucial problem of which his study affords fleeting glimpses—the problem, in a system where states figure as both the attackers and the indispensable defenders of order, of discouraging aggression while encouraging vigilant and forceful resistance to aggression. How can things be arranged so that states will be able and willing to fight to uphold order without increasing the risk that they will fight instead to disrupt order? Murphy shares the international lawyer's tendency to worry about the abuse of the defensive claim as justification for fighting without worrying sufficiently about the abuse of the restriction of that claim; nothing facilitates aggression so much as the inhibition of defense. It is an open question whether the deficiency of the United Nations as an agency of world order is attributable more to the disposition of its members to pick a fight or to avoid a fight.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
University of Virginia

Who Gets What from Government *by Benjamin I. Page. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1983. 264 pp. $15.95.*

This book has two stated purposes—to examine how government policy in the United States affects the distribution of income, and to provide explanations, political and economic, for the current state of tax, spending, and regulatory policy. It primarily, though not exclusively, focuses on federal policy and national political processes. Page's assertion that the "United States is in an exceptionally antiegalitarian mood" (p. 2) does not even begin to suggest the scope of his indictment. He has a distaste for capitalism, particularly its American variant, and a conspiratorial view of American politics (complete with manipulated masses) that embraces the whole of American history. His prescriptions, while wide ranging, can be reduced to an endorsement of democratic socialism.

With nearly half the federal budget now devoted to "payments for individuals," a rigorous analysis of recipient populations would be a valuable contribution to current debates on spending policy. Page is not interested in this type of analysis, but instead mixes selective (usually dated) evidence, subjective judgments, and his unusual perspective on life in America. He finds, using these criteria, that federal policies fail to alleviate and, in certain instances reinforce, economic inequality.

There is no precision in the use of terms like "poor" and "rich." In-kind programs, however, are variously attacked for being too limited, not worth to recipients what they cost the government, or contaminated by a grudging attitude on the part of taxpayers. In-

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come transfers are criticized for having too limited a redistributive impact. Tax policy is judged as insufficiently progressive. Regulatory policy is not sufficiently directed toward helping the poor, consumers, and the like. The constitutional and legal system is primarily concerned with protecting private property and sustaining capitalism.

The quality of Page's analysis can be gleaned from his remarks about education. He concedes that the United States "does better than much of the industrialized world" when it comes to spending for education. But, he warns, public schooling may actually reinforce inequality through a disproportionate emphasis on discipline (thereby training people for "subordinate positions in society") and through textbooks that "encourage approval of capitalism and propagate the belief that unequal incomes result from unequal merit" (p. 85).

Page's excursions into political or economic explanations for the deplorable state of American public policy are quite extraordinary. In the case of tax policy, he discusses the possible effects of interest group lobbying, inter-party differences, committee decision-making in Congress (he is a decade behind in his discussion of executive committee sessions, use of the closed rule, and the relative standing of the revenue committees), policy implementation, and public opinion. Page concludes that tax policy generally conforms to public preferences, but this is probably because public attitudes are manipulated. "There is," according to Page, "much misinformation in the air" (p. 53). A similar reliance on manipulated opinion to explain opinion-policy congruence is found in the social welfare realm. Elsewhere, Page tends to focus on biases in the interest group system.

Some portions of this book border on parody. Bordering on outright offensiveness is Page's condescension toward those for whom he ostensibly speaks. His musings on defense spending go far beyond conventional critiques: "The owners of factories and banks and oil companies very likely have more to lose from . . . a Russian occupation . . . than would the average blue-collar worker" (p. 108). So much for what freedom really means to the common folk.

This book attempts to bring together political science and economics, but it lacks sophistication about either. It is not an interesting polemic. It is certainly not good scholarship. For those in need of an ideological "fix," it may provide temporary relief. For the serious reader, it is likely to prove profoundly disappointing.

DENNIS S. IPPOLITO
Southern Methodist University

Political Attitudes in America: Formation and Change *by Paul R. Abramson. San Francisco, W.H. Freeman and Co., 1983. 353 pp. $14.95.*

The political attitudes examined extensively in this book are party identification, political efficacy, and political trust. These attitudes might seem rather narrow and often uninteresting subjects—even to some students of public opinion and survey research. Nonetheless, Paul Abramson provides a very useful and interesting synthesis of the sizeable empirical literature on these matters and of some of his own original analysis. The main

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data sources for this work are the 1952–80 Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies (SRC/CPS) national election surveys, including the 1956–60 and 1972–76 panel studies. Perhaps Abramson's most important contribution is that he provides a reasonably complete and well organized summary of the relevant research articles that have used the SRC/CPS and other data. Thus, this book is the ideal starting point for those wishing to learn about these three types of political attitudes, and it is a handy reference for specialists in political behavior.

The volume is divided into six parts. The first presents an introduction to the study of political attitudes (how they are measured through survey questions, and so forth) and generational replacement, an important phenomenon that is examined throughout the book. This section also presents the evidence showing the decline in voter turnout, partisan loyalty, and political trust.

The next three parts examine in virtually identical fashion the formation, change, and stability of party identification, political efficacy, and political trust. Admittedly, and with due caution, these concepts are measured with the now-standard SRC/CPS survey items. Abramson reviews the controversies concerning the decline in political trust and the existence of the "internal" (one's own perceived political effectiveness) and "external" (perceived government responsiveness) dimensions or types of political efficacy. He pays special attention to racial, generational, and educational differences in attitudes and trends. Generational replacement has contributed substantially to the decline in partisanship, but it has prevented a decline in internal efficacy (presumably through increased education) and has perhaps slowed the decline in external efficacy and political trust. Trends in attitudes have been different for blacks and whites, with blacks feeling less politically effective and having weaker party loyalties. Curiously, since political efficacy and strength of partisanship are positively related to political participation, Abramson's findings do not explain the recent political mobilization of blacks, which might instead be attributed to ethnic identity or to what Sidney Verba and Norman Nie have called group consciousness.

In the fifth section, Abramson digresses to cover the academic debates about changes in political tolerance (attitudes toward Communists, socialists, and atheists), *The American Voter's* "levels of conceptualization," liberal-conservative issue consistency, attitude stability, and issue voting. Although these debates are only loosely connected with the rest of the book, Abramson provides concise and fairly even-handed reviews of some occasionally bitter controversies. These reviews, again, are useful to have in one convenient place. It would also have been useful, however, if Abramson had taken note of the overwhelming aggregate-level stability of opinion when addressing the different individual-level interpretations of attitude stability. This raises ecological inference questions, of which Abramson is clearly aware.

The concluding section of the book explores one of the possible consequences of the trends in political attitudes. Abramson shows that seventy percent of the recent drop in voter turnout can be explained by the decline in political partisanship and in feelings of external political efficacy.

Overall this book has few methodological or other faults. It is filled with data, although not to excess. Abramson uses some clever but relatively simple statistical techniques: cohort matrices, bivariate regression analysis to estimate the possible effects of

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age, and a method that estimates trends that would have occurred without cohort replacement or changes in partisan strength or other attitudes. Abramson pays sufficient attention to historical events that probably contributed to attitude trends, although they are not formally included in the statistical analysis.

Only two shortcomings of the book are worth mentioning. First, some attention should have been devoted to reciprocal relationships, since these have been appraised in at least some studies of policy preferences, partisanship, and voting. Partisanship and political efficacy may be affected by political activity, even the simple act of voting. Second, tests of statistical significance should have been reported in various places for some of the small but substantively interesting differences between groups at certain time points. These differences might have occurred simply due to sampling error.

ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO
Columbia University

Covering Campaigns: Journalism in Congressional Elections *by Peter Clarke and Susan H. Evans. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1983. 151 pp. $17.50.*

Why is the typical House seat so safe? Political scientists have many plausible answers to this question, but communications scholars Clarke and Evans make the case that press coverage of campaigns for the House is an important and overlooked factor in the high rate of return enjoyed by incumbents. They find that newspaper reporting of House elections, particularly in the few hotly contested races where turnover is most likely, favors incumbents. The imbalance in reporting tends to interact with the other advantages of incumbency identified by such students of Congress as Richard Fenno, John Ferejohn, Morris Fiorina, and David Mayhew.

The book is based on an ambitious, well-integrated study of a sample of eighty-six House races in 1978. Three kinds of data were gathered. From the largest daily newspaper in each district, the reporter assigned to the House race was interviewed by telephone and asked about the race, the candidates, and the effort that had been put into covering the election. Clippings of all stories mentioning at least one of the candidates during the six weeks prior to the election were obtained and analyzed for the specific kinds of information available to the reader. Finally, the results were married with survey data from the University of Michigan's election study to determine the relationship between press coverage and voter knowledge of the candidates.

Despite the commitment of journalists to objective coverage, incumbents received both more coverage and coverage with a different emphasis. For many of the races, this result is easy to explain, given the half-hearted efforts of poorly qualified challengers facing popular incumbents. It is not so easy to explain in the tight races where challengers were credible and well funded. Clarke and Evans looked at how reporters went about their work. Reporter laziness was not the answer, since they found that reporters made as much effort covering challengers as incumbents; further, reporters seemed equally

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knowledgeable about both candidates. The answer lies somewhere in the swamp of "news judgment," and particularly in the incumbent's greater skill in making news that editors see fit to print, even during an election campaign. Stories about incumbents dealt heavily with political attributes; challengers, who are usually deficient in such resources, often tried to stress issues, but even here did not succeed in getting much coverage for their efforts. As the authors put it: "The present mix of language in written news reports, giving incumbents the edge on both political background and issues, imposes hopeless odds on challengers" (p. 50).

Basic to the problem is that many journalists view House elections as boring, with little payoff to reporters in career advancement. As one veteran put it: "I would rather have a tornado. It's over in a day, and you can get a prize for covering it" (p. 112). House races tend to be covered by young reporters with relatively little preparation or experience in politics. The high rate of reporter turnover from one election to the next further weakens the ability of the press to take the initiative in analyzing and presenting the races. The net result is that incumbents exert substantial control over the tone and agenda of coverage of their own reelection efforts.

Covering Campaigns is brief but to the point. The style is conversational and the language simple. Wary methodologists may question inferences about journalistic activities drawn from telephone interviews, and will want better justification for some of the typologies used (such as "high resource" versus "low resource" candidates). But most of what is argued rings true. The straightforward presentation and the clear point of view will make this research accessible to those with little background in social science techniques. If it becomes available as a paperback, *Covering Campaigns* would be useful in many undergraduate political science and journalism courses. Prospective as well as practicing journalists could profit from reading this critique of press performance.

One unsettling question remains: If this analysis of newspaper reporting is accurate, what would a similar study of local television news coverage reveal?

SCOTT KEETER
Rutgers University

Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness *by Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1982. 375 pp. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $9.95.*

In their important and timely book, supported by the Twentieth Century Fund, Bardach and Kagan focus on the social dimension of regulatory unreasonableness—the experience of being subjected to inefficient regulatory requirements. Their concern is with "site-level unreasonableness," which has to do with particular encounters between enforcers and the regulated.

Contributing to site-level regulatory unreasonableness, Bardach and Kagan determined, has been the shift towards a more aggressive, tougher, and more uniform regulatory enforcement structure—a structure characterized by more stringent statutes, shifts in

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the burden of proof, and the strengthening of remedial and sanctioning powers. But although these changes fortified the regulators' legal powers, they have reduced their discretion. Regulators must now pay stricter attention to what is legally proper. By compelling the regulated to "go by the book," the legal changes have made it more difficult to be as flexible as circumstances warrant. Unreasonableness flows from over-inclusive, centrally formulated legal rules enforced in a literal way. Regulators and the regulated have different perspectives. The former are likely to pay heed to "violations" of the rules, while the latter are more concerned with what they perceive to be "real problems." Business enterprises are more attentive to the probabilities of harm, and government to the mere possibility of it. The official perspective adopts a theoretically oriented approach to problem solving, while regulated businesspersons use experience as their guide. What the regulators regard as documentation, the regulated view as onerous paperwork.

Legalistic regulation may have positive effects and may at times be necessary, according to Bardach and Kagan, but it also has perverse ones. It can create resentment and resistance, undermine attitudes and constructive information-sharing, and divert the energies of regulated and regulator into pointless legal battles.

Bardach and Kagan's model inspector is one who minimizes adversary relationships, gives regulated businesses a fair hearing, is responsive, shows forebearance, and provides information that reduces the cost of compliance or makes the required compliance measures appear justifiable and understandable. If inspectors are to discharge their tasks effectively, then agency managers must foster an atmosphere in which flexibility can be exercised. Managers can upgrade recruitment and training, and can encourage specialization. Although resource constraints may pose problems, they may also provide incentives for agency managers to use their staffs more selectively, to be efficient, and to extend enforcement resources through informal techniques and cooperative strategies.

But standing in the way of flexible enforcement is a political environment comprising legislators, legislative subcommittees and staff, executives, agents of budgetary control, lawyers and lobbyists for affected interests, advocacy groups, the media, and courts. Bardach and Kagan liken these forces to a toothed ratchet wheel that allows regulation to turn toward greater stringency, but then locks it in place, preventing any downward movement except occasionally when political anti-regulation pressures become intense. The authors speculate that regulatory rules rarely recede because economies of scale dictate that major efforts to revise them be done at infrequent intervals, because revisions make for boring work, because regulatory agencies have not regarded the elimination of costs as their responsibility, and because the threatening political environment discourages such activity.

Bardach and Kagan consider alternatives to overcome unreasonableness. Although mandatory self-regulation programs can lead to unreasonable costs, displacement of constructive effort, and "destructive defensiveness," the authors conclude that on balance government is likely to be more responsive to such efforts. In some circumstances, depending in part on how it is implemented, a mandatory disclosure strategy can penetrate the clouds of confusion and secrecy. Greater dependence on liability law, and the imposition of taxes and charges on disfavored conduct, are other options that the authors consider. Bardach and Kagan conclude that while these forms of indirect regulation may be

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more reasonable than direct regulation in some situations, they also are risky; in any event, for a variety of social ills, indirect regulation is not an adequate substitute. Finally, the authors examine how planners might conceive the task of regulatory design, and assess institutional procedures to curb regulatory excess. They speculate that regulatory unreasonableness may breed an unfortunate reaction—a move to make everyone accountable for everything. That tendency, they argue, could sap the citizenry of a sense of responsibility as they seek to avoid being judged for wrong-doing.

Bardach and Kagan have written a book that all students of regulation and public administration generally will want to read. The work identifies an important problem and analyzes it in a most insightful way. Covering a wide range of material, the book is rich in detail, drawing not only on some fresh research, but also on existing literature. This fine book should stimulate further studies that test its assumptions. More data should better enable political scientists and policymakers to differentiate among various kinds of site-level regulation, to make some judgments about the prevalence of "unreasonableness," to determine under what circumstances movement can be made toward the ideal of the "model inspector," and under what situations something that is perceived by some as regulatory unreasonableness is in fact the inevitable and perhaps necessary cost of pursuing certain social objectives. For encouraging such thinking, political scientists all owe a considerable debt to Bardach and Kagan.

ROBERT A. KATZMANN
The Brookings Institution

Regulation and Its Reform *by Stephen Breyer. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982. 472 pp. $25.00.*

One can sometimes tell a book by its citations. Breyer, superlative lawyer that he is, documents his text with more than a thousand notes. Most cite lawyers and law cases. Most of the ideas cited come from economists. A perusal yielded no references to a political science journal, although Theodore Lowi's *End of Liberalism* does get its usual mention. However, "Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci." and "J. Law & Econ" appear repeatedly. Several well-known economists and lawyers make the index—such as Alfred Kahn, Paul MacAvoy, Ronald Coase, George Eads, G. Calebresi, Richard Stewart—but nary a political scientist, sociologist, psychologist, organizational theorist, or historian.

Breyer is forthright about the nature of his book. He points out that "the approach of this book is normative. It considers "*justifications* for regulation, not *causes*" (p. 9). He adds "the book does not provide a general causal theory or explanation of regulation. Instead, it asks what reasonable human goals a program might sensibly have, regardless of its historical origins. It assumes that regulators seek in good faith to attain such goals, regardless of the existence of other possible motives in fact" (p. 10). All students of political science realize how severely these limitations confine this book.

As Breyer acknowledges, he owes a "considerable intellectual debt" (p. viii) to Alfred Kahn, Paul MacAvoy, and to the array of economists they represent. The analytical sub-

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stance of the book is largely based on economics. The presentation is clear, but derivative. The seven supply and demand diagrams and the one equation are all relegated to the end notes. Various economic models are adumbrated and their conclusions explained, but the models are not questioned and the conclusions are not derived.

Most of the economic thinking associated with Kahn and MacAvoy has focused on the regulation of prices and market entry by such federal agencies as the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. In this general area, some strong arguments can be made for deregulation, and some major steps toward deregulation have been taken over the last few years. Breyer cogently explains these arguments and reforms.

Most of the recent growth in regulation has been in different areas (health, safety, and environmental regulation) by such agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the National Highway Traffic Safety Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Breyer tries to handle this kind of regulation by lumping it together with price-and-entry regulation as "economic regulation." This is too procrustean a bed; Breyer barely touches on the perplexities of regulating uncertain risks to life and limb. The book is essentially about the regulation of prices and markets. Nearly all the ideas in it concern this kind of regulation, as do most of the pages and examples.

The book is well written, but since it breaks little new ground it may be boring to those familiar with the relevant literature. The jacket blurb claims that "because it is comprehensive and superbly organized, with a wealth of highly detailed examples,"—which is correct—"it is practical for use in law schools and in courses on economics and political science." Students of economics would have to supplement it with some more rigorous economics. Students of political science should read it only to discover something about economics and law. There is little political science in it.

In short, this is a textbook of sorts, written by a lawyer and inspired by some economists, that focuses on the regulation of industries like the airline, trucking, and natural gas industries. In its narrow category, it is excellent. Nothing better like it exists.

JAMES W. VAUPEL
Duke University

Revolt Against Regulation: The Rise and Pause of the Consumer Movement *by Michael Pertschuk. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. 192 pp. $12.95.*

Michael Pertschuk has written a lively autobiographical memoir of his years as a consumer activist, first on the staff of the Senate Commerce Committee and then as chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). However, the book, based on a series of

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lectures delivered at Berkeley's Graduate School of Business Administration in 1981, is not a work of scholarship. The substance of the consumer protection problems that ignited his anger is rarely touched on and then usually through the sort of dramatic anecdotes that can give congressional hearings a few minutes on the nightly news.

Instead, the reader is offered an often engaging account of the political maneuverings of Pertschuk and his allies and opponents. He condemns business lobbyists and their congressional allies for one-sided, intemperate attacks, but he himself is given to similar excesses either from personal disposition or as a matter of political strategy. He discusses the media strategy of a coalition set up to preserve the FTC's consumer protection powers as one designed to focus "raucous" media attention on the issue—"the more outraged and intemperate the better" (p. 102). He understands the political usefulness of anger, but he also realizes the hazards of using this tactic from within the bureaucracy. He appears to have found the transition from congressional staffer to bureaucrat a difficult one. With the benefit of hindsight he recognizes his "own unfortunate tendency as FTC Chairman to untamed speeches and interviews" (p. 92). Despite this self-assessment, the book contains a certain amount of untamed rhetoric, a feature of the writing style that, of course, increases the book's entertainment value, if not its academic authority.

In a reflective epilogue, Pertschuk comments on the uneven tone of the book noticed by many readers and discusses the tension between outrage and civility in political debate. However, the book revealed a deeper tension, not between modes of talking, but between ways of thinking—between deeply felt outrage and careful analysis. This tension is most obvious in Pertschuk's treatment of economists and of policy advice based on economic analysis. He is wary, critical, but ultimately respectful of economic advice. "Free-enterprise economists" are scornfully treated and viewed as the running dogs of the capitalist class (pp. 62–66). Later in Chapter 5, the only one to deal with the substance of regulatory policy, he credits economists with alerting him and other consumer activists to the costly, unintended consequences of some of their more poorly thought out proposals. The FTC economists did, it seems, manage to convince their chairman of the value of market incentives, cost minimization, and a limited form of cost-benefit analysis. He has, one feels, understood the ultimate scarcity of resources.

Yet if forced to choose between "the elegance of the economist's models and the inelegant passion of moral outrage and indignation" (p. 151), it seems clear that he would choose the latter. The dichotomy may well be a false one, however. Oddly, some people seem to believe that moral outrage will be contaminated by contact with the facts. But even the indignant can make a stronger case for their favorite reform if they have thought it through and know how the benefits and costs will be distributed.

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Columbia University

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Consequences of Party Reform *by Nelson W. Polsby. New York, Oxford University Press, 1983. 267 pp. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $8.95.*

The responsibility of post-1968 Democratic party reformers for the parlous condition of American politics today provides the theme for this ranging, acute, and instructive survey of contemporary American politics. Polsby has constructed a catalog of the ruinous change in the conduct of American politics and government brought about by the eruption of ephemeral forces in the Democratic party at the 1968 convention. The author's insistent, repetitive fixing of responsibility on Democratic reformers for a wide array of cumulative, interacting developments constitutes a tour de force. He effectively employs the theme of reform as culprit to sustain lively interest in his compact, orderly, and trenchant review of the informal processes that traditionally have been used to create governing coalitions having some claim to being representative.

Polsby's catalog of changes includes the popularization of presidential selection processes with the accent placed on primaries. Ironically, the old coalitional selection processes produced candidates with broad appeal, while the processes of popular selection are dominated by intense minorities and produce candidates who are unwanted by large elements of the party. Unpopular candidates bring high levels of defection at the polls and contribute to declining public support for candidates who become presidents. The reforms are also associated with increasing candidate control over delegate selection, and a sharp reduction in the participartion of party regulars and officeholders in the selection process. An evil consequence of this is that the candidates nominated by the party are deprived of the experience of reaching accommodation with independent power-holders within the party, and thus have not been socialized to bargaining and negotiating as a condition of achieving some portion of their program goals once they reach the White House. Popular selection of nominees produces presidents who are unacquainted with coalitional processes and are ineffective in office.

The parties have suffered an erosion of the old "face-to-face, primary and geographically proximate" relations with voters, and have become "distant, symbolic and noninteractive" (p. 141). The national parties have gained centralized authority over state parties and a consequent erosion of the initiatives of the state parties has weakened them.

All of these debilitating changes in traditional political processes result primarily (although not exclusively) from the success of elite representatives of mass constituences, which formerly were politically passive, subordinate, or excluded, in asserting claims to a share in party office and influence in the Democratic party. Polsby's single-factor analysis and his focus on the period after 1968 deprive him of the occasion to consider whether party reforms and the broader changes in the political process that he ascribes to the reforms might not both be the products of underlying forces that have transformed American society and institutions since World War II.

This perspective would permit readers to consider the party changes after 1968 as the culmination of a dual process of broadening participation in party management and of suppressing state party insurrection against democratizing the party, which kept the Democratic party in ferment from 1944 to 1968. Thus, the equal rights statutes and executive orders that responded to the pressures of organized women and minorities working to effect changes in the workplaces, schools, and places of public accommodation can

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be considered antecedents to the effective prosecution of the demands on parties. The perspective is particularly important in responding to the concluding caption in the last chapter of Polsby's study, "On Turning Back the Clock: Are Parties Recoverable?" (p. 180). If party rules changes are seen as but a small if significant part of a long-term transformation to a new order in American politics, then the passing of the old order cannot be reversed by going back to the old rules—if indeed the old order could be restored at all. Polsby's response to the question is moderate, tentative, and probably consistent with the Hunt Commission recommendations. He implies acceptance of a process of continuing change which may effect, as Robert Michels put it, an "amalgam" of the old and new elites, rather than a circularity or a transformation.

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City Limits *by Paul E. Peterson. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981. 268 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $9.95.*

The democratic promise of city politics has been a consistent theme in Western thought for several thousand years, but Paul Peterson's extended essay suggests that this faith is poorly served, at least in the United States. Compared to the national political arena, political participation rates in local politics are low, and urban party and interest group life is stunted or nonexistent. The issues of local politics are less intense, often parochial, and finally trivial when set against the dramas of war and peace and the complexity of macroeconomic management.

These characteristics of local political life stem from the inherent limits on urban politics imposed by its subordinate place in a larger system. For example, the city's open borders thrust it into a competition with other places for its economic and fiscal lifeblood. Most of what cities do depends on their ability to attract and hold corporate, commercial, and residential taxpayers. Thus, by nature, "cities are above all concerned with their economic well-being" (p. 32) and must act accordingly.

Compelled in this way, cities tend to pursue certain sorts of activities rather than others. The constraint on their taxing and spending imposed by competition with other cities and by the preemption by higher governments of the best tax resources means that cities cannot contemplate the pursuit of genuine redistributive policies. Peterson uses the case of New York's fiscal downfall to illustrate the point. Local social welfare politics, in the broadest sense, becomes a "non-issue" and helps to account for the failure of local partisan crystallization.

Economic development policy, in contrast, becomes the "meat" of urban politics, but its very character—involving great transportation infrastructure schemes, tax and finance incentives, and urban renewal—makes it largely an elite domain, marked by consensual, closed, and centralized decision-making. The politics of allocation—a third type of policy concerned mainly with education and protection and maintenance services—is the only arena in which pluralist competition occurs. But these policies have no systematic impact on a city's economic well-being (unlike redistribution, which harms the economic position

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of the city, and development, which helps). Thus, city leaders relegate these policy areas to a place of secondary importance.

As Peterson explores the implications of the preeminence of economic well-being as an urban concern, it becomes apparent that the chief contribution of the book is not that it seeks to offer a novel perspective (it does not), but rather that it represents a masterful excursion through the literature of urban politics. Peterson has sought essentially to locate the contributions of community power theory, the pluralist school, the debate over reform and machine conflict, the research on macro-determinants of public policy, ethnic politics studies, and more in the context of his policy typology. Although the book begins by asserting the morbidity of urban politics scholarship today, *City Limits* is in fact an impressive reminder of the rich theoretical material that has emerged from this field. As a broad didactic synthesis, a kind of stock-taking, the book is a fine, intelligent contribution.

Readers will no doubt find much to provoke argument in this book. One key problem in my view is the exceedingly narrow treatment of redistribution. Redistributive policies are defined as transfers from the better-off to the less well-off that have negative effects on the local economy (see p. 43). Although Peterson is consistently vague about what it is that might be redistributed in cities, one can guess that it is income or various income subsidies like housing or health care. It comes as no surprise in his analysis, then, that cities do not have the resources for such policies and cannot afford to pay for them by taxing the wealthy, for fear of driving these important taxpayers to the suburbs. Thus, redistribution of this sort is a non-issue in local politics.

But by limiting his notion of redistribution to transfers that harm a city's economic position, Peterson is able to ignore a whole set of processes that raise what others have seen as issues of distribution and redistribution. These processes, which Peterson attempts in passing to neutralize by calling them "allocational," have to do with the patterns of delivery of urban services to classes, races, and ethnic groups. But who gets public goods such as police and fire protection, libraries, and parks, raises clear issues of conflict between better-off groups and the less well-off. To suggest that service delivery is not a crucial redistributive issue in cities because it does not systematically harm the local economy is to perform a misleading, if convenient, feat of definition.

PETER K. EISINGER
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Kings of the Hill: Power and Personality in the House of Representatives *by Richard B. Cheney and Lynne V. Cheney. New York, Continuum, 1983. 226 pp. $14.95.*

There is a long tradition of writings on Congress, best exemplified by William S. White's *Citadel*, that collectively might be termed the "loveable old codgers" school of congressional historiography. This new book by Congressman Richard Cheney and his wife, Lynne, falls squarely in that tradition. The Cheneys present sketches of eight of the House's most important historical figures: Henry Clay, James K. Polk, Thaddeus Stevens, James G. Blaine, Thomas Reed, Joseph Cannon, Nicholas Longworth, and Sam Rayburn. One can quibble over the choice of entries. Many readers may regret the

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absence of Wilbur Mills, who columnist Russell Baker only half-jokingly tagged the "third house of Congress" during Mills's heyday as Ways and Means Committee chairman. But generally, the list comprises virtually all of the major Speakers in the history of the House. Only Stevens, who merited inclusion due to the centrality of his role in directing Reconstruction, was never elevated to the Speaker's chair.

Potential purchasers should carefully note the subtitle, "Power and Personality in the House of Representatives," for it encapsulates what is both the book's greatest strength and its greatest weakness—its insistent dwelling on the personalities of the powerful. This approach makes the book a quick and lively read, but it is apt to leave the more-than-casual student of Congress ultimately frustrated. In treating political conflicts solely in terms of the interplay of forceful (and seemingly quirky) individuals, the authors fail to impart much sense of the House as an institution. Thus, the reader is treated to often vivid descriptions of personal rivalries and eccentricities without such descriptions being rooted in a deeper appreciation of the lasting importance of the precedents generated through specific conflicts and events.

For example, there is a colorful account of Thaddeus Stevens's vindictiveness towards the South as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, and later the Appropriations Committee. Yet there is only a one-sentence mention (p. 66) of how the press of business during and after the Civil War necessitated the spinoff of Appropriations from Ways and Means, a development that made hash of fiscal policy for over a century until the taxing and spending functions were partially reconciled by the adoption of the budget process in 1974. The Cheneys' version of the familiar story of the revolt against "Czar" Cannon is especially deficient in this regard, as is their account of Rayburn's packing of the Rules Committee in 1961. In their only genuine attempt at analysis, the author's final chapter offers a muddled paean to strong congressional leadership as a way to insulate Congress from being overly responsive to constituency pressures.

The major purpose of the book, however, is simply to recount some oft-told tales in an entertaining fashion, and in this the book generally succeeds. Inevitably, some of the personality sketches are more successful than others. Most affecting, perhaps, is the oddly melancholy portrait of Sam Rayburn, whose immense political influence consumed an otherwise lonely life. Polk, that stolidly successful Speaker and president, remains as enigmatic after reading the Cheneys' portrait as before. The chapter devoted to Henry Clay's "War Hawk" Speakership is enlivened by a marvelous depiction of Clay's bitter antagonist, the sickly, half-mad John Randolph of Roanoke.

All told, *Kings of the Hill* is best suited for some light vacation reading. Congressional scholars may find it most useful as a handy shelf reference to liven up lecture notes; nowhere else are so many celebrated anecdotes available in a single source. There is little new here, and serious students of Congress would be better advised to consult George B. Galloway's standard history for authoritative acounts of events. Nonetheless, there is a reverence for the great historical personages of the House that informs the book and leaves the reader acquainted with a more richly colored cast of characters than congressional aficionados have known before.

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The Vice President as Policy Maker: Rockefeller in the Ford White House *by Michael Turner. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1982. 252 pp. $29.95.*

During the telephone conversation in which he was offered the vice-presidency, Nelson A. Rockefeller recalled Gerald R. Ford saying: "I want you on the domestic and Henry [Kissinger] on the foreign side and then we can move on these things" (p. 52). At that time, Kissinger was both the secretary of state and the national security adviser. With this model in mind, Rockefeller, who had twice previously declined the vice-presidential nomination when he was governor of New York, accepted Ford's offer. He hoped that during the period of post-Watergate healing he could assume a domestic policymaking role in that office that would transcend the vice-presidency's traditional inconsequentiality.

In the end, Michael Turner concludes, Rockefeller failed. There was ambiguity in Ford's initial commitment, ambiguity Rockefeller failed to clarify because it opened the door to one last slim shot at his lifetime ambition, the presidency. However, the long delay caused by the vice-presidential confirmation hearings kept Rockefeller from the scene while Ford's domestic White House was being structured in a decentralized way and while roles were being carved out by key aides. In addition, as New York's former four-term governor and a serious presidential contender for a decade and a half, Rockefeller as vice-president could not function on a level of equality with other advisers. Such a role was uncomfortable for him and for the others around President Ford, especially Donald Rumsfeld, who himself harbored presidential ambitions.

Two major attempts by Rockefeller to have an impact on Ford's domestic policy were his effort, after being appointed as vice chairman of the Domestic Policy Council, to define a comprehensive framework for the administration's 1976 legislative agenda and his proposal to meet energy financing needs through the creation of the proposed massive Energy Research and Finance Corporation (ERFCO). The first of these was short-circuited when Ford announced a spending ceiling in October 1975 of $395 billion, thus severely limiting resources for any new domestic programs. The second survived major intra-administration infighting, only to languish in a Congress that knew the measure's prime mover, Rockefeller, was a lame duck vice-president, and suspected that the administration was not wholeheartedly behind it.

Turner's treatment, based on a large number of interviews with high-level presidential and vice-presidential aides of the Ford era, offers excellent insight into peak executive decision-making processes. The author's understanding of Rockefeller's role would have been enhanced, however, by greater familiarity with his record as governor of New York. No one knowledgeable about that era, for example, can read of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) proposal without thinking of its similarity in scope and concept to the numerous public authorities created by Rockefeller in the state. Such issues as the effect on the ERDA proposal of the fact that it was offered in the midst of the New York fiscal crisis (which was triggered by the default of one of these authorities, the Urban Development Corporation) are given insufficient attention by the author.

The Rockefeller experience demonstrated that the vice-president is likely to be more effective as a "minister without portfolio" than as an on-line policy adviser. It also demonstrated, once again, that the vice-presidency can be only what the president wished it to

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be. On 5 November 1976, Vice-President Rockefeller submitted a memo to the incoming president and vice-president, Jimmy Carter and Walter F. Mondale, outlining factors that might contribute to their "effective working relationship." It emphasized the need of the vice-president for sufficient staff, timely information, entré into key decision arenas and, above all, regular and free access to the president. Later, Carter and Mondale worked out a role for the vice-president widely hailed for its effectiveness. Perhaps Rockefeller's experience (and his frustrations), as reported to them, had something to do with its design.

GERALD BENJAMIN
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Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power *by Edward Keynes. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982. 236 pp. $17.95.*

The author would like to see an end to the situation in which "aggressive Presidents and supine Congresses" have combined to expand the president's undoubted authority to repel foreign invasion into a power to wage undeclared war in any corner of the globe (p. 1). Yet for two reasons this book will not make a great contribution to creating the doctrines that would impose real limits on presidential initiative. First, the focus on the courts distracts attention from the branch of government most capable of imposing limits. Second, the discussion of the courts' role suffers from serious weaknesses.

The courts' role in restricting presidential initiative is limited, for at least two reasons. First, most judges believe they lack the information and expertise necessary to second-guess decisions for or against committing U.S. forces to hostilities abroad. Second, as the history of the Vietnam cases so clearly shows, suits will be brought by opponents of a particular commitment, who hope to secure by judicial ruling the limits on initiation or conduct of hostilities that they cannot obtain directly from Congress. Most judges are reluctant to rule in such cases, lest they be accused of short-circuiting the democratic process. Thus, as Keynes himself points out several times, only Congress is able to impose real limits on presidential activity. A study of the way in which Congress has used or failed to use the War Powers Act and related legislation would reveal more about the current balance of presidential and congressional authority in war-making than any discussion of court rulings.

The discussion of the courts' role includes an interesting examination of the eighteenth-century roots of constitutional doctrine. The treatment of contemporary doctrine could have been improved with four changes. First, the "political question" doctrine under which courts have abstained from ruling in many cases developed in relation to a whole host of domestic and foreign policies. If a comparison of its use in domestic matters and foreign policy matters not involving the use of force showed that the doctrine was interpreted broadly in cases related to war powers, then inquiry into the nature and appropriateness of the differences would contribute to thinking on the subject.

Second, he cites Civil War cases that are not completely comparable to cases involving foreign wars. Civil war can be viewed as an extreme form of crime and riot, domestic

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troubles that the president has wide authority to suppress. Therefore, the question of committing force does not raise quite the same constitutional issues.

Third, the problems posed by prior treaty commitments deserve more attention. Keynes rightly notes (p. 40) that whatever a treaty might say about preserving Congress's role in decisions about war, it has the practical effect of tilting the political balance in favor of war. Yet a treaty commitment can have a deterrent effect that reduces the likelihood of war. This is an area of presidential and congressional choice that clearly deserves greater attention.

Finally, Keynes ought to have carried his analysis of different types of cases further. Courts can be more effective in limiting some initiatives, such as domestic measures supporting the war effort, than others. Elaboration and examination of different categories of cases would contribute to sounder doctrine on the extent of presidential, or congressional and presidential, power to begin and continue foreign wars.

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The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry *by Paul Starr. New York, Basic Books, 1983. 514 pp. $24.95.*

Starr's book has already been hailed as the definitive study of the growth of the medical profession as a central institution in American society. While it is a very good history of the key changes in the medical profession over the past century, it does not include much sociology, and it is particularly short on politics. This adds up to some serious gaps in an otherwise important and major study.

Starr's book is divided into two parts. First, Starr details the dismal status of physicians in the nineteenth century. Physicians were challenged by "domestic medicine" and "lay medicine." In accord with Jacksonian ideals, expertise was suspect and medical knowledge was regarded as the property of the people. Also, the distribution of medicine was internally divided among physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries. Getting a medical education required very little formal training; private medical schools that were little more than degree mills abounded. There were far too many doctors and business was poor. This situation began to change slowly in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. With the discovery of antiseptic procedures and anesthesia, hospitals were safer and began to attract middle-class patients. The growth of hospitals, urbanization, better transportation, and a tightening up on licensing at the state level led to an improvement of the medical market. These changes were well under way before the famous Flexner Report in 1910 that dramatically decreased the number of medical schools, and that over time radically shrank and limited the supply of doctors. Starr's recounting of the early transformation of medicine admirably brings together many separate studies that were available only to specialists.

In the second part of the book, Starr details the central importance of the growth of private insurance as yet another important force expanding the medical market, a process

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that was powerfully aided by government. The addition of Medicare and Medicaid further expanded the medical market. Because few controls were placed on doctors or hospitals, this expansion increased the hegemony of medical professionals.

Starr argues that the government failed at crucial junctures to reform medicine (primarily with some form of sickness or health insurance) because no major group in society was squarely behind these reforms. As a result, his detailing of the failures of government, beginning in the Progressive Era through the present, to regulate medicine and to secure some form of health insurance is incomplete.

Starr's analysis is typical of most forms of "pluralist" analysis—reform does not occur because no group exists powerful enough to ensure reform. The trouble with this approach is that it equates the question of the relation of medicine to the larger society with medicine's power relative to that of the general public. The approach thus treats the public as simply another interest group. If reform doesn't occur it must be because the public is not sufficiently interested in change. This leaves unanswered the evidence of the "mobilization of bias" in interest groups in society, the purpose of representation, and the question of the appropriate relationship of medicine to the public. Starr nowhere addresses these empirical and normative issues. A study of the sociology of medicine cannot ignore the "collectivity orientation" of the medical profession. This otherwise fine book on medicine has little to say about these matters.

DAN E. BEAUCHAMP
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Social Welfare or Social Control? Some Historical Reflections on Regulating the Poor *edited by Walter I. Trattner. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1983. 161 pp. $14.95.*

The theory developed by Francis Piven and Richard Cloward in *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Social Welfare*, first published in 1972, has been widely commented on by political scientists, sociologists, urban policy analysts, and others. The Piven-Cloward theory, simply stated, is that since the collapse of feudalism and the rise of the market economy, the expansion of relief programs to help the poor was not undertaken out of humanitarian impulses, a sense of social justice, a response to perceived needs, or an accommodation to varying political interests and pressures. Rather, it occurred only in periods of mass unemployment as a result of mass protests and turmoil in order to maintain the necessary level of political stability, and further, that when mass protests and turmoil ceased, relief programs were restricted in order to force the poor into the labor market.

In this volume, the historians take their turn. The editor and the authors believe, quite justifiably, that the Piven-Cloward theory, based as it is on a political scientist's and social worker's view of history, should be checked by the historians' view of the record in the United States. They do this in chapters covering welfare in late eighteenth-century Philadelphia (by John K. Alexander), the abolition of outdoor relief in the period 1870 to 1900 (Raymond A. Mohl), the widows pension movement, 1900–1930 (Muriel W. Pum-

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phrey and Ralph E. Pumphrey), and the formative years of social security, 1930–35 (W. Andrew Achenbaum). Though, as Trattner explains in his introduction, the book was not intended as a comprehensive critique, its more modest effort raises some serious questions about the validity of the theory. James Lieby, who takes as his task "to reflect upon the historiographical or philosophical characteristic of the thesis and its application," (p. 90) is critical of both the thesis and its critics who, in his view, fail to offer more than a sketchy alternative explanation. In their response, Piven and Cloward indicate they are unmoved by the critics.

This is an interesting book that is worth reading, but also a disappointing one. It is interesting because of the historical episodes described—such as late eighteenth-century Philadelphia and the widows pension movement, when an expansion of welfare occurred without mass protests, and the late nineteenth-century, a period marked by three serious depressions and by some of the most violent mass protests that have been seen in this country, when welfare programs were seriously contracted. But the book remains disappointing because none of the historians take on Piven and Cloward on their own grounds—the 1960s and 1970s. Is this too recent for historians? In any event, apart from the recognition given to the role played by Piven and Cloward in fomenting the mass protests and a brief reference to the large increase in the number of female-headed families during these years, these historians do not provide a view of why what happened to welfare in those years happened and how agitation over civil rights and the Vietnam War were translated into protests about the welfare system that became effective avenues for achieving a quadrupling of the welfare caseload during a period of low unemployment and rising real wages.

While Piven and Cloward remain as contentious as ever in defense of their views and deal acerbically even with those of their critics who see some merit in their theory though they reject it as a total explanation, they themselves appear to be modifying it with respect to the future, though with ambivalence. They comment on the one hand that "without mass disorder in the 1980's, there is little hope that the AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] system can be saved from destruction—by the Reagan administration" (p. 144), but, on the other hand, that the success of the Reagan assault "may not be entirely foreordained." They have come to believe their theory "may represent a better characterization of the past than of the future." The historians have further work to do.

BLANCHE BERNSTEIN
New School for Social Research

The Political Integration of Women: Roles, Socialization, and Politics *by Virginia Sapiro. Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1983. 205 pp. $16.95.*

Sapiro asks why so many young "women whom we would expect to have cast off the veils that have enshrouded women in the past" (p. 170) continue to behave politically as though they were still shrouded in veils that keep them politically separate from the public world of men. To answer the question, she utilizes the socialization panel study begun by M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi in 1965 when the respondents were seniors in high

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school and continued through our time. Sapiro uses the 1965 survey but puts most emphasis on the 1973 wave, when respondents were in their mid-twenties. That wave of 676 women forms the basis of her investigation.

Her answer to the above question is that women are still not politically integrated because "the private roles women are expected to perform as adults promote political marginality" (p. 138). The private role she singles out is that of homemaker, although she distinguishes within it the roles of marriage, motherhood, and employment. Homemaking is a politically inhibitory role, both because of historical-cultural expectations and because of very real material constraints. The cultural expectation is that women's "place" is not "in the public world of politics [but] . . . in the private world, especially of the family" (p. 30). The values of that world are said to differ fundamentally from the male one, making for a specific woman's perspective based in part on sentiment, love, sacrifice, moralism, and passivity (p. 31). The material constraints of homemaking and motherhood, especially when the children are young, add to women's inability to translate legal and political rights into effective integration. Women simply lack the socioeconomic resources to do so.

Cultural expectations and lack of resources, however, are but two explanations. Another and often more powerful one is the extent to which women have internalized the cultural role definition. She labels such internationalization as privatization in order to highlight "the domination of women's lives by private roles, concerns, and values" (p. 73). Privatization is used as one of the variables of the study because it "taps very directly women's understanding of women as public or private creatures" (p. 74). The other variables are homemaking, marriage, motherhood, and education.

Although one might at first assume that a privatized role definition would not be very prevalent among young women, especially those who are employed or childless, the relationship between role structure and privatization "is not nearly as strong as some might expect: only 14 per cent of the variance is explained by these variables" (p. 74). Homemaking and education, of course, both are related to privatization. College education is apt to decrease levels of privatization, especially if the respondent reports having experienced opinion or value changes during college.

Privatization is the best predictor of respondents' attitude towards the woman's liberation movement, the current influence of women, political interest, knowledge, and a sense of political efficacy, as well as of certain types of political participation. Privatized women vary from non-privatized ones in that they are more likely to call themselves conservatives, to trust government authority, and to reject the need for governmental change. Thus, women's perception of their gender role accounts for much of women's inability to become fully integrated politically. In the concluding chapter, Sapiro convincingly shows how the interaction between females' self-definition and public policy helps keep women privatized. She closes with a fine agenda for the future, designed to remedy the situation.

The author thus has offered a thoughtful analysis of a generation of "new" women who, surprisingly, turn out not to be so very new after all. Unfortunately, as the author recognizes, the data on which the conclusions rest frequently are not designed to test her assumptions adequately. Having to rely on data collected for different purposes is always tricky. It becomes doubly so when the investigator has a challenging and persuasive thesis

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but must rely on a few, often imprecise items to test it. To cite but one example: the four items used to measure participation are far too gross to explore the privatization notion. If women talk to people in order to influence them politically, who are these people? Husband and children, or colleagues and male dinner partners? And what about contacting public officials? Is it done in order to lodge a private, particular request (a complaint about a neighbor's loud radio that keeps children from sleeping) or for public purposes?

The significance of some of her findings might have been enhanced had she offered male responses for comparative purposes. For example, is the magnitude of the gap in political interest between college and non-college educated women unique to them or is education a great leveler independent of gender? Without more recourse to male responses—if only by way of footnotes—it is hard for the reader to determine the true extent of women's privatization and uniqueness.

Among the most fascinating chapters is the one on male/female language and communication styles (ch. 6). In fact, Sapiro is at her best when she interprets and reinterprets the extant literature. She approaches the literature with great intelligence, thorough mastery, a fine sense of humor, and (most importantly) a good deal of skepticism. Her attempts at demythologizing "common wisdom" and social science findings make this a most provocative and useful book, even though the definitive study on gender roles has still to be written.

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
Rutgers University

George Meany and His Times: A Biography *by Archie Robinson. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1982. 445 pp. $18.75.*

George Meany's life was a continuous battle for his beliefs, which remained virtually the same during the sixty-three years he was in the labor movement. They included simple virtues he deeply felt, such as free and honest trade unionism, the American political and economic system, family, religion, and human rights. He relentlessly fought presidents and industrialists, dictators, and union officials in pursuit of his beliefs. His style remained equally steadfast. With a cigar in mouth and a New York Irish-American accent, he was direct, brusque and intimidating, but not irreverent or personal, serious with humorous jabs, and always right on target.

Archie Robinson's biography portrays all of these sixty-three years in chronological order because that was Meany's way of telling Robinson about them in four years of taped interviews. Robinson catches the style, wit, and significance of Meany's battles mainly by quoting from the interviews or Meany's speeches or other recorded utterances. Meany's photographic memory, Robinson observes, was an invaluable tool: "When he mentioned a meeting—whether of a month or sixty years earlier—he supplied the exact date, the hour and the day of the week, plus the weather at times" (p. 5). The official records, to which Robinson had access, invariably proved he was right.

This is more than just a biography of Meany, as Robinson indicates by the title, which also includes "His Times." During the twenty-seven years Meany served as president of

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the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and later the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), when he was organized labor's designated voice in the nation's capital, Meany spoke out loud and clear on dictatorship, corruption, inflation, discrimination, legislation, political action and, of course, politicians, all in behalf of workers everywhere. But he rarely became embroiled in collective bargaining. The reason is not hard to understand even though Walter Reuther chided Meany for not having been involved in strikes. Meany did not represent workers in their dealings with employers. That was not his job. He was not a labor leader but a leader of labor leaders, just as the AFL-CIO is not a labor union but an association of labor unions. Meany was not involved in strikes since he did not nor was he expected to take part in collective bargaining.

Labor divides its activities into two main categories—negotiations with employers in behalf of appropriate units of employees and dealings with the world in which workers live. The two categories interreact, but they are run differently for obvious reasons. The AFL-CIO services the member unions and speaks for them on political, social, and economic affairs. It also assists in resolving differences between and among unions, such as jurisdictional disputes. Noted for their zealous concern about their autonomous rights, the unions are difficult to deal with on such matters, even where they have a historical community of interests. Meany was masterful in unifying the AFL and the CIO when they merged in 1955. It is a tribute to his skill that the AFL and CIO antecedents of the unions are hardly recognizable as new alliances and groupings of unions have formed.

Meany was also superb in countering corruption in the labor movement. He accepted no excuses, forced errant labor officials to resign, and booted the Teamsters out of the AFL-CIO. The United Auto Workers (UAW) left voluntarily, but for reasons that had nothing to do with corruption; rather, it was the direct result of the clash between Meany and Reuther over leadership of the combined movement. Meany's ultimate victory came after both he and Reuther were dead and Douglas Fraser led the UAW back into the ranks of the AFL-CIO. The fascinating battle of these two powerful men is the subject of an excellent chapter in Robinson's book.

Indeed, Robinson's table of contents in effect describes the wide range of Meany's activities in labor's activities away from the bargaining table—The Man, The Organizer, The Lobbyist, The Big Split, The Politican, Meany and F.D.R., The Cold War, The Taft-Hartley Struggle, AFL-CIO, The Fight Against Corruption, Landrum-Griffin, J.F.K., Labor and Civil Rights, Walter Reuther, Nixon and Labor, Meany and Watergate, Meany and Ford, The Carter Years, and Human Rights.

Meany spoke in crisp and precise words. He and his listeners knew what he was saying, and he was so forceful they were compelled to listen. Ordinarily, a book of extensive quotations from taped interviews and speeches and records can be deadly dull. Robinson's biography is an exception because, through his words, Meany appears lifelike, cigar and all. As one who knew Meany for many years and watched with awe and wonder as he scored his points over the toughest opponents including, in particular, John L. Lewis, a master of forensics, I can attest to the power of the quotations in Robinson's book.

Not only Meany, but his times also come to life through Meany's words of what he did and said, and why, a period made more exciting by the influence Meany exerted. As

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Robinson writes: "His career was unparalleled in American labor history. Besides dealing with eight U.S. Presidents, he knew scores of world political and labor leaders, hundreds of members of Congress and thousands of American union officials. He chatted with Popes, royalty, sports and media figures, and, when his sympathies were engaged, exiles like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn" (p. 14). Many of them, warts and all, appear in Robinson's book.

THEODORE W. KHEEL
Battle, Fowler, Jaffin and Kheel

Love Canal: Science, Politics, and People *by Adeline Gordon Levine. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1982. 263 pp. $24.95.*

For those interested in a comprehensive description of problems encountered by the people of Love Canal in trying to deal with the issues surrounding the country's first catastrophic hazardous substance incident, this book is must reading. Although the text's organization is confusing at times (with frequent references to incidents that "will be dealt with later"), the complexity of the Love Canal story makes this virtually unavoidable. Overall, it is a balanced and accurate treatment of the effects of Love Canal on the residents.

There is, however, a distinct bias to this study. Levine states that on her first arrival in Love Canal in early 1978, she "felt an eerie sensation that danger was lurking somewhere in this peaceful setting" (p. 2). This style may fit the mystery novel genre well; I doubt that it serves sociology in the same way. Unfortunately, the style persists throughout.

As suggested in her book's subtitle, Levine purports to deal with three elements in the Love Canal incident—"science, politics, and people." I commend her treatment of the last of these as accurate, factual, thorough, and sensitive. She has succeeded in portraying the depths of the residents' fears, the frustrations they felt in their dealings with local, state, and federal bureaucracies, the personal problems they faced in this ordeal, and the lack of respect they were accorded by "experts" and other officials. She also dispels the myth, all too prevalent among "experts," that mere citizens—"uneducated housewives"—have nothing to offer when the problem is technical in nature. The knowledge, for example, of the existence and depth of the swales leading away from the canal (knowledge essential to an adequate response) was provided by these citizens.

The inclusion of "science" in the text's subtitle is somewhat misleading. While Levine details the controversies that surrounded the multiple studies conducted at Love Canal, the lack of adequate explanation to the citizens is the focus of her treatment, rather than the scientific adequacy or accuracy of the studies. Concurrently, while she recognizes many of the problems that surround scientific studies in hazardous substance research, she ignores her own recognition when describing the effects. She notes, for example, that the compounds in the canal may have changed due to "interaction, synthesis of new compounds, and possible neutralization or activation of others" (p. 73). Levine acknowledges that given the current state of knowledge, the effects of such interactions are unfathomable. But she concentrates not on what science has done to address this problem,

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but on what the people affected by the contamination wished the studies had been able to do. They "wanted those studies to be *used* to help them, immediately if possible . . ." (p. 80).

Levine's treatment of "politics" is similarly hampered by her perspective. Throughout, she documents political actions taken by citizens and the effects on them of actions taken by various political actors. There is, however, no indication that she understands either the politics in which those actors are enmeshed or the organizations in which those political actions take place. This is perhaps the most serious flaw in this otherwise commendable study.

The author notes, for example, that the New York State Department of Health (DOH) had no stucture "specifically prepared to handle exactly the sort of problem Love Canal presented" (p. 87). Yet her proposed solution to this DOH shortcoming demonstrates her own lack of political and organizational understanding: "A few weeks' lead time—used, for example, for . . . deciding on the best data to collect, designating a comparison group, piloting a questionnaire . . ., becoming familiar with the residents' abilities to provide the information required, training field interviewers thoroughly, assessing laboratory resources, and deciding precisely what information was needed from physician records . . . might have made a difference . . . " (p. 87). The notion that "a few weeks' lead time" would be sufficient to accomplish these tasks demonstrates, at the least, Levine's political and organizational naiveté. This time frame is hardly sufficient, solely from a methodological standpoint, to accomplish these tasks. The notion that, within a few weeks, a political organization would be able to accomplish this, is ludicrous.

Unfortunately, the lack of attention to scientific adequacy and accuracy, and the lack of understanding of the constraints that operate on the political and organizational milieux, permeate this book. To be more reflective of its content, this book's subtitle might read: "The Effects of Science and Politics On the People."

THOMAS G. INGERSOLL
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School Desegregation and Defended Neighborhoods *by Emmett H. Buell, Jr. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1982. 202 pp. $22.95.*

In light of the nationwide publicity given the desegregation of the Boston public schools in the fall of 1974 and 1975, it is surprising how few academic books and articles have been written on the subject. This book is thus one of the rare attempts to explain this controversy by means of policy implementation and sociological theory, a synthesis that the author does not successfully achieve.

A major theme of the book is that the controversy and protest generated by school desegregation in Boston is only partially explained by the standard sociological theories of racism, class antagonism, ignorance, or suspicion of big government. Buell argues that opposition to "forced busing" has its roots in the defense of neighborhood institutions against unwanted social change. A "defended neighborhood," in this case South Boston, is a type of urban village with a distinct identity and boundary, where

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predominantly ethnic and blue-collar populations feel personal safety and interact with neighbors on a relatively intimate basis.

This theory, like many other sociological explanations, suffers from the failure to test it scientifically. While it is commonplace for observers to describe Boston's reaction to school desegregation as caused by some unique feature of the city, much of the protest was probably a function of the characteristics of the desegregation plan. Comparative, quantitative research indicates that the greater the mandatory white reassignment in a school district, the greater the protest. An important fact ignored in this book and in many other sociological interpretations is that Boston has one of the most extensive mandatory white reassignment plans in the nation. Thus it would have been unusual and worthy of study if Boston had *not* had the kind of protest that it did. Moreover, that South Boston (and Charlestown) had the greatest protest participation in the city can be explained by the fact that they had the highest unemployment and lowest median income levels in the city—details of which Buell seems oddly unaware. Empirical research indicates that protest is greatest where white flight is least. That is, protest is a function of the inability to flee an unwanted social policy, regardless of whether an area is a "defended neighborhood."

There are outright errors in the author's analysis of various trends. For example, in a section in Chapter 9 on racially imbalanced schools, the author incorrectly states that court guidelines varied from district to district and over time. As an example, he says "the court set ideal white enrollment in any district 7 school at 31 percent, but allowed actual enrollments to vary by ±8 percent. Hence, no district 7 school was supposed to have a student body more than 39 percent or less than 23 percent white" (p. 154). First, plus or minus 8 percent of 31 percent is a range of 34 to 29 percent, not 39 to 23 percent. Second, the court guidelines consistently held that no school in any of the eight community districts was to vary by greater than plus or minus 25 percent of the district's racial composition. In the district 7 example cited above, 25 percent variance would produce a range of 39 to 23 percent white, which is probably the source of the author's misunderstanding. While this confusion over the difference between percent and percentage points may seem trivial to someone not accustomed to dealing with such numbers, the effect is to render uninterpretable the table analyzing trends in all districts from 1975 through 1980 and the three pages of discussion (pp. 154–56).

A similar problem exists with Buell's explanation of the "Taeuber" and the "Coleman" indices of segregation, both incorrectly labeled and described (pp. 156–57 and n. 17), and with the discussion of aggregate black and white reading achievement and drop-out rates (pp. 157–63), in which there is no acknowledgement of the effect of high socioeconomic status white flight on such indicators. In short, there is no evidence that Buell understands the implications of many of the numerical trends he describes. For those who are familiar with the history and impact of school desegregation in Boston, this book, although well written, has little that is new. For those not familiar with the situation or with social science research methods, it is at times misleading.

CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL
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Educational Policy Making and the Courts: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism *by Michael A. Rebell and Arthur R. Block. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982. 319 pp. $27.50.*

Just Schools: The Idea of Racial Equality in American Education *by David L. Kirp. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. 374 pp. $19.95.*

In an interview with William Trombley, education writer for the *Los Angeles Times*, U.S. District Judge William M. Taylor, Jr. recounted how he had conducted himself in the Dallas school desegregation case. Very close consultation occurred between the court and a middle- and upper-class coalition of businessmen and politicians, the Dallas Alliance. Referring to his personal friend Jack Lowe, an Alliance leader, Judge Taylor told Trombley: "Jack would call me and say 'Mac, we're making progress but slowly. You'll have to give us more time.' I told him the record was open until I said it was closed. There never was any discussion of any specifics, though every once in a while, on the grapevine, I'd get rumors of what they were working on." Judge Taylor adopted the minimalistic Alliance plan in 1976. When the city's two newspapers failed to work up much enthusiasm for the plan, he met with the editors, the result being that they moderated their views.

Curiously, Judge Taylor never appears in the literature of judicial activism, which seems reserved for activists on behalf of desegregation. Non-enthusiasts for desegregation, no matter how spirited their policy intervention, are spared the label "activist."

Rebell and Block search for the substance of judicial activism in sixty-five carefully chosen cases dating from 1970 to 1977 and two pairs of legislative and judicial case studies, one originating in New York, the other in Colorado. Using the principle-policy distinction adumbrated by Ronald Dworkin, the researchers found that judges tended strongly to avoid ruling on policy issues divorced from legal principle. In four out of five cases, they balanced principle and policy, thus contradicting a stereotype of basic refusal to face up to matters of principle.

Most cases were brought by minority plaintiffs, who tended to prevail in 71 percent of the cases. But class certification was granted less than half the time. Judges tended not to encourage parties other than plaintiffs and defendants to litigate. Somewhat over half the cases were brought by public interest attorneys.

Formal discovery techniques were effective in obtaining sufficient evidence, with complex social science data not constituting a serious obstacle to adjudication. Sweeping reform decress were issued only in fifteen of the forty-one cases in which there were remedial orders entered. Compliance with these orders was managed without serious conflict; only four contempt motions were filed in the forty-one cases.

Rebell and Block conclude that in these cases the judges did not compromise the legitimacy of the court function by intruding on the policy realms of the legislature and the executive. The public interest lawyers, they hold, hewed to the basic interests of their clients rather than sailing off in their own direction.

In comparing judicial and legislative handling of social service knowledge, the authors find that "courts appear to be better equipped than legislatures to evaluate social fact evidence systematically and to render analytically reasoned decisions" (Rebell and Block, p. 209). They insist that public criticism of courts in public law cases should be attributed

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not to any peculiar judicial incapacity in such cases, but to the content of the social controversy in which the litigation is imbedded. Rebell and Block conclude that activism increasingly characterizes all three branches of national government, especially since the New Deal.

Students of the subject are much in debt to Rebell and Block for their exploration of activism at the judicial grass roots. Any effects adverse to representative democracy are exceedingly difficult to document other than in debate and in isolated cases. Hereafter, scholarly discussions of the subject will not be able to skirt everyday court practice and process.

If Rebell and Block have not altogether demythologized judicial activism, they have certainly written the best guide yet to the subject. They have paid insufficient attention to the ideological aspects of the controversy over judicial activism. This, however, is the only significant shortcoming of a superior study.

David Kirp's *Just Schools* is a lovingly detailed analysis of school desegregation in five California Bay Area school districts during 1955–80. The districts are San Francisco, Richmond, Berkeley, Sausalito, and Oakland.

At one point Kirp asks: "How can the judiciary reconcile the need to act effectively with the importance of retaining the qualities that distinguish it from the coordinate branches of government?" (Kirp, p. 290). He answers by setting up a goal of "uniform minimum integration" and aims at a geographically uniform policy tied to an objective of enforcing minimum integration regardless of the cause of the initial segregation. In effect, there would be little left for the courts to act on. Remedies would necessarily be weighted toward local conceptions of adequacy, a fact that somewhat troubles Kirp. He does not take a position on judicial activism nor does he seem eager to counteract it. He seeks racial justice through a lessening of mandatory judicial power and a simultaneous strengthening of local decision, including minority participation.

MEYER WEINBERG
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The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left *by Todd Gitlin. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981. 327 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $6.95.*

Almost everyone agrees that the mass media shape the world around us, but few can agree on the extent of its influence or the consequences they have on social and political behavior. The lack of agreement stems more from the elusiveness of the subject matter than from inattention or lack of interest; indeed, in recent years, research on the media has become an academic growth industry. But studying the mass media is a bit like nailing a chiffon pie to the wall—you start out with clear intentions and a seemingly easy task, only to have the results become inconclusive as they slip away.

Todd Gitlin's book is an honest, exceptionally well-written and skillfully researched analysis of the role of the mass media in shaping the conduct of the "New Left" movement in the U.S. during the 1960s and in brokering its message to the public and elites. It

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dissects the dynamic interaction between the media and the movement—their mutual attraction and repulsion, the symbiosis and the ultimate distancing—in what Gitlin calls the "movement-media dance."

Concentrating largely on the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and its offspring, on the one hand, and the *New York Times* and CBS News, on the other, the author first chronicles the evolution of the New Left and then generalizes about the limits of serious organized dissent in the United States. He argues that the news media not only reflect the dominant values in a society but, as organizations functioning in a complex social system, adhere to certain rules and routines that operate to define the newsworthiness of events. These operating realities contribute to the formation of perceptual lenses or "media frames" through which the media view, evaluate and report (or fail to report) events. As a key arbiter and interpreter of events, the media will, in the end, shape, rather than be shaped by, these events.

Drawing upon the writings of Antonio Gramsci, Gitlin posits that the media operate to sustain, protect, and even promote the dominant social values, and thereby manage and massage the message of "deviant" groups such that the media not only distort the intended message but also impel the movement to accommodate to the media's operating procedures. While taking pains to avoid explaining by a single factor the decline of the New Left, Gitlin nonetheless assigns a leading role to the media in undermining the movement. His analysis is sufficiently broad to be of interest to students of politics, sociology, communications, and recent American history. Despite the heavy dose of ideology, the book's contribution to the understanding of American social movements transcends any one intellectual camp.

Methodologically, Gitlin's research draws on an abundance of data, including experience as a participant-observer, but, though logical and convincing, is not systematic. He is methodologically "soft" and empirical, but adroitly avoids empirical overkill. In so doing, he reveals both the limits of research based on personal conviction and its inherent merit.

For all the insight in this volume, the open-minded reader will be troubled by some nagging doubts. If the news media had followed different standards and reported accurately and fairly the message of the New Left (though what is fair and accurate is open to debate), would the movement have been more successful? If the news media were more diverse (as in continental Europe), would the diversity have altered the strategy and tactics of the New Left such that it would have made a different or more lasting imprint on U.S. society? Between the lines of Gitlin's pages are the unwritten questions: Why didn't they listen? Why didn't they understand? These are legitimate and important questions to ask, but individuals from all organizations having definable goals will ask the same questions of the media over and over again. This, too, is an index of the media's influence. The questions transcend politically deviant groups.

ANDREW K. SEMMEL
U.S. Department of Defense

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Harold L. Ickes: The Aggressive Progressive, 1874–1933 *by Linda J. Lear. New York, Garland Publishing, 1981. 452 pages. $55.00.*

In most nations, the Ministry of the Interior, with its responsibility for internal security and the national police, is a powerful and intimidating organization. In the United States, the Department of the Interior, confined as it is to natural resources and the public domain, seems in contrast relatively innocuous. Able men have nevertheless held the job and ably defended (or in the current administration betrayed) the departmental charter. But only one secretary of the interior has had the energy, self-confidence, breadth of interest, and voracity of appetite to reach out for larger powers and to impose himself on larger issues. This was Harold I. Ickes of Illinois.

Ickes, who served longer than anyone else as secretary of the interior, came to the job rather fortuitously at the age of fifty-nine after a lifetime of political combat and frustration in Illinois. In this volume, Linda J. Lear provides an intelligent, sensitive, and carefully researched account of these first fifty-nine years. Her purpose is to show how his Illinois background prepared Ickes for his flamboyant career in Washington and how it explains his indignant, truculent, self-righteous brand of American progressivism.

His mother died when Ickes was sixteen. Ignored by a shiftless father, the boy was passed on to relatives who encouraged his passion for education. He worked his way through the University of Chicago, subsisting at times (or so he later claimed) on 15 cents worth of fried ham a day. After an interval as a newspaperman, he plunged into Chicago reform politics. Later he took a law degree, but legal practice was always secondary to his role as a political organizer.

These hard early years bred in Ickes an emotional identification with the underdog and a deep resentment of all who opposed his crusades and his ambitions. Born in poverty, he married into wealth; but, though he settled comfortably into a North Shore estate, a chauffeur-driven limousine, and the freedom to pursue his political causes, his perpetual sense of grievance remained unassuaged. Since he never had had a real father, Ickes was always, Lear persuasively suggests, in search of heroes as father-substitutes. He found them successively in Theodore Roosevelt, Hiram Johnson and finally, though Franklin Roosevelt was in fact eight years younger, in the president he served so ably for twelve years in Washington.

Lear confronts her subject with a discriminating mixture of respect and skepticism. She has a firm grasp on the paradoxes of Ickes's character, that singular blend of idealism and vindictiveness, of rectitude and ruthlessness, of compassion and paranoia. She is perhaps less convincing in portraying Ickes as a Bull Moose progressive adrift in more complicated times—a man who, in spite of his bellicose rhetoric, was essentially conservative in his conviction that there was nothing wrong with the system that an honest government and an honest press could not cure. This account may not, however, explain Ickes's close New Deal association with planners like R. G. Tugwell. In any event, scholars will look forward to the projected sequel on Ickes in Washington.

This volume is a photographic reproduction, with a 1980 preface, of a substantially unrevised doctoral dissertation of the early 1970s. One wishes that the author could have amplified the dissertation in the light of later scholarship and eliminated the excessive number of grammatical and typographical errors. Still, one must be grateful to Garland

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Press for making this useful and interesting work accessible to a larger audience, though the price may well discourage non-institutional buyers.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy *by David M. Oshinsky. New York, Free Press, 1983. 597 pp. $19.95.*

The spirit of Joseph R. McCarthy lingers on. Much as the junior senator from Wisconsin dominated national politics and the media during the 1950s, his political career continues to fascinate and command the interest of students of post-1945 American politics seeking to understand the origins of what came to be called McCarthyism. His abbreviated but contentious impact on national politics, and the bitter rancor precipitated by his often-irresponsible charges, inevitably influenced how contemporaries and the first generation of historical researchers appraised his life and times. They were either uncritically adulatory or bitterly denunciatory. The passage of time combined with the greater availability of primary source materials, however, has given rise to more dispassionate and objective studies—among these, David Oshinsky's recently published biography. Ably written, thoroughly grounded in the published studies on the senator's life and times, this essentially derivative biography recaptures the time and setting of McCarthy's brief period of major national political influence. As biography, it commands attention and admiration.

Yet, this is both a disappointing and a deficient study, principally because it provides no new insights or understanding of the McCarthyite phenomenon. These failures in turn stem from Oshinsky's obsessive fixation on the tactics and antics of the senator and the author's failure to research and understand the broader institutional and political developments pertaining to the general issue of internal security in the post-1945 period. Most surprisingly, Oshinsky fails to review the admittedly murky, covert, and episodic relationship between McCarthy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during the 1950s, and the antecedents and relationship of this particular effort to bureau officials' earlier, more ambitious, and ultimately successful attempts to influence American politics and priorities.

As early as February 1946, FBI officials had initiated an "educational campaign," which included covert collaboration with the House Committee on Un-American Activities, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (in this case with the formal approval of Attorneys General J. Howard McGrath and Herbert Brownell), state governors and local police officials, the American Legion, and a carefully selected group of conservative columnists, reporters, and activists (such as former Republican President Herbert Hoover). Oshinsky, moreover, fails to survey the enveloping internal security programs and procedures of the period. While sketchily discussing the initiation of federal loyalty and security programs, he apparently has not read the most recent literature on internal security policy based on recently declassified documents. In consequence, not only is he ignorant of the background to the January 1951 FBI memorandum that surfaced at the Fort Monmouth hearings, but he is unaware that federal preventive detention programs

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predated the Internal Security Act of 1950. He amazingly concludes that cold war passions waned with the Korean War truce (despite the fact that the mid-1950s witnessed FBI officials' decision to initiate the now-infamous COINTELPROS and to Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] officials' decisions to initiate a mail intercept program and to share their findings with the FBI). To see McCarthy as an evil genius and an adept practitioner of media politics is to reveal a disturbing ignorance of the broader and less personal forces transforming American politics after 1945. In contrast to the myopia of the 1950s, scholars of the 1980s should have a fuller understanding of the dynamics precipitating the McCarthyite phenomenon.

Because of its thoroughness as biography and the author's ability to understand and not judge his subject, Oshinsky's monograph will serve as a useful beginning for students seeking a fuller understanding of post-1945 American politics. It may be hoped that new research will be more broadly conceptualized, focusing on the forest and not the trees. Such a study is long needed.

ATHAN G. THEOHARIS
Marquette University

Legislature: California's School for Politics *by William K. Muir, Jr. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983. 219 pp. $19.00.*

Muir has written an extraordinarily thoughtful and provocative book about the California legislature. His theme, that "legislative institutions in a free society must teach their members to govern well" (p. 2), is drawn from the writing of both James Madison and John Stuart Mill. According to Muir, "the California legislature was organized to provide a first-rate political education and to discipline legislators to work hard in exchange for it" (p. 180). This theme is followed consistently throughout the book, as the author examines the committee system, the norms of bill-authoring and specialization, the importance attached to acquiring and sharing knowledge, the use of staff, and the role of political leadership.

Most books on state legislatures are critical studies that describe flaws and prescribe reform. This is an admiring study that seeks to explain why the California legislature works so well and that warns of the risks of trying to implement further reforms. More specifically, it is a study of the California legislature during the 1975–76 period, its "golden age" (p. 10) before the legislature was shaken by intra-party warfare and burdened by financial crisis.

The book admirably describes how a number of legislative norms develop and flourish, and in particular it provides an excellent analysis of the norm of reciprocity. It explains how a system works in which legislators have considerable freedom to initiate bills, plan legislative strategy, and negotiate compromises without strong partisan restraints. There are valuable insights into the use that legislators make of staff and of lobbyists. Scattered throughout the book are well-chosen, perceptive quotations from legislators. Many of the themes in the book are pertinent to all or most of the state legislatures in the United States.

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Muir argues that the success of the California legislature depends heavily on the willingness of most members to work hard at their job, and he seeks to explain this willingness. The explanation is not political; reelection depends on faithful constituency service, not on brilliant legislative performance. He writes: "The fear of being defeated at the polls did not effectively goad legislators into doing their committee work well, carrying complicated legislation, or specializing" (p. 105). What, then, are the characteristics of the California legislature that inspired members to become conscientious, effective lawmakers, and are these characteristics that could be duplicated in other states?

One characteristic is the excellent staff system, since "the legislature had created support systems that made the attainment of knowledge extremely easy and inexpensive" (p. 111). While the California staff support is extraordinary, bigger and better staffs are within the grasp of any legislature. Muir also believes that "California legislators desired knowledge and were willing to work hard to get it because they had adopted the vocation of politics. They were by ambition and by circumstance professional politicians" (p. 116). If Muir is correct, this conclusion raises serious questions about the potential for excellence of legislatures made up of part-time, citizen members. A third explanation for the California legislature's success is its restrained level of partisanship and party discipline. He argues that any effort to strengthen party discipline in California would destroy the members' incentives to become knowledgeable and effective. While it is difficult to judge the validity of this argument (because Muir devotes little attention to the role that parties now play in the legislature), it does raise questions about the quality of legislators' performance that can be expected in strongly partisan legislatures. Like any good book, the questions that this study raises are as valuable as the information and insights that it presents.

MALCOLM E. JEWELL
University of Kentucky

Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 *by Doug McAdam. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982. 304 pp. $25.00.*
The State Against Blacks *by Walter E. Williams. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1982. 183 pp. $14.95.*

Both of these books are the products of distinct orientations. McAdam's work deals with political behavior and the structural factors that shape it. Williams's analysis concerns the link between the intent and consequences of public policy.

For whatever reasons, either because of the different sets of substantive issues the authors discuss or because of the authors' own personal preferences, the works mirror the ideological polarization found in current discussions of race politics and race policy. McAdam displays a decided sympathy for the radicalism of his subjects, while Williams writes in a conservative vein regarding employment and business regulation policies.

The differences between these two works do not end with the matter of ideological preference. In McAdam's book, the substance and complexity of his arguments, as well

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as his empirical rigor, merit extensive comment. In Williams's book, his lack of theoretical sophistication and conclusive supporting evidence proves to be a major liability.

McAdam's primary concern is theoretical. He is disturbed by the failure of social theorists to come to terms adequately with the civil rights revolution, particularly during the early 1960s. When the civil rights movement then hit its full stride, theorists, as McAdam points out, found themselves confronted with a social movement that their models did not enable them to explain. Equipped only with the analytical tools at hand, some theorists were content to regard the civil rights movement as a mere manifestation of a psychological disposition, namely alienation. Others were ready to attribute its appearance to the intervention of enlightened elites. To explain this state of affairs, McAdam singles out the pluralist-elite controversy, which for the sake of maintaining the consistency of the respective positions denied any suggestion of an independent existence for the civil rights movement, and hence devalued the importance and subtlety in studying this phenomenon.

McAdam's aim is to rectify these shortcomings. He attempts to do this by constructing a theoretical model that takes into account those key features of the civil rights movement overlooked by other theorists. McAdam's model lays out a dynamic in which the autonomous evolution of the movement takes place against the challenges and impact of political institutions and social forces.

McAdam's model allows him to make several perceptive comments concerning the development of black protest. For instance, he is able to link the growth of the black urban churches in the South and southern black universities with the creation of black protest organizations. These institutions generally receive less than their due in the literature, but McAdam skillfully brings to light their significance as factors that provided the structural basis for black protest. McAdam, moreover, draws attention to the need to reassess the psychological disposition of protesters. In fact, he stands the mass mobilization theorists on their heads. McAdam points out that the protesters' shared sense of efficacy and confidence provided one of the most important resources for a movement attempting to challenge as thoroughgoing and rigid a system of social control as Jim Crow segregation.

McAdam's larger contribution, however, is his tying together in a systematic and comprehensive fashion the vast array of variables that have shaped black protest in the twentieth century. Students of black politics and social movements will find in his work a clear and detailed model of the evolution and dynamics of black protest.

Nevertheless, McAdam's work is not without its limitations. Although its design is elegant, McAdam's model is basically confined to a specific case. As a result, whole classes of movements and issues do not fit into it. This becomes a problem at a crude level of definition. McAdam's indistinguishable use of the terms "insurgency," "movement," and "protest" might be appropriate in a discussion of black protest, but it may be less so when talking about a wide range of social movements. Moreover, McAdam's discussion of the decline of the civil rights movement might have been more tightly argued. While he properly attributes much of this decline to governmental repression and inter-organizational competition for finances, he neglects an issue that might as well have had an impact. Robert Michels's "Iron Law of Oligarchy" might have received attention in this regard. Some may also want to question McAdam's inferences regarding the function of the collective violence, which had taken hold in the movement by the late 1960s.

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The arguments put forward by Walter Williams are familiar, and were stated by Edward Banfield in *Unheavenly City*, published over a decade ago. Those who found Banfield's arguments persuasive will probably find room to be sympathetic toward Williams's discussion. Williams perhaps does a service by pointing out the entrepreneurial potential of blacks. On the whole, however, he fails to carry the conservative perspective on race policy much beyond Banfield's earlier attempts.

Williams, in fact, inspires little confidence in his being in full command of his subject. Consequently, his observations appear to be misinformed impressions or at best a narrow but not entirely casual presentation of highly polemical views. For example, one of Williams central theses is that many ethnic groups have overcome economic disadvantages and discrimination without relying on the power or protection of the state. The conclusion that follows is that blacks should follow suit and reorder collective goals away from political to economic ones. However, Williams simply ignores the experience of ethnic groups whose "American success" was achieved largely through the state. The formation of urban political machines is by Irish immigrants one obvious counter-example to Williams's thesis.

If there is a case to be made for less government intervention in race relations and a reordering of black collective goals to stimulate black entrepreneurial achievement, Williams could have enhanced the plausibility of this position by providing a more careful reading of sources and a fuller range of complexity in his argument. As it stands, his work offers less than the kind of rigorous analysis on which public policy should be based.

MICHAEL MITCHELL
Princeton University

Hearts and Minds: The Anatomy of Racism from Roosevelt to Reagan *by Harry S. Ashmore. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1982. 512 pp. $15.95.*

Harry S. Ashmore was one of those people rarely found in the South after World War II—a white liberal who promoted civil rights for blacks and fought against racism. Now, thirty-five years later, he tells the story of his involvement in the civil rights struggle, recounting both the successes and failures in American race relations from the 1940s to 1982. His work is an autobiographical account of a native son, with a boyhood in South Carolina and a career as a premier journalist on newspapers in South Carolina and Arkansas, who later goes on to a career in the North, working for the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Los Angeles Times*, *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and the Center For The Study of Democratic Institutions. The author of seven books, he was also the recipient of a Pulitizer Prize as editor of the *Arkansas Gazette* for his courageous stand against Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas and the White Citizens Council during the Little Rock school controversy of 1957–58.

Ashmore's book presents the frame of mind of the South at the time of World War II. The Jim Crow South started to move slowly toward change in the 1940s. The author describes the Dixiecrat campaign of Strom Thurmond in 1948 and the background plan-

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ning of the National Association For the Advancement of Colored People in its fight against school segregation. As late as 1952, however, the race question was not a central issue in the presidential campaign. The Supreme Court decision in *Brown* v. *Board of Education* (1954) had a revolutionary effect, and Ashmore gives Chief Justice Earl Warren much of the credit for unifying the Court behind the school integration decision.

The Brown case triggered a sharp counter-reaction in the South, with White Citizens Councils forming and pledging "massive resistance," and southern members of Congress signing a Southern Manifesto of defiance. Ashmore faults President Dwight D. Eisenhower for his failure to back the Court decision publicly, thereby encouraging opposition to develop. Eisenhower took a strong stand and finally intervened during the Little Rock affair, only after Governor Faubus refused to enforce a federal court order to integrate. Ashmore's account of the episode, in which both he and his newspaper, the *Arkansas Gazette*, were so intimately involved, is compelling and is one of the best parts of the book.

Another major strength of Ashmore's work is his portrayal of major black and white leaders and his discussion of the civil rights organizations that had an effect on developments. All of the major events and participants are covered, including the Montgomery bus boycott, the lunch counter sit-ins, the Freedom Riders, the federal intervention at the state universities of Mississippi and Alabama, and the Birmingham and Selma demonstrations. He also examines the northern racial situation and declares his belief that the South has come to greater acceptance of racial change than the North. President John F. Kennedy's commitment to civil rights is described as intellectual, while President Lyndon B. Johnson is applauded for his "gut" commitment.

Ashmore recounts with a tinge of sadness the radicalization of the civil rights movement with the rise of the Black Power advocates and the disastrous race riots that caused a white backlash. He describes with regret the lessened civil rights enforcement since Johnson left the White House and condemns the reversal in race relations that he sees developing under President Ronald Reagan.

Ashmore's book is a well-written, perceptive account of a subject that cannot be ignored. It is a work that belongs in every library and should be of great use to both historians and political scientists.

RONALD L. FEINMAN
New York Institute of Technology, Old Westbury

The Baby Boom Generation and the Economy *by Louise B. Russell. Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1982. 183 pp. Cloth, $19.95; paper, $7.95.*

The long-run trend in fertility in the United States has been downward, except for the rise during and after World War II. The crude birth rate declined steadily from about 55 per thousand in 1820 to 18 or 19 per thousand in the 1930s. A reversal began in the 1940s and continued into the following decade, with the birth rate reaching 25.0 in 1955. By 1970 the rate had returned to its Great Depression levels; since then it has fallen even lower.

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The result has been the "baby boom" generation—the swollen segment of the population born in the nineteen-year period 1946 through 1964.

In a painstaking and thorough analysis, Louise Russell addresses three interrelated questions in this volume: whether the baby boom generation has suffered economically as the result of its size; how, if at all, the baby boom has affected the economy; and whether the changes in the age structure of the population are helpful in predicting economic change.

The first institution to feel the effects of the baby boom was the school system. Public school enrollment doubled between 1946 and 1972, but not only as the result of increased numbers of young persons. Enrollment rates increased as well. Qualitative improvements also occurred, at least as measured by real resources per enrolled student. As a result, far from suffering educationally because of its size, the baby boom generation did better than its predecessors. As it flooded the labor market, however, its experiences were less favorable. Russell estimates that the cohort contributed between one-half and one percentage point to the higher unemployment rates of the 1970s. Moreover, although she emphasizes ambiguities in the data, she acknowledges (almost reluctantly) that its disproportionate numbers probably led the baby boom generation to experience relatively worse employment and earnings records than had been enjoyed by previous cohorts of labor market entrants.

The author finds that the interrelations between the baby room generation and the housing market have been less pronounced than generally supposed. While an important factor, the baby boom generation has not been the "main force driving the housing market of the 1970s" (p. 126). At the same time, despite high housing prices and mortgage rates, the true cost of home ownership dropped in the 1970s, and home ownership rose rapidly among young adults. Russell admits, however, that younger members of the generation may be less fortunate, since real costs of home ownership rose rapidly after 1979.

In her discussion of the costs of providing health care and pensions for the baby boom generation as it reaches retirement age, Russell is appropriately cautious, but ventures the judgment that the cohort will continue to do "reasonably well" (p. 165). She estimates rates of return on social security taxes and finds them to be positive, not only for the baby boom generation but, what is more significant, for the following (smaller) generations. Her ensuing discussion of inter-generational equity is particularly interesting. She observes that the higher social security taxes paid by a small cohort to finance the retirement of a larger cohort may be viewed as compensation for the relatively lower wages of the latter resulting from its larger size. In sum, Russell concludes that "the baby boom generation has not been unlucky because of its size" (p. 166); that it has rarely played a dominant role in affecting the economy; and that, accordingly, age structure is only a "limited guide to the future" (p. 171).

The volume brings together a large amount of valuable data. It is closely reasoned and yields a number of conclusions that are far from obvious. Finally, it is largely free of jargon, and should thus be appealing not only to economists but to other social scientists as well.

HERBERT S. PARNES
Ohio State University

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State Supreme Courts: Policymakers in the Federal System *edited by Mary Cornelia Porter and G. Alan Tarr. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1982. 221 pp. $29.95.*

The editors of this volume bring together an assortment of essays that examine several dimensions of policymaking undertaken by the state supreme courts. An introductory chapter prefaces the concerns of this book, and an excellent and very handy bibliographic essay concludes it. The eight substantive articles in between explore a range of issues including the common law of torts, state judicial administration, exclusionary zoning cases, compliance with directives from the United States Supreme Court, and other interesting matters. The book is well constructed and should command a wide reading, especially among those who recognize that federal courts hold no monopoly of judge-made law.

The force impelling the increased scholarly attention to state courts and judges, Porter suggests, has been "the advent of the Burger Court" (p. 3). The supposition is that restrictive policies of the Burger Court have generated increased state court policymaking in favor of individual rights and liberties. There are some basic problems with this premise. First, there are really no systematic data at present to support the assertion that state court creativity, beyond that of the federal courts, is relatively new. In fact, as Tarr writes in opening his bibliographic essay: "Before the 1970s scholarly interest in state supreme court policymaking was almost nonexistent" (p. 201). Moreover, one of the articles in this very volume—the Lawrence Baum and Bradley C. Canon piece on tort law—recounts dramatic changes in this field well before the "advent" of the Warren Court. A second difficulty is whether the Burger Court has been as restrictive as the premise presumes. This Court undoubtedly has been determined, particularly between 1972 and 1976, to undermine Warren Court extensions of the rights of the criminally accused. But in other ways, the Burger Court has been more daring than its predecessor—for example, in its leading the way in dismantling sex discrimination laws in the country. A third problem is that one does do not know from this volume the extent of state court policymaking that rejects libertarianism. (The pre-1937 policies of the United States Supreme Court refute any assumption that activism is the preserve of libertarian judges.) That is, by focusing on the libertarian advances made by state courts beyond Burger Court policy, one may blind oneself to the possibility that conservative state courts may interpret "the advent of the Burger Court" as a welcome relief.

A different, though important, problem also permeates this collection of essays. Four of the eight substantive articles contain either "activist" or "activism" in their titles. It is obvious that Porter unhesitatingly defines activism as libertarian doctrine, and this seems to be the presupposition diffused throughout the volume. Again, activism is not confined to liberals (as the Supreme Court's *National League of Cities* v. *Usery* [1976] more than indicates). Given the theme of this book, a liberal court could never escape the charge of activism, even if the constitution it may be interpreting is literally infested with the libertarian creed.

Despite these criticisms, the book stands well as a valuable addition to the relatively neglected area of the field. Its essays are informative (ranging from traditional descriptive research to sophisticated quantitative methodology), and they are well written and comprehensive. Furthermore, the rich diversity of its coverage does not diminish the excellent

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organizational structure of the volume. The editors have produced a solid whole, the discernible scholarship of which clearly outranks its limitations.

JAMES MAGEE
University of Delaware

Poor People's Lawyers in Transition *by Jack Katz. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1982. 273 pp. $25.00.*

In this account of one hundred years of legal aid to the poor, lawyers are both motivated by and out of sync with the broader social movements around them. The organized legal profession began providing free assistance to the needy during the Progressive Era. Consistent with the muckraking style of that time, early legal aid lawyers (privately financed by bar associations and community chests) were active in "publicizing outrageous conditions, drafting legislation, coordinating political support, and mounting lobbying campaigns" (p. 36). Once the Progressive movement lost momentum, legal assistance lawyers turned toward "passive advocacy and the profession of social work to help what was often seen as a psychologically weak clientele" (p. 50). This counseling orientation, prevalent among legal aid attorneys after 1920, made them surprisingly quiet during the 1930s, when other middle class reformers again took up the cause of the poor.

The War on Poverty made legal aid a public function. From 1965 on, the Legal Services program took over and increased the funding of most of the existing legal aid societies, established several hundred new poverty law firms, and changed the orientation of the profession toward providing for the poor. The radical milieu of the 1960s fostered interest in decentralized delivery, client participation, and group "empowerment." Yet, Katz argues, the activist social milieu hampered as much as it aided the work of poverty lawyers. By the 1970s, the problems posed to lawyers by community control and group involvement were manifest; client group representatives used their influence to secure patronage positions for their neighborhoods, while lawyers who tried to work closely with poor people's groups found themselves caught in internecine battles. Lawyers resolved these tensions by being more exclusively attentive to litigation. This solution met several professional needs of the poverty lawyers in a way community control and group work never could: they could get valued court experience; impress their superiors and peers; and make themselves indispensable to clients.

Problems emerge when Katz attempts to evaluate the significance of litigation efforts on behalf of poor people: "reform activities increasingly appeared to have less success in eliminating poverty than in legalizing the state's definition, organization, and maintenance of the poor as a segregated economic class. . . . (p. 8). The tenor of the times increasingly worked against them: "Throughout the seventies, poverty lawyers did not change their litigation objectives, but the structural implications of their reform role changed as the tenor of times became progressively more conservative. . . ." (p. 12). He implies that if the radical themes of the War on Poverty had reinforced litigation strategies rather than diverting Legal Services lawyers from them and if litigation had coincided with a congenial social environment, more could have been done to combat

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poverty during the 1960s. The evidence, however, does not support this. In the late 1960s, the Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law, a Legal Services back-up center, brought to the Supreme Court several cases that strengthened due process for welfare recipients, ended residency requirements, and struck down man-in-the-house rules. The Court stopped short of reading a "right to welfare" into the Constitution in *Dandridge* v. *Williams* (1970). Without this protection, it was only a matter of time before state legislatures enacted more restrictive laws governing welfare eligibility and grant size.

In the 1960s and again in the 1970s, legal strategies on behalf of the poor ran up against the will of the legislature. Legal strategies to change social conditions are limited for many reasons, among them that legal rules represent social choices. That poverty law litigation served to reinforce the way the welfare system treats the poor should not be surprising. What else could be expected in a polity that disperses aid to the poor as a segregated, means-tested group?

This book should be read for its historical perspective on lawyer interest in the poor, its attention to the relationship between broad reform movements and the narrower ones that arise in the organized professions, and especially for its discussion of the role of career incentives in dictating organizational goals. Evaluation of the significance of lawyer efforts to improve the lot of the poor, however, must await accounts that start from more realistic expectations about the role of legal remedies in achieving social justice.

BETH RUBENSTEIN
Harvard University

Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role of the Supreme Court *by Arthur Selwyn Miller. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1982. 355 pp. $29.95.*

Compounding a mélange of constitutional law and history, jurisprudence, and political and economic theory, Arthur Selwyn Miller has written a rambling and discussive volume, with some inner contradictions, on American constitutional law and the role of the Supreme Court in the past, present, and future. His avowed aim is to advocate "an . . . unabashed proposal for greater judicial 'activism' " (p. xi) and to defend modern judicial intervention (p. 6). In so doing, he calls to the Supreme Court in clarion tones to be more active in the enhancement of human dignity and in doing justice, both of which he prudently does not attempt to define. First, he attacks the hoary myth, exposed in the 1920s and 1930s by the school of legal realism, of a Rule of Law, consisting of neutral principles impartially applied (pp. 8, 80, 109). In discussing the mythology of the Court and its history, he proceeds to smash other icons in the ritual of constitutional adjudication. First, the Supreme Court does not find or declare law, but makes it. Second, the Constitution and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it are now, always have been, and presumably, always will be, instruments of the ruling class, of the rich and the powerful (pp. 47, 480). John Marshall's great opinions, which Miller calls arrogant, are so regarded, although the author is unaware that Marshall's great opinion in the Steamboat

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case went against the vested interests of the Livingstone and Fulton monopoly. The same has been true since the Court under Roger Taney, the post-Civil War Court, and after 1937 to the present. Apparent deviations by the Court after 1937 are dismissed as siphoning off the discontent of the masses to the benefit of the ruling class (pp. 8, 18, 80)—a role that, in Miller's view, the Court must pursue more vigorously. Legalism and legal education fare poorly in what is being done now and what must be done in the future. Legal education is "a legalized form of brain damage" (p. 24), and law schools "are in large part service stations for corporations and government" (p. 282), uninterested in teaching justice or ethics.

Miller argues that considering a declining economy, an increasing ecological gap, and a growing underclass of the deprived, the Court should fashion a Constitution of Human Needs (p. 145) and should not be exclusively composed of lawyers. It should convert itself into a Council of State after the pattern of the Council of Revision, discussed but not adopted in the Convention of 1787 (p. 297). As such, it should cast off its self-imposed restrictions like the ban on advisory opinions and political questions and relax the rules governing "Cases and Controversies." Then the Court could assume a crucial and positive role in politics and government, advance justice, and enhance human dignity (still undefined). To the anticipated objection that his proposal is undemocratic, Miller's response is that the whole of the American political system is undemocratic and that what is required in a democracy is the enhancement of human dignity and the pursuit of justice. To believe that Miller's proposal is even a partial solution to the political and social ills of the republic requires a great leap in faith. Certainly, Miller is correct in pointing to the internal perils that confront this country and with a vast show of learning he makes his case and paradoxically presents himself as an unbelieving believer, not to say an unbiased advocate. But such a presentation hardly makes a significant contribution to the study of Constitutional law.

ROBERT J. HARRIS
University of Virginia

Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand *by Peter Reuter. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1983. 233 pp. $17.50.*

Reuter's book is what a scholarly treatise applying economic theory to an important criminological area should be. It relies consistently on a theoretical model—industrial organizational analysis—that it tests against data. It is modest with respect to claims, and stimulating. It is critical of orthodox institutional beliefs, practices, and personnel. The book offers arguments for revisions in policy, concepts, and practice.

The author infers the structure and functioning of three illicit industries in New York City—bookmaking, numbers, and loansharking. He asks thematic questions: what role does violence play? Is there a monopolistic coercive role that the Mafia plays? He considers what entrepreneurs, employees, and customers do (or might do), and the impact of the police. He concludes that the industries examined are not monopolistic, and that they demonstrate considerable internal variability among small, fragmented business units.

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Durability, profitability, resources, participants' nature and relationships, management competence, and clientele differ. There is no golden goose. Market forces account for far more in real practice than does violence. The Mafia exists but has as its function—because of its reputation and durability—that of arbiter of disputes. The Mafia has other public uses, such as entertainment by the media, self-justifying publicity for law enforcement (and by implication for legislators relying on the police), and, in the public mind, fear. Reuter argues that illegal markets are important, but must be conceptually differentiated from myths about "organized crime." It is to the former that he would have us direct our research, policing, and policy attention.

Reuter is critical of the police, their intelligence data, and their lack of relevant skills and perspective. The secretiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and quixotic targetings by enforcement groups are challenged. He doubts that gambling enforcement pays off.

What might be criticized? A data base derived from seven informants (one, apparently, exceptional), four police specialists and their private files, some wiretap affadavits, and raid-confiscated records may not satisfy field-work oriented criminologists. Reuter seems not sufficiently read in the criminological literature. The narrow economic rationalist's assumption that criminals act in conformity with their models, given the evidence for psychopathology, non-monetary motivations, and awareness that most are far from being profit-optimizing planners may also jar. When Reuter reaches a conclusion about the prevalence of violence in that real world (he does not utilize or present statistics of any kind) derived from abstract economic reasoning, saying, "these two lines of argument seem to solve the problem quite comfortably" (p. 135), it might drive those already suspicious of academic economics quite raving mad.

Reuter asserts that what scholars are doing at this stage regarding studies of the illicit marketplace is "natural history." If this is so, we cannot yet know if Reuter better describes the proverbial elephant. What he proposes is consonant with field work data, as for example on drug dealers, which does rely on large samples. Reuter is clearly thinking hard, specifically, and provocatively. His focused approach is capable of integration with other methodologies. My intuition tells me that he is on the money.

RICHARD BLUM
American Lives Endowment

Corporate Liberalism: The Origins of Modern American Political Theory, 1890–1920 *by R. Jeffrey Lustig. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. 357 pp. $25.00.*

During the last twenty years, many historians have interpreted the transformation of American society that occurred at the beginning of this century in terms of the rise of corporate power. Gabriel Kolko, James Weinstein, and others have described the corporate reorganization of the economy and the influence of corporate leadership on government.

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In this book, R. Jeffrey Lustig analyzes how the rise of the corporation transformed American political thought.

Lustig's thesis is that the "classical liberalism" that dominated political thought in the nineteenth century was redefined between 1890 and 1920 in ways that legitimized corporate power. Classical liberalism defined its political order in terms of the exercise and preservation of individual rights. This included a strong commitment to private property.

But for early American liberals, property was important because it *was* private, in the sense of being owned by individuals. The ownership of property was an important source of individual autonomy. The liberal state was an aggregation of individuals, all pursuing their interests while respecting the rights of others.

Committed to a theory that viewed the individual as the basis of all political and economic life, Lustig argues, nineteenth-century liberals were uncertain about how to respond to the rise of corporations as an increasingly important form of enterprise. The corporation had long been seen as an unusual combination of individual interests, authorized by the state only under special circumstances.

But as corporations proliferated, liberals had to confront questions about just what corporate powers should be permitted, and which practices proscribed, as well as about relationships among individuals, corporations, and the state. "Faced with such questions," Lustig says, "classic American liberalism fractured."

The dominant liberal response, Lustig argues, was one that redefined the corporation, rather than the individual, as the basic unit of society. The courts began to see the corporation as a "person," and to endow it with all the rights individuals were said to enjoy under classical liberalism. The power that corporations exercised over individuals was as legitimate—indeed, as a form of "property" that the state should protect.

Borrowing from European theories about the role of groups in society, liberals began to treat the corporation as a "group" representing its "members," and to insist on the essential unity of interest between capital and labor. Political scientists also justified corporate dominance. Arthur F. Bentley and other early pluralists rejected the classical view that politics should be guided by "natural law," and argued that government was simply a process of balancing conflicting interests. This view implicitly legitimized the dominant position of whatever interests happened to be strongest.

While much of Lustig's argument is persuasive, he tends to oversimplify the diverse political forces that ultimately became part of the twentieth century "liberal consensus." As John Buenker and other historians have demonstrated, "welfare state liberalism" had different political origins and a different constituency from the "corporate liberalism" Lustig describes. Leaders like Robert Wagner and Frances Perkins may not have challenged the corporate order. But they had a very different view of the place of workers in that order, and of the state's role in protecting workers' interests.

A focus on political theory tends to understate the difference between these two political forces. The welfare state liberals were mostly practical politicians. They had no Herbert Croly to articulate their philosophy. Lustig therefore tends to miss some of the tensions between them and the corporate liberals. Only with the coming of the New Deal were these two forms of liberalism fused.

Nevertheless, this book will be extremely useful for those who seek to understand the

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intellectual and ideological underpinnings of modern American politics. The philosophy it describes is still shaping public policy decisions, from the Chrysler loan guarantees to the Job Training Partnership Act, and it is still enormously powerful.

HUGH O'NEILL
Office of the Governor, State of New York

The Political Economy of the Welfare State *by Thomas Wilson and Dorothy J. Wilson. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1982. 223 pp. Cloth, $29.50; paper, $12.95.*

This book presents an economic analysis of a number of welfare state programs at a level appropriate for students of public administration and social welfare who do not have a strong background in economics. I had originally thought that it was going to present a neo-Marxist analysis in the tradition of Ian Gough's *The Political Economy of the Welfare State*, but I was wrong. The term "political economy" is not being used to imply a neo-Marxist analysis. Some comparative reference is made to programs and policies in the United States and in various European countries on the Continent, but the focus is on programs in Britain.

The authors deal primarily with three categories of welfare state programs: cash transfer programs (such as retirement pensions, sickness and maternity benefits, unemployment benefits, industrial injury benefits, assistance with housing costs, family income supplements for working families with very low incomes, and benefits for the disabled); health care; and personal services (such as services for children, the elderly, and the handicapped). The only major sector of the welfare state that is not considered in any detail is education.

In the first chapter, the authors discuss what they mean by the term "welfare state" and in their definition refer to programs that provide "benefits in cash or in kind to identifiable individuals which can not be regarded as payments for current contributions to national output" (p. 4). The reference to "identifiable individuals" in this definition is to differentiate welfare state programs from others, such as national defense that provide "public goods" in the sense that it is impossible to exclude certain individuals from the benefits conferred. They do not mean to exclude such "quasi-public goods" as government-financed health services or educational services.

The authors point out that for some years prior to the recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s, social programs were growing faster than the increase in the gross national product (GNP), a condition that could not go on indefinitely. They argue that one positive effect of the long recession is that it made it possible for the first time carefully to scrutinize a number of programs that had formerly been considered sacred cows. While some cuts were made and changes proposed, it is clear to the authors that no serious analysts are proposing that Britain dismantle its welfare state.

The book concludes with a number of policy recommendations. For example, the authors consider whether Britain should shift from its National Health Service approach to the national health insurance approach that is common on the Continent. They do not

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come out in favor of a wholesale shift, but they do support the expansion of medical insurance alongside the existing National Health Service. In this context they mention that it might be wise to start charging for some services, such as consultations with a general practitioner. Thus, the authors are at least willing to consider seriously the reintroduction of differences in health services based on economic status, a violation of egalitarian ideas that they are aware will be opposed by many.

Looking beyond the current recession, the authors anticipate that unemployment will continue to be problematic. One suggestion for dealing with the problem is to allow people to start collecting old age pensions at age 55. They also present an extended discussion of the negative income tax. They do not see it as a feasible replacement for social insurance in general, but they do feel that it might be used to replace certain programs, such as supplementary benefits and short-term insurance benefits.

This book is clearly written and well organized. It will be particularly useful for those who want to find out about the various welfare state programs in Britain. However, the book is written primarily for British students of social administration. The first author is an economist and the second author is a lecturer in social administration and social work. The book does not attempt to make any major theoretical or empirical contributions.

JOHN B. WILLIAMSON
Boston College

Woman-Battering: Victims and Their Experiences *by Mildred Daley Pagelow. Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1981. 287 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $12.50.*

Mildred Pagelow, a sociologist, has produced the most thorough and thoughtful volume on woman-battering that I have yet encountered. Her lengthy and well-documented book critiques most current sociological and some psychological studies on the subject and proceeds to an evaluation of her own detailed study. Yet Pagelow is strongest when describing individual encounters with victims and examining societal response to their struggles. Pagelow's insight and non-judgmental sensitivity to her subjects' stories make for particularly refreshing reading on a subject that has received overly simplistic treatment in much of the popular and professional literature.

Pagelow focuses her analysis on the major propositions of her field study, in which she suggests a positive correlation between limited resources and "negative institutional response," and between traditional values and a woman's propensity to remain in a violent relationship without seeking to effect positive change. These propositions serve as the springboard for much of Pagelow's evaluations of others' studies. She examines other sociologists' research premises and pinpoints certain biases that taint their studies, comparing and contrasting her own approach. She also uses her propositions to structure her descriptive data. Although the formal study conducted by Pagelow failed to reach significant results on two of the four variables contained in her propositions, anecdotal material fleshes out the numerical findings and lends credence to her conviction that these variables deserve further study.

Unfortunately, the broad scope of the book detracts from Pagelow's fine independent

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work. In writing her comprehensive sociological volume on woman-battering, Pagelow is forced to spend valuable space on reviewing all the researchers who preceded her in the field. Much of the more useful criticism of her predecessors appears in her fine chapter on myths and again in her discussion of why women stay with their abusers, the book's most powerful portion. Thus, much of the material in the early chapters seems redundant and unnecessary, except as a vehicle for demonstrating Pagelow's exhaustive scholarship. Perhaps Pagelow could have handled her predecessors' scholarship through more liberal use of footnotes and thereby spared the non-academic reader the paintstaking sociological critique.

Pagelow's own study demonstrates careful logic. Her probing search for real explanations of why women stay in battering relationships marks her greatest contribution to the field. Readers will be convinced by Pagelow's portrait of the victims. Many of these women clearly need greater societal support and understanding before they will feel free to leave abusive relationships. Nor can they be expected to change overnight, once support is provided. "Americans want instant everything!" (p. 219), bemoans one English researcher. Pagelow's case examples also support her thesis that these women have remarkably strong characters. One woman who sought refuge in a shelter expresses her pride: "We all *had* to be strong, or we couldn't have survived what we went through" (p. 57).

Pagelow can easily be forgiven for tenacious loyalty to her own proposed research variables, for after all, what is a study without a thesis? Less acceptable, however, is her apparent aversion to psychological explanations for battering and being battered. Pagelow rejects the studies that propose psychological causation, professing to prefer sociological analysis. Yet her sensitive portraits of battered women reveal her great psychological understanding and undermine her professed repudiation of the alien discipline. Had she accepted and acknowledged her insights as attributable to a psychological analysis, the insights could have had more impact. Thus, Pagelow's allegiance to her discipline's methodology and viewpoint jeopardize her book's distribution and usefulness. Less attention to sociological protocol would also have made this study more readable. For those devoted to sociological review, however, Pagelow provides ample documentation and suggests fruitful avenues for further study.

DANIELLA LEVINE
Columbia University

Fruits of Merchant Capital: Slavery and Bourgeois Property in the Rise and Expansion of Capitalism *by Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese. New York, Oxford University Press, 1983. 469 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $10.95.*

This is a collection of essays by two historians joined together in marriage and Marxism. One of the authors is a specialist in eighteenth-century French history, the other in American Negro slavery. Their collaboration possesses great strength, based in part from a shared ideology, a vantage point of comparative history, and a sensitivity to the role of

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women as well as of workers. Beyond this, they have read thoughtfully and widely, not only in substantive works, but also in theoretical and methodological studies. The chapters range from reworked book reviews to studies based on the authors' archival investigations. A substantial portion of the material has previously been published.

In a preface, the authors assail capitalism, which they assert rose on free labor and reinforced servile labor systems throughout the world. Calling this anomaly a world tragedy, they ignore the failure of Marxian theory to be realized anywhere in the world and the servile labor systems and mass slaughters in the Marxian-inspired states of Russia and China. They combine with their stress on the role of merchant capitalism and its contradictory character an insistence that it played a conservative role in historical development.

The book is constructed in three parts called political economy, social history, and ideology. The first part is mainly a set of book review essays in praise of Jacob M. Price and in criticism of Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman and more particularly the latters' critics. The unifying theme is the centrality of the political economy of merchant capital in the historical process. Merchant capital, the authors believe, in general has stimulated economic growth while retarding industrial development. The slave systems created by merchant capitalism did not develop home markets, generate capital for industrial growth, foster technology and science, or even encourage entrepreneurship.

An assault on social history—mockingly referred to as "attention to the bedrooms, bathrooms, and kitchens" (p. x)—constitutes part two. The new social history, evidently, has missed the unavoidable political dimension of social life. In the instance of the French Revolution, with its social upheaval, the political revolution "consolidated and directed secular and economic change" (p. 177); and in the Old South the slaveholders were the ruling class, fixing attitudes toward slavery, women, work, and politics.

In the section on ideology, readers are informed that the most successful Marxist scholars "have abandoned stark materialist determinism" (p. 267). Following this lead, the authors look at bourgeois ideology, which they identify as "propertied individualism." They examine the course of ideology in three separate cases—the physiocrats, the role of women in the French domestic economy, and the place of jurisprudence in antebellum America. In the first case, they note the tenacity of propertied individualism in the heat of the French Revolution and in the building of a foundation of social relations by the revolutionaries and Napoleon. The third case is more complex, for while in the North it was relatively easy to interpret law on the basis of propertied individualism, in the South it was necessary to face the fact that some individuals were property. Here the law was based on slavery rather than on bourgeois relations.

The book is certain to annoy some readers, who will dislike its ideological bent and will wish that the authors had read more John Stuart Mill and less Karl Marx. To some it will seem that this is history with individual persons and their complex motivations left out and Marx's people and their more simplistic drives put in. There will be those who will object to the sectarian assurance with which the authors write, their lapses into sarcasm, and their denunciation of "bourgeois historians." Doubtless their motive is to be provocative and in this they have admirably succeeded.

JAMES A. RAWLEY
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

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Northeast Asian Security After Vietnam *edited by Martin E. Weinstein. Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1982. 182 pp. $17.50.*

Conference symposia all too often combine superficial essays by established scholars with excellent papers from struggling newcomers, lack cohesive focus, and are out of date by the time of publication. This volume suffers only from the third flaw. As suggested by the title, "after Vietnam" means the latter 1970s. Most of the papers were written in 1978, although Donald Zagoria's excellent overview of Soviet problems and prospects in East Asia fortunately spanned the tumultuous 1978–79 period. Nevertheless, one wonders why it took until 1982 to publish this thin volume, with few footnotes and no bibliography.

On the first two charges, however, Martin E. Weinstein need make no apologies to the reader. His colleagues comprise some of the most sophisticated Korean, Japanese, and American specialists, none of whom indulge in the polemical or the banal. Akira Iriye's historical synopsis of the decades following World War II is schematic but solid, underscoring the linkages between domestic and foreign politics within and among the key actors. Masataka Kosaka's reasoned assessment of the power balance as of 1977, although obviously dated, stills seems valid in terms both of subjective Japanese perceptions and of objective reality. Makoto Momoi, Japanese Self Defense Agency spokesman, offers his standard scary sequence of speculative scenarios as a counter. Fortunately, they seem no more justified now than when they were written.

Chae-Jin Lee unfortunately confines his study or Sino-Japanese relations to the initial negotiation of diplomatic recognition in 1972. He therefore fails to cover the post-Vietnam period, which saw the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship trigger a wave of euphoric expectations in Japan over future economic prospects, only to recede in somewhat bitter disillusionment with Chinese cancellation or suspension of contracts in 1978–80. On the other hand, while Bae-Ho Hahn's acknowledges that his essay was written before the assassination of President Park Chung-Hee, it stands the test of time exceptionally well.

A particular virtue of the volume is its balance of viewpoints combining the "what if" projections based solely on military capability (present and estimated), with more restrained analyses of the accompanying political intentions and obstacles. This does not mean a simple inclusion of two extremes, "worst case" versus "best case". Instead, the authors differ in methodology and mood, leaving it for the reader to distill out of each paper and the volume as a whole what real risks exist, as well as where and how likely they are.

Yet good as are these papers, they remain dated. There is no virtue in hard-backed books that are of use for limited duration, especially when the price comes to ten cents a page and the publication is years after the writing. Were this group of authors to repeat their ruminations every five years for distribution in an inexpensive paperback, the value would be immensely enhanced, both for classroom and non-academic audiences. Last but not least, the publisher might even be able to afford a map.

ALLEN S. WHITING
University of Arizona

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U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power and Ideas as Sources of Change *by John S. Odell. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982. 385 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $8.95.*

This is a most enjoyable and perceptive discussion of the major factors explaining the fundamental reversals of U.S. international monetary policy since 1965. This was a topical problem on the eve of the 1983 Williamsburg summit meeting, but also an enduring and crucial one, since the author's analysis gives little hope that the Williamsburg meeting will rescue the world monetary system from the shambles in which previous policies have left it and that are also one of the roots of the stagflation in which the West has been engulfed for more than a decade.

None of the three factors mentioned in the subtitle gives, by itself, a satisfactory explanation of this obvious policy failure. Actual decisions reflect their interaction, as differently interpreted by policymakers, in the light of their own preconceptions. The author minimizes the importance of domestic politics and agencies' interests, but stresses that recurrent and growing crises led to a considerable decline of the quasi-monopoly previously left to central bankers, switching it to national leaders who were more inclined either to respond to, or to seek better control over, market forces, private transactors, and foreign participants (see pp. 270–71).

Among the successive presidents, only John F. Kennedy took throughout, and Richard M. Nixon occasionally, an active interest in the esoteric topic of international monetary reform. But even they bowed in the end to their bureaucracy—in practice to the Department of the Treasury, whose jurisdictional and operational supremacy was always paramount in this field (p. 55).

Secretaries Douglas Dillon (and Undersecretary Robert Roosa), Henry H. Fowler, John Connally, and George Shultz are most often quoted as having played the major influence on the vital policy reversals of the period. Dillon and Roosa's primary concern was to restore the strength of the dollar as the inescapable center of the monetary system (pp. 97–98). Fowler, on the contrary, felt that the dollar could no longer assume this role alone, in view of the Triffin dilemma, and of the need to preserve full international cooperation in the defense of world peace and national security (pp. 132, 137, 140). Connally's outlook was very different from that of Dillon and Fowler: "My basic approach is that foreigners are out to screw us. Our job is to screw them first" (p. 263). As for Shultz, he brought to his job a preconception opposite to that of Dillon, Fowler and Connally concerning the role that the Treasury Department could play: "No one should aspire to manage the economy—the Secretary of the Treasury or whatever . . . I think the basic idea about our economy is that it manages itself" (p. 308).

The major explanation of the fundamental policy changes reviewed in the book is that they were primarily influenced by whoever the political process brought in as secretary of the treasury, for reasons that had nothing to do with international monetary policy. Each secretary interpreted prevalent market forces, power relationships, and academic ideas in four opposite ways bolstering, and rationalizing (in the manner of Sigmund Freud), his own intuitions and predilections (pp. 370–372). The result was leadership under Dillon, cooperation under Fowler, unilateralism under Connally, and laissez-faire under Shultz.

I wish that space permitted me to quote a score of remarkably incisive passages sum-

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marizing the slogans that, far more than reasoned arguments, always inspire major policy decisions (see, for instance, pp. 51, 62, 100–101, 127, 153, 168, 209, 186, etc.). A wealth of interviews documents the history recorded that are unimpeachable as far as I am able to judge. The only points I could add are an explanation of the abrupt dismissal of the "olive branch" tendered by Charles de Gaulle in 1965 and so widely misinterpreted by all commentators (p. 120); and the fact that Governor William M. Martin as well as Dillon and Roosa belatedly concurred with my 1959 dilemma and proposals for a world "clearing house" (unfortunately misnamed "central bank" ever since).

ROBERT TRIFFIN
Louvain-la-Neuve University

The Fall of the First British Empire: Origins of the War of American Independence *by Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 450 pp. $24.00.*

Historians study events; political scientists, to put the difference in oversimplified terms, are interested in cases. Historians seek to discover what happened and why; political scientists use the same material to ask what the world is like. Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson are political scientists, at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and at Colorado College, respectively, who have written a historical account of the origins of the American Revolution that is important for both disciplines.

The orthodox version of their subject holds that there was, in relations between Britain and its North American colonies, a commonly accepted status quo at the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763. The British introduced a series of measures that violated this status quo. The Americans balked, London persisted, and finally the colonies were forced into reluctant rebellion, with consequences that are known—or at least taught—to every American high school student.

Tucker and Hendrickson understand the events of 1763 to 1775 differently. There was, they argue, no status quo on which both sides agreed. There were, instead, two different and ultimately irreconcilable interpretations of the colonies' proper status. During the war, the Americans had attained a considerable degree of independence in fact, if not in form. With the war over, the British took a series of steps, most of them involving taxation, that were consistent with Britain's claim to sovereignty in North America but that the colonials vehemently resisted. Each British initiative, from the Stamp Act to the Coercive Acts, was doubly explosive because it raised the ultimate issue of sovereignty. The Americans claimed, and no doubt believed, that they were faithful to the proper terms of British rule, but their version of those terms was such as to deprive London of effective control of North America.

Successive British governments had to deal with the dilemma that the American position presented. The ministers in London knew that trying to enforce their rule was dangerous; yet they believed, wrongly as it turned out, that giving up the better part of their North Atlantic empire would be disastrous for Britain's security and prosperity

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(though Adam Smith, almost alone, foresaw events correctly at the time). So London dithered, backtracked, blustered, and finally went to war.

Tucker and Hendrickson have turned the conventional wisdom about the American Revolution on its head. It was the Americans at least as much as the British, in their view, who violated the imperial status quo. It was the British, even more than the Americans, who were the reluctant belligerents. The drama of the years leading up to the outbreak of war lies in London's efforts to resolve the British dilemma; to these efforts most of the book is devoted. The authors' account is meticulously documented, carefully argued, and, to this reviewer at least, entirely persuasive. They have written a book that comes along once in a generation—a genuinely revisionist account of a major historical episode.

They have not persuaded all reviewers. The book has been criticized as being partisan, as an indictment of the British for temporizing too long before finally moving to bring the Americans into line, and as a vehicle for a hidden agenda, propounding the wisdom of firmness in a way that echoes the contemporary debate about the foreign policy of the United States.

These charges miss the mark. The authors do not take Whitehall to task for pusillanimity in dealing with the colonies. Quite the contrary, they show that the doubts and hesitations of the various British governments were fully justified. The British faced a real dilemma given their definition of their interests; no easy course was open to them. In fact, Tucker and Hendrickson are critical not of the ministries, but of the members of the opposition, like Edmund Burke, who claimed that there was some middle path between giving up effective control of North America and fighting to keep it. This, they demonstrate, was at best wishful thinking.

Although it was not written to prove a point about anything except the American Revolution, the book is relevant to other episodes in the history of international politics. It is a contribution to the literature of imperialism. It joins studies of nineteenth-century overseas empires in Africa and in the New World in finding the causes of imperial change not in the metropolis but in the imperial possessions themselves.

It is in addition a case study of the use of force. It shows Britain contemplating war, aware of the risks and costs, but having to weigh against them the imagined costs of failing to secure the ends for which war was being considered, and all the while searching for a way to attain them without fighting. The use of force is, of course, a central issue, perhaps the central issue, in international politics. No recent book so clearly illustrates the problems that it raises. *The Fall of the First British Empire* can therefore serve as an excellent text for those who study the subject, and for those who teach it.

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
Columbia University

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Reporting U.S.-European Relations: Four Nations, Four Newspapers *by Michael Rice et al. Elmsford, N.Y., Pergamon Press, 1982. 120 pp. Cloth, $18.50; paper, $8.95.*

Books often deliver less than they promise, but here is one that delivers more. The book compares the coverage of *The Times* of London, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Le Monde*, and the *New York Times* of the United States's relation with Europe. It also provides readers with concise profiles of these four great newspapers, discusses problems of foreign correspondents, and tells how journalists on both sides of the Atlantic view their roles.

The four newspapers examined have a total circulation of about 2 million, and there are probably nearly as many opinions about their strengths and weaknesses. My own opinion, as a fairly frequent reader of the three European papers and a daily reader of the *New York Times*, was quite at variance with many of those of the experts. I do not believe, as Jan Reifenberg does, for example, that the *New York Times*, "despite its professed independence and objectivity . . . reflects . . . official thinking in Washington so closely as to raise a fundamental question: To what degree must a newspaper maintain a healthy distance from government?" (p. 27). I do not agree with Henri Pierre that *The Times* of London's correspondents produce stories "which too often are colorless" (p. 63). I do agree with Jonathan Carr and Pierre Salinger, who studied the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Le Monde*, respectively, that their practice of mixing fact and opinion makes them very different from American and British papers, and with Salinger that *Le Monde* often neglects the facts in favor of the opinions.

Two of these themes, closeness to government and opinion in the news columns, are central in reporting U.S.-European relations. If the *New York Times* keeps Moscow reaction stories to the Polish strikes of August 1980 from appearing on page one because of what "might have been a conscious decision at the editorial level . . . to conform with the Carter administration's deliberate 'low profile' vis-à-vis the USSR," as Reifenberg suspects (p. 43), then it is logical for him to see that newspaper's neglect of West German news as another government decision. Reifenberg, longtime the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* correspondent in Washington, does not discuss his own newspaper's relationship to the Bonn government. That is the task of Jonathan Carr, Bonn correspondent of the *Financial Times* of London, who concludes that the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* has successfully remained independent and critical of Bonn for more than a decade.

To Henri Pierre, *The Times* of London manages to be at once fiercely independent and, in the case of U.S.-European relations as well as many other issues, "on the whole in line with the British government's positions" (p. 66). As the correspondent for *Le Monde* in London, Pierre could not find such a relationship inappropriate. In the words of Pierre Salinger, Paris correspondent and bureau chief for ABC News: "For many years, readers of *Le Monde* could read certain articles on foreign policy with the assurance that they had been instigated by the government. That is much less true today although the official thinking of the Quai D'Orsay is not absent from the columns of *Le Monde*" (p. 82). Salinger is equally forthright on the question of the reporter as commentator: "Journalists are encouraged to mix information and opinion. . . . The *Le Monde*

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correspondent very often draws a conclusion to his story, rather than letting the reader do it" (p. 84).

Reifenberg argues that American correspondents, too, slant the news for their readers, using selection rather than their opinions. He cited stories by *New York Times* Bonn correspondent John Vinocur headlined "Visit Tests Emotions of Jews Driven from Germany" and "Hitler's Alpine Hideaway Is a Tourist Town's Gold Mine." Reifenberg concludes: "It seemed to this reviewer that both stories reflected Vinocur's feelings toward Germany: a constant, nagging doubt as to whether today's Germans have really overcome a sordid past. . ." (p. 41).

If the theme of the book is the importance of newspapers in influencing relations between nations, these examples underline the importance of the individual journalists working for those papers. Such differences of perception and misunderstandings can never be wholly eliminated (particularly since, as the book stresses, they are so prevalent in government-to-government relations). But, as Michael Rice, the editor, suggests, a few modest steps might be taken to get a broader range of opinion before readers in all four nations under study. Newspapers should consider more frequent publication of the views of other nations' correspondents or politicians, to help readers develop "the cosmopolitan understanding that is increasingly an ideal of journalists themselves" (p. xxxii).

DONALD R. SHANOR
Columbia University

Harold Macmillan: A Biography *by Nigel Fisher. New York, St. Martin's Press. 1982. 404 pp. $19.95.*

The author acknowledges his disappointment in not being able to write a definitive biography, because Macmillan wished personal aspects of his life omitted. This, therefore, is a political biography, not in competition with Macmillan's six volumes of memoirs, but offering the viewpoint of a younger Conservative member of parliament whose observations of Macmillan go back thirty-five years.

Many footnotes refer to conversations with people who had special knowledge of various stages of Macmillan's career. Macmillan himself read the entire work in manuscript. But the rest of the sources are all secondary works, especially Macmillan's own publications, supplemented by *Lords' Hansard* and the press. Unhappily, Fisher has a cavalier way with footnotes. Sometimes the reference is simply to a volume without any page noted; sometimes it is simply to authors, without a title; and in at least one instance (ch. 8, n. 29) the pages cited are incorrect.

Fisher offers three main criticisms of Macmillan's post-1945 career, and two-thirds of the text is devoted to this period. First, he criticizes Macmillan's somersault over Suez. Fisher argues that as chancellor of the exchequer, Macmillan ought to have appreciated the vulnerability of sterling, a fact that indeed persuaded him to urge a quick withdrawal from an operation he had supported so short a time before.

Indeed, this uncertain touch in economic affairs connects the Suez episode to his sec-

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ond occasion for criticism, the July "massacre" of 1962, when Macmillan abruptly dismissed Selwyn Lloyd (then chancellor of the exchequer) along with several other ministers. Here, Fisher argues that Macmillan was wrong on the economic merits of Lloyd's policy and wrong in the manner in which the reshuffle was carried out.

Third, Fisher strongly condemns the timing of Macmillan's resignation in 1963. As he points out, a delay of a month would have saved the Conservatives a lot of unfavorable publicity, as all the jockeying for position went on right in the middle of the annual party conference. A month more or less could not profoundly affect the ability of his successor to settle in before the impending general election. Macmillan's haste in supporting Viscount Hailsham (Quintin Hogg) and, when that candidature proved impossible, his settling on Lord (later Sir) Alec Douglas-Home, seems clearly related to his determination to block R. A. Butler as his successor.

This work is not only not a definitive biography; it is not a contribution to scholarship in the ordinary sense. But it does offer a fresh perspective, different from those available in the memoirs of Butler and Anthony Eden. Without being uncritical, the author's affectionate respect for his subject shines through every page.

BARRY MCGILL
Oberlin College

The Wheat and the Chaff *by François Mitterrand. New York, Seaver Books, 1982. 284 pp. $16.95.*

In the context of the present political crisis in France, the publication of these two volumes of "jottings" by the Socialist president of France (originally published in French in 1975 and 1978) is particularly interesting. These are public jottings, meant to convey an overall impression of the man to an American audience. Like the architect, who is different from the bee because "he has built the cell in his head before building it in the hive," Mitterrand confesses that he has carefully thought through each entry, and has edited and arranged these "random notes" for publication. Nevertheless, he tells us, these are notes dealing with "something I feel strongly about or am involved with emotionally" (p. 3).

The portrait that he creates is that of a thoughtful man, who enjoys the company (and the recognition) of literary intellectuals rather than politicians, a man who befriends intellectuals and observes politicians. His politics are those of thought and reasoned policy, rather than bargaining and power (*la politique des politiciens*). In fact, there is very little in this book about Mitterrand's major triumphs or failures as a political leader of the opposition, or about his day-to-day involvement in French politics. There is no indication that he was the architect of the resuscitation of the French Socialist Party during these years, and of the victory of the Left in 1981.

Isolated from the policy process at home, Mitterrand sees himself as a participant in a larger process abroad. His political dialogue involved a surprising broad range of world leaders. During the 1970s, he conferred with Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, met frequently with other European socialists and visited the United States several times. He developed a

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strong interest in the Middle East, where he met with Israeli and Arab leaders. But his strongest emotions are expressed in his references to Latin America, particularly to Chile and the murder of Salvador Allende: "For the second anniversary of Chile's entrance into solitude . . . silence. . . . Silence for Allende and that simple action which consists in never giving up what one holds in trust from the people" (p. 174).

The international dialogue in this volume contrasts sharply with the distance from which Mitterrand observed the policymaking process in France: "Georges Pompidou and I . . . never had a private conversation, never even exchanged a word. . . . The two Frances simply did not know each other any longer" (p. 121). Mitterrand's reflections on French policy are communicated in open letters and articles, but are not part of a continuing dialogue between government and opposition. Nevertheless, some of his brief observations on French domestic politics provide some important insights into his behavior as president.

Mitterrand's socialist commitments developed during the middle years of his political career, but numerous bitter comments about the duplicity of the French bourgeoisie reaffirm the depth of that commitment. He argues that Charles de Gaulle's downfall in 1969 was the work of "these men in power," that "Valéry Giscard d'Estaing looked up and saw the Big Bosses with their thumbs pointing down, and finished off the colossus" (p. 14). Mitterrand's jottings also consistently reaffirm the gulf between Right and Left in France, as well as his view that a Socialist president must be different from the presidents of the Right. "For Valéry Giscard d'Estaing the presidency is a point of arrival," he wrote in 1974. "For me it is a point of departure. . . . If I am elected, I will change the course of things, and therefore the life of my contemporaries" (p. 128).

Finally, Mitterrand asserts his personal commitment to stay the course. "I am incapable of making a move until I have marshaled all of the resources of my mind," he wrote in 1975, but "I am incapable of stopping until I have exhausted all the resources of my will" (p. 140).

The portrait of Mitterrand that emerges from this book is that of a strong, confident, but often lonely leader. He chooses to portray himself as a man of vision, sensitivity and strength, rather than a man who is engaged in the day-to-day bargaining of politics. This is not entirely comforting in a France where policy seems to be on a collision-course with diminishing popular support. Mitterrand wrote of Giscard in 1976, that he would do well to meditate on the response by Charles-Maurice de Tallyrand to someone asking him: "How do you think this government will end?" "Accidently," he replied (p. 230).

MARTIN A. SCHAIN
New York University

Khrushchev *by Roy Medvedev. Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1983. 292 pp. $17.95.*

A book by Roy Medvedev is always worth reading. However, in contrast to his previous works, this biography of Nikita Khrushchev adds relatively little to existing knowledge

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and is disappointingly one-sided. The first 55 pages cover the years 1894 to 1953. The next 190 pages deal with 1953 to 1964. A final 10 pages deal with Khrushchev in retirement.

A few interesting new details appear in the first 55 pages, but these sections are marred by several annoying tendencies. First, Medvedev glorifies Khrushchev's skills in tackling almost every task, or type of task, he undertook. He credits Khrushchev for most successes, while frequently glossing over or downplaying Khrushchev's responsibility for failures or for repulsive acts. It would be too strong to call the book a whitewash, but it would be no exaggeration to note that the innocent reader would come away with little understanding of why other authors have called Khrushchev "the butcher of the Ukraine." Second, Medvedev makes considerable use of Khrushchev's memoirs, but fails to use those memoirs when the testimony of them contradicts Medvedev's own version of events. An example is Medvedev's interpretation of why Lazar M. Kaganovich became First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1947 (pp. 43–44). Third, the book has very few footnotes (only ninety-one in all) and, in contrast to Medvedev's earlier works, only a few are based on private testimony by participants. Sadly, Medvedev's sources may be drying up. The result is that many of the author's versions of historical events must be taken at face value.

Analogous problems exist in the main section of the book, on Khrushchev's years in power. With the exception of frequent critiques of Khrushchev's more irrational economic policies, Khrushchev's domestic and foreign policies come in for ringing praise. At times, this is, in my opinion, entirely appropriate. At other times, it lacks credibility and sounds forced. For example, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev are presented as equally guilty in precipitating the Cuban missile crisis (p. 192). A more glaring example is Medvedev's response to Mikhail A. Suslov's lengthy indictment of Khrushchev's leadership (ch. 21). Medvedev responds to many of Suslov's points by noting that the Presidium had, after all, approved or ratified Khrushchev's policies. This is a weak response, given that Medvedev had been arguing throughout the second half of the book that Khrushchev exercised "absolute power" after June 1957. If such was the case, what choice did the others have? (I suspect that Medvedev exaggerates the extent of Khrushchev's power.) In addition, Medvedev had excused much of Khrushchev's ruthlessness in the 1930s and 1940s by arguing that Stalin would brook no opposition. The criteria used by the author for evaluting leadership behavior appear to have shifted.

My critique should not obscure the fact that this book contains many balanced accounts; nor should it be forgetten that Khrushchev was, in certain respects, a great man with much to his credit. I cannot judge Medvedev's motives, but I would guess that he is seeking in this book to rescue Khrushchev's reputation from the blackening to which Soviet authorities have subjected it. That is a noble task. But in the process, I suspect, Roy Medvedev has over-corrected.

GEORGE W. BRESLAUER
University of California at Berkeley

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The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979 *by Saadia Touval. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982. 377 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $11.50.*

Touval's study is a well-documented, comprehensive look at attempts by the world community to provide mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1948 to 1979. Touval is interested in critically evaluating the role of the mediators, particularly to challenge the "commonly held assumption that mediators, to be effective, must be impartial" (p. 3).

In his first chapter, Touval looks at the theoretical literature on mediation. In the successive chapters, he reviews the major historical events surrounding each of nine mediation initiatives. He analyzes the role the mediator played, focusing on the circumstances of the intervention (including the issue in conflict, the environment in which the mediation took place, and the timing of the mediation effort), the acceptability of the mediator (including how impartial he was perceived to be) and the personality traits and skills of individual mediators. Touval attempts to explain why mediators who are perceived as biased can still perform their role effectively.

Touval presents examples of mediators who were perceived to be partial but who were still successful, as well as examples that are not as supportive of his claim. Talks between Egypt and Israel sponsored by the U.S. from 1970 to 1972 provide a good example of where the image of the U.S. as being biased helped it to be accepted as a mediator, because both Egypt and Israel were seeking to strengthen their alliance with the U.S. at their adversary's expense. Touval writes that "it was not the impartiality which they sought from the intermediary but a de facto coalition with the U.S. against a third party" (pp. 195–96). This role played by the U.S. did successfully lead Egypt and Israel into an interim agreement, although this strategy was not successful in the long run. The U.S. played the same role after the Yom Kippur War in 1973 through the efforts of Henry Kissinger. Here again, both Egypt and Israel were willing to negotiate in return for U.S. support (pp. 277–78).

Touval also provides some examples, however, where the perceived partiality of the mediators did not help their efforts and indeed seemed to be a liability. U.N. Special Envoy Folke Bernadotte, sent to mediate between the Arab nations and Israel in 1948, offered inducements to the Arabs during the first month of his mission. He also maintained close connections with the British. According to Touval, both of these actions "damned him in the eyes of the Israelis" (p. 52), and were important elements in his mission's failure. The U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine, which conducted negotiations from 1949–51, took a number of actions that alienated Israel, including "covening general conferences with the Arab states instead of trying to tackle problems on a bilateral basis between Israel and each of its neighbors" (p. 93). This was one of the "tactical errors" that Touval says contributed to the commission's failure.

In summary, although Touval does give examples that show that it is not necessary for mediators to be impartial, examples are also presented where greater neutrality may have been beneficial to the mediation efforts. Thus, Touval's challenge to the assumption that mediators should be impartial to be effective is not completely persuasive, and his work is

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theoretically unsatisfying. Nevertheless, he has presented an excellent analytical survey of mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

BONNIE L. KOENIG
Yale University

The House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World *by David Holden and Richard Johns. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982. 569 pp. $19.95.*

Richard Johns, in carrying forward an unfinished work by the late David Holden, has produced the most important book on Saudi Arabia to appear in many years. Nearly a decade in the making, and reflecting the input of three of Great Britain's best Arabists (including notable contributions from James Buchan), *The House of Saud* is unlikely to be surpassed for some time. One would be hard pressed to cite three other writers anywhere with as much experience on analyzing Arabian political and economic developments.

The book's title could be misleading to some, as suggesting a narrower focus than the topics addressed. The work covers the broad historical sweep from the origins of the Al Saud dynasty to the present day in a manner that is empathetic without distorting the truth. Interspersed throughout that portion of the narrative that traces the evolution of the ruling household are sharply etched descriptions of numerous other forces, events, and personalities. As the authors point out with a wealth of information and insight, all three have helped to shape the distinctive character of Saudi Arabia's people and culture.

In a manner reminiscent of one of Holden's earlier classics, *Farewell to Arabia*, all five of Saudi Arabia's kings—and, by this reviewer's count, a hundred important commoners as well—come alive in this volume as in few other writings. Holden's talent for humanizing his subjects was his hallmark, and the effect has not been lost in Richard John's completion of the manuscript. And yet, while *The House of Saud* should be required reading for anyone in search of penetrating portraits of the kingdom's *dramatis personae* alone, the work is of equal value for its analysis of the country's economic and political history.

Readers of the *Financial Times*, with which Johns and Buchan have been associated, need no reminders that it is in economic and political history that Johns excels. To be sure, nothing yet produced about Saudi Arabia's economic affairs by American writers, or for that matter by any other Western commentators, is comparable to the informal yet highly detailed accounts that Johns and his *Financial Times* colleagues have been producing on the subject for the past decade and more. This dimension of the book gives *The House of Saud* added standing as a reference work. As such, it will prove to be of value to bankers, businessmen, and investment counsellors, as well as to academics and informed general readers interested in the country's development.

No book of twenty-six chapters that covers as much as this one does, however, is without blemish. For example, some specialists will fault *The House of Saud* for the relatively short shrift it gives the kingdom's "Second Family," the Al Shaykh. The lapse is more noticeable owing to the fact that for as long as the Al Saud have dominated the

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rulership, the Al Shaykh have been the preeminent force within the country's religious, judicial, and educational establishments. Without their crucial collaborative role, it would be difficult to imagine the House of Saud attaining its current position of power inside the kingdom, let alone the degree of prestige and influence it has acquired in the Arab and Islamic worlds.

An additional weakness has to do with excessive criticism of several major figures examined. One questions the necessity, five times before the reader is a third of the way into the text, of calling attention to the fact that a particular key official was "frequently drunk" (p. 151); "fired by alcohol" (p. 155); under "the influences and ravages of alcohol" (p. 161); manifesting a curtailed working day "because of the temptations of the bottle" (p. 162), and unable to avoid being tempted by "the forbidden juices" (p. 170). There would seem to have been other ways of getting the point across that the individual in question was, like the rest of us, a human being who was somewhat less than perfect.

These criticisms aside, *The House of Saud* has no rivals as an informed and perceptive account of modern day Saudi Arabia. In carrying on what Holden began, Johns's prodigious effort is a reminder that those who seek to interpret Arabia, in the end, must stand on one another's shoulders. The task of increasing knowledge and understanding about the kingdom is, indeed, facilitated through the process of individuals engaging in collaborative efforts. *The House of Saud*, in short, contributes more than any other single work currently available in the literature on a country that, in less than a decade, has been catapulted into the forefront of the pertroleum and financial worlds, as well as the 42-nation Islamic Conference Organization, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), the League of Arab States, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. No small feat for a country, and for Johns and his colleagues to have chronicled and accounted for it, no small achievement.

JOHN DUKE ANTHONY
American Educational Trust

Iran Since the Revolution *by Sepehr Zabih. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 247 pp. $21.50.*

Sepehr Zabih has undertaken the difficult task of narrating and analyzing the policies and course of the Islamic Republic of Iran from the triumph of the revolution in February 1979 to the autumn of 1981. For those wishing to understand this complex and turbulent period, Zabih's book is extremely useful, suitably cautious, and generally on firm ground.

The writing of contemporary history carries a whole set of particular dangers and problems, but it is far more possible and necessary to do this well than most academics understand. Obviously, this task involves working with incomplete documentation and a smaller degree of hindsight. Yet a good grasp of the forces behind events alongside an ability to separate reality from gossip or rumor can see an author through successfully.

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Often, books written with a sense of immediacy and a bit of courage are far superior to the plodding and narrow monographs that follow.

While writing in the wake of developments sometimes makes Zabih's narrative seem like too much of a list, it is nonetheless useful to have the events collected. His ample quotations from documents give a clear picture of debates within Iran. Above all, however, this is political history; there is relatively little material on social, cultural, and economic changes.

Zabih begins with a brief chapter on why and how the Ayatollah Khomeini succeeded. It is a rather disappointing discussion because, like many Iranian accounts, it overstates the role of the United States in this process and does not impute enough weight to internal factors. Other works have provided a more accurate picture of U.S. policy and the dynamics behind the upheaval.

The book is far better at analyzing the reasons behind Khomeini's triumph over liberal and leftist forces, the establishment of new institutions, the hostage crisis (briefly retold but with a good presentation of its role in Iranian politics), and the fall of President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr. Zabih gives a clear sense of the Islamic regime's strength and its enemies' inability to combat Khomeini's charisma or organization, while also showing the ferocious repression used to keep the government in power.

A final section reviews Islamic Iran's international posture, showing the importance of its nonalignment philosophy and hostility to the Arab states in the Gulf. While he affirms that Iran wishes to export its revolution, Zabih rightly stresses that this is to be done more by example than by attack: "Whether the Islamic Republic could serve as a model for emulation by other Moslem countries depended on its political viability" (p. 193).

Considering the regime's future, Zabih sees a government in serious trouble, attacked by urban guerrillas, Iraq, some regional unrest, and economic problems. But contrary to many Western analysts, he does not underestimate Khomeini's personal popularity and the institutionalization of clerical rule, as well as the government's shrewd use of the media, the treasury, and its Revolutionary Guard, all of which are major assets for survival. Zabih also provides a good basis for understanding the factors and forces that will dictate the country's leadership in the post-Khomeini era. While he can be disputed on a host of points, Zabih lays out the facts and issues in a clear and cogent manner.

BARRY RUBIN
Georgetown University

Democracy in Latin America: Promise and Problems *by Robert Wesson. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1982. Cloth, $23.95; paper, $10.95.*

Robert Wesson's book takes on the ambitious task of describing, in a large number of Latin American countries, how authoritarian regimes replaced relatively short-lived populist ones, and of explaining why liberal democratic institutions have persisted in only one or two countries in the region. Wesson's normative position starts from the presumption that Western (actually U.S. style) democratic institutions are better than any other

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alternative and that, deep down, many Latin Americans would prefer political systems that allowed them to have these institutions. In this respect, Wesson's book is in the currently much maligned tradition of North American comparative political research on domestic regimes.

The main problem with Wesson's book is that he tries to deal with too many countries over a very long period (the colonial era to the present) and consequently has not enough time to develop his analysis of any one country in depth. His argument about the origins of authoritarianism in the excesses of populism strikes one as correct, but not terribly original.

He wavers somewhat on the role of the Iberian tradition in making Latin America ripe for authoritarianism. For example, he argues that "in Latin America, democracy was more the result of the conviction that modernization required it. . . . It was always to a large extent an import grafted onto a society of basically authoritarian temper and social structure" (p. 15). Later, he cites the Organization of American States vote of July 1979 as evidence of a continued desire for democracy, or at least a desire to appear to favor a return to democratic practices, in Latin America (p. 85). In other words, Wesson tries to defend himself against the claim that a pro-democratic normative focus for a study of Latin America is not ethnocentric by arguing that the Latin Americans themselves might choose more democratic institutions if they thought they would work. This seems somewhat inconsistent.

There are some positive points, though. Wesson starts the book with a fine chapter on the effects of colonialism on Latin American cultures and political systems, summarizing a great deal of historical material in a small number of pages. It would be very interesting to use the book along with *Dependency and Development in Latin America* by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto in advanced undergraduate or graduate courses on Latin American history or politics, because of the contrast in approaches of the two books despite a similar range of countries and time periods. And, not least in importance, Wesson's approach and argument is much better thought out and defended than that of other authors (such as Jeane Kirkpatrick) on the dynamics of democratic decay and the rise of authoritarianism. Still, I was disappointed at times by the book's shallowness. While better than Kirkpatrick's, it is not as exciting as Guillermo O'Donnell's monograph on the rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism in Latin America or the various books by Fernando Cardoso on the development of dependent political systems in Latin America, because it does not work at the same level of abstraction. Nor does it present a consistent and controversial perspective on its subject.

Nevertheless, it is a useful book that represents the latest attempt to reinterpret the scholarship of the 1970s in terms of North American theoretical concerns of the 1960s. The continuing political relevance of the widespread concern in North America and Western Europe for the spread of democratic forms of government guarantees that books like this will have to be written. The task of North American scholars is to undertake such efforts without succumbing to ethnocentric biases. In this respect, Wesson is only partially successful.

JEFFREY A. HART
Indiana University

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Volume 98
1983

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and public affairs.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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